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 This study analyzes the once great medieval Tuscan 
capital of Lucca’s struggle for survival at the beginning of 
the fifteenth century. This was the age of the rise of 
regional states in Italy, and the expansionistic aims of 
Milan, Florence and others were a constant challenge to  
city-states such as Lucca which desired a political and 
cultural status quo. Yet, it was a challenge that was 
successfully met; unlike Pisa, Siena, Perugia, and various 
other major Tuscan cities, Lucca did not succumb to Milanese 
or Florentine aggression in the early Quattrocento. Why it 
did not is a major topic of discussion here.  
 One of the means in which the Lucchese faced the new 
political and military realities of the time was the 
establishment of a monarchial system of government in the 
signoria of Paolo Guinigi (r. 1400-1430). The Guinigi 
Signoria was not characterized by the use of intimidation 
and violence, but rather by clientage, kinship and 
neighborhood bonds, marriage alliances, and the general 
consent of the people. Paolo garnered the consent of the 
people at first because his wealth allowed him to protect 
Lucca and its contado to a greater extent than would have 
been possible otherwise, and because of his family’s long 
ties with the powerful Visconti of Milan; he held it later 
because he provided the city-state with capable leadership. 
 This study extends the evidence of recent scholars that 
every Italian Renaissance city was unique based on its 
particular geography, alliances, civic wealth, and a number 
of other factors. Lucca in the period of Paolo Guinigi, a 
monarchy in the setting of one of the traditionally most 
republican cities of Italy, provides a most interesting 
example. “Civic humanism,” for example, has a decidedly 
different slant in Lucca than elsewhere, and is best 
exemplified in the figure of Giovanni Sercambi. This study 
also provides new perspectives from which to view Florence 
and Milan during the period of “crisis” at the beginning of 
the fifteenth century, and thus contributes to the mass of 
scholarship concerning the Baron thesis.  
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            CHAPTER 1 
 
 
         INTRODUCTION 
 
 On 6 April 1369, a day that was to become a celebrated 
holiday in Lucca, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV 
liberated the city from more than forty years of foreign 
subjugation. Ever since the death of the native ruler 
Castruccio Castracani in 1328 Lucca had been subject to 
outside rule, first to a series of short-lived, absentee 
Lombard lords, then after 1342 to its neighbor and hated 
rival Pisa. Release from the “Babylonian servitude,” as the 
Lucchese perceived it, was cause for widespread celebration 
throughout the city.  
  Giovanni Sercambi (1345-1424), Lucchese chronicler who 
witnessed the events of April 1369, wrote that the citizens 
stormed the gates of the fortress of the Augusta, which had 
become the symbol of Pisan tyranny in Lucca, and had managed 
to dismantle them before the end of the day: “There remained 
neither man nor woman, noble nor peasant, who had not 
ascended to the top, some with hammers, some with pick-axes, 
some with other iron tools, and some with only their hands 
to destroy the parts of this wall.” Sercambi, who later 
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last strongholds in Lucca, leaves the impression not so much 
of hostility in the crowd, but rather of great cheer: “There 
was such an atmosphere that many cried tears of joy, and 
many seemed to have gone mad and outside of themselves. 
Truly, the happiness was such that the language of man is 
incapable of describing it.”1  
   Nor was this an event noticed only in Lucca. The 
noted humanist Coluccio Salutati, though early in his own 
political career, wrote to his friend Niccolosio Bartolomei 
in Lucca that the whole world is happy about the liberation 
of Lucca: “For what could be more pleasing, what better, 
what more admirable, what more full of joy than to speak of 
the freedom of the fatherland?”2 Salutati in fact would come 
                                                          
1Giovanni Sercambi, Le Croniche Lucchesi, ed. Salvatore 
Bongi, 3 vols., in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (Lucca: 
Giusti, 1892), 1: 188, “andarono alla dicta porta et quine 
le porti gictaron per terra, & il muro smurando, in tal modo 
che, inanti che fusse ora di vespro, non rimase homo nè 
femina, grande nè picciolo, che non montasse in su le dicte 
mura, chi con maresecuri, chi con sicuri, chi con altri 
ferrimenti, chi colle mani, a disfare i merli di tale 
muro...E con tanto inpito d’ allegrezza, che molti d’ 
allegrezza lagrimavano & molti parevano macti e fuor di 
loro. E di vero l’ alegrezza fu tale che lingua d’ omo dire 
nol potre.” 
  
2Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, ed. Francesco Novati, 4 
vols. (Rome: Forzani, 1891-1911), 1: 88-89, “quid enim 
gratius, quid maius, quid admirabilius, quid gratulatione 
plenius quam dicere de patrie liberatione?” Salutati would 
build friendships with a number of Lucchese citizens during 
the early 1370s when he was Chancellor of Lucca, which in 
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to help the Lucchese get the new government running as he 
was named Chancellor of Lucca in 1370-1371, one of his first 
important political offices before beginning his long career 
in Florence.   
 The Lucchese, having experienced the loss of their 
independence, never appreciated it more than in 1369 and 
afterwards. Civic leaders after 1369 would be constantly 
vigilant above all else about doing everything possible to 
preserve self-rule, including abandoning some of their 
cherished republican institutions. Foreign as well as 
domestic policy was to be focused on achieving this end.  
The experience of foreign subjugation throughout the middle 
decades of the fourteenth century did much to shape the 
future history of Renaissance Lucca. 
 Yet, only thirty years later, at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century, the future of the Republic of Lucca again 
looked uncertain as another period of crisis had arisen.  
Lucca was caught in the middle (literally) of the ongoing, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this edition of his letters. For Salutati’s stay in Lucca, 
see Giorgio Tori, “Coluccio Salutati, Chancellor of the 
Republic of Lucca and the Problem of the Minute di 
Riformagioni Pubbliche (1370-1371),” in The Other Tuscany: 
Essays in the History of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena during the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. Thomas 
Blomquist and Maureen F. Mazzaoui (Kalamazoo, Michigan: 
Western Michigan University, 1994), 111-122; Ronald Witt, 
“Coluccio Salutati, Chancellor and Citizen of Lucca (1370-
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epic struggle between the superpowers Florence and Milan; 
the lands of the former bordered Lucchese territory to the 
east, while the lands of the latter touched those of Lucca 
to the northwest. This meant, among other things, an almost 
constant intrusion of foreign troops prone to robbery and 
land devastation through the outer parts of the city-state.  
 In addition, Lucca was struck by another deadly bout of 
the plague in the year 1400, which did much to shut down the 
normal working life of the city.3 When the plague worsened 
in the hot summer months of that year, the population 
suffered so much from death and the flight of citizens from 
the contagion that it was openly wondered if anyone would 
remain to defend the city. Important offices in the 
government fell vacant, farmlands went unworked because of a 
lack of labor, and populations of entire villages in the 
countryside (“contado”) of Lucca were lost.4 
 Moreover, the Guinigi family, which had emerged as the 
leading family of Lucca after 1369, met with much ill 
                                                          
3After the Black Death of 1348, Lucca was hit by the bubonic 
plague in 1362, 1373, 1383, 1390, 1400, 1410, 1418, 1423, 
and 1430. See Franca Leverotti, Popolazione, famiglie, 
insediamento: Le Sei Miglia Lucchesi nel XIV e XV secolo 
(Pisa: Pacini, 1992), 80. 
 
4For example, on 2 July 1400 almost one-half of the seats of 
the General Council (65 out of 135) had to be replaced; 
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fortune at the turn of the century. Under Francesco, the 
unofficial “pater patriae” of Lucca, many gains had been 
made by the Guinigi after 1369 as they developed into the 
most financially and politically prominent family of the 
city.5 Lazzaro, his oldest son, took over leadership of the 
family and became the unofficial leading citizen of the city 
upon his father’s death in 1384, and though somewhat less 
respected (and more ruthless) than his father, was 
nevertheless a capable ruler. But in February 1400, Lazzaro 
was slain by a jealous brother, Antonio, and another rival. 
Antonio was beheaded the next day for his crime. Bartolomeo, 
the third son of Francesco, died as result of the plague in 
May; the fourth son, Paolo, the major subject of this study, 
                                                          
5Several Lucchese chroniclers refer to Francesco as the 
“father of the fatherland;” the first mention of him in 
Sercambi’s Le Croniche concerned his refusal to submit to 
the Pisan governor of Lucca’s demand for a “loan,” as he 
knew it would not be repaid to him. He appears to have been 
well respected even outside Lucca, as he had a large role in 
bringing about Lucchese independence in 1369 through his 
negotiations with Charles and through his wealth. Francesco 
and the “pater patriae” of Florence, Cosimo d’ Medici, had 
many similarities in the type of rule they established in 
their respective cities; for example, both held near 
undivided power within their own families, maintained loyal 
bodies of friends within the city as supporters of their 
rule, and enjoyed the general support of the popolo. Though 
both claimed that their power had been attained by purely 
constitutional means, they also made use of special 
commissions (balìe) to further consolidate their regimes 
(thus holding on to outward forms of “republicanism”), 
which, though not being innovatory measures in themselves, 
were quite unusual in that they were for unprecedented 
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was ill and had moved into the countryside while the 
pestilence raged. Paolo (1372-1432) at the time was twenty-
eight years old and did not have extensive political 
experience having only recently entered public life. The 
future of the Guinigi and Lucca did not look promising in 
this summer of 1400. 
 In addition, other prominent family members from other 
branches were deemed unreliable insofar as succeeding to 
leadership of the family after Lazzaro’s murder; Dino, for 
example, a cousin of Francesco, was a candidate for a time 
to assume leadership of the family, but in the end was 
considered too old. Michele Guinigi, the brother of 
Francesco, though well-respected, had a terminal illness and 
would not live beyond the end of the year 1400. Because of 
the sudden dimunition of the Guinigi house, and the general 
state of confusion in Lucca due to plague and war, the 
threat of vengeful exiles returning grew throughout the 
year. Emergency steps, the Lucchese had come to believe, had 
to be taken in order to save the city from total collapse. 
 In a meeting of the General Council on 2 July 1400, the 
suggestion was made by Guinigi supporters that rule over the 
city ought to be entrusted to a special balìa of twelve 
citizens in order to solidify civic policy.6 It is clear 
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from the Council’s vote of 101-30 in support of this special 
commission that gave the Twelve “power to do everything that 
was necessary to save Lucca, and to do whatever pleased 
them, both inside the city and in the countryside,” that the 
majority of Lucchese citizens perceived the real state of 
danger they were in, and were willing to cede some of their 
customary freedoms.7 Though the balìa was given 
extraordinary powers, even having the right to replace 
members of the Anziani (the executive branch of the 
government in normal times) according to Sercambi, it could 
essentially only stave off trouble, not prevent it.8 For the 
enactment of balìe, or special commissions which were 
increasingly used by Italian cities in the early Renaissance 
as a means of dealing with emergency situations and 
centralizing rule, could merely synchronize local opinion 
and effort, not actually remove foreigners and exiles from 
their lands.9 Thus, by the end of the summer, several 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
7Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 8, “imperio di tucto ciò che 
fusse di bizogno a riparo di Luccha; e quello che a loro 
piacea, cosi dentro come di fuori.” 
 
8Ibid., “con piena giurisditione et balìa, sensa avere li 
antiani a esser in pratica nè a consiglio con loro....potea 
rimuovere l’ officio dello antianatico, e cassare officiali 
e soldati, e di nuovo elegere.” 
 
9On the general topic of the types of authority given to the 
balìe of Italian cities at this time, see Marvin B. Becker, 
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prominent families had departed Lucca for safer places to 
live. 
 Outsiders detected the vulnerability of Lucca as well.  
Lucchese exiles who had been harbored in Genoa, Bologna, 
Florence, and various Lombard cities were showing heightened 
interest in events in Lucca. The Florentines themselves, who 
had moved troops into position in the Valdinievole and 
Valdarno, held many discussions on how to sack the Guinigi 
house and destroy their supporters.10 In a letter written in 
July 1400 to Giovanni Testa, the Gonfaloniere of Lucca, 
Giovanni di Sala from Bologna warned: “I pray you govern 
Lucca well, as you do not know whom to trust....Today Lucca 
is in the greatest danger that it has ever been in to fall 
under the rule of others, and I know well about that which I 
write to you.”11 By the end of the summer of 1400, as the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Early Renaissance,” in Florentine Studies: Politics and 
Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 
119-20; Anthony Molho, “The Florentine Oligarchy and the 
Bali`e of the Late Trecento,” Speculum 43 (1968), 29-30. 
 
10Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 10, “E molto altamente se ne 
parlava, intanto che il comune di Firenza, con alquanti 
usciti di Luccha et etiandio con alquanti asentati, preseno 
pensiero e molti ragionamenti del modo di mandare per terra 
la dicta casa de’ Guinigi e loro amici.” 
 
11Series Anziani al Tempo della Libertà, no. 1984, Lettere 
originali, 1369-1400 (letter of 5 July 1400), 439, “Pregote 
che la sapi bene governare, perchè tu non sai di chi 
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plague began to slacken and the likelihood of foreign armies 
or exiles entering Lucchese lands appeared even greater, 
civic independence hung in the balance. 
 When Michele Guinigi, the brother of Francesco, died on 
11 October it was apparent to the governors of the city that 
it was necessary to take action immediately, or else the 
city would be lost. Michele’s death meant to many that all 
remnants of Guinigi power in Lucca were gone; first the 
deaths of Francesco’s three eldest sons, and then of his 
distinguished brother all within the space of a few months 
signified both inside the city and out that Lucca was 
without any source of leadership or protection. Paolo, the 
fourth and now suddenly oldest son of Francesco, had not 
established himself yet in public life having only recently 
come of age to hold political office; some Lucchese, 
moreover, thought he was not up to the task of being leader 
of the city.12 What happened next has become a widely 
misunderstood part of Lucchese history, yet it points out 
that the concern for preserving civic independence from 
foreign rule continued to be the guiding principle of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
voi non vegnate soto altrui, et io so quello che io te 
scrivo.” 
12One member of the di Poggio family, for example, stated in 
August 1400 that “pero che non si sosterrà che Paolo Guinigi 
maestri, e prima che si consentisse...voremmo prima morire,” 
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Lucchese rulers well into the fifteenth century -- even 
though at this time it meant sacrificing the institution of 
the republic. 
 On 14 October, three days after the death of Michele, 
Paolo Guinigi was thrust into a position of supreme power by 
a group of high-ranking members of the Lucchese government.  
He was named as the Captain and Defender of the People of 
Lucca and set up to rule alongside the Anziani, because it 
was felt by this group of patriotic conspirators that this 
situation offered the city the best chance for Lucca to 
remain free from foreign control. Paolo’s wealth, which 
could help as a means of protection for their territories, 
and the fact that the family had well-established ties with 
the powerful Visconti family were the two vital factors 
which led the republican heads of Lucca to put their hopes 
in him.13   
                                                          
13For the wealth of the Guinigi, and of Paolo in particular, 
see Salvatore Bongi, Di Paolo Guinigi e delle su Ricchezze 
(Lucca: Benedini Guidotti, 1871), 8-11, and Eugenio 
Lazzareschi, “Il tesoro di Paolo Guinigi,” Bollettino 
Storico Lucchese 3 (1931), 73-79; for the Guinigi ties with 
the Visconti, see Franca Ragone, “Le spose del Signore: 
Scelte Politiche e Ceremonie alla Corte di Paolo Guinigi,” 
in Ilaria del Carretto e il suo monumento: La donna 
nell’Arte, la cultura, e la società del ‘400, ed. S. 
Touissaint (Lucca: S. Marco, 1995), 121, where the author 
claims that when Paolo took over in 1400, the decision to 
tie the family’s fortune with that of the Visconti had 
already been made by Lazzaro, Paolo’s older brother, when he 
went to visit Giangaleazzo Visconti in Pavia in 1399. 
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 It is uncertain exactly who instigated this takeover of 
the government, exactly what Paolo’s role was, and to what 
level the coup was known about beforehand by some of the 
members of the balìa of 2 July and the Anziani, among other 
things -- but it is clear that this step was taken for the 
purpose of conserving self-rule.14 A month later, in 
November 1400, after a failed plot on the life of Paolo, a 
further step for internal security was taken, as the balìa 
and the Anziani for the November-December term accepted the 
further elevation of the recently-elected Captain and 
Defender of Lucca to the office of absolute Signore. The 
city fathers of Lucca cherished living as a self-governing 
commune to such an extent that they were willing to live 
under a Signoria in order to keep it. 
 By the year 1400, the Lucchese had come to be 
distrustful of their republican form of government. They 
believed that republican regimes had certain advantages, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the past, as shown by Giuliano Lucarelli, I Visconti di 
Milano e Lucca (Lucca: Maria Pacini Fazzi, 1984). 
 
14Sercambi is vague on these matters, stating only that he  
discussed many times the dangers that were to come with 
Paolo, and that Paolo, “come savio,” understood that action 
must be taken, Le Croniche, 3: 12; it is certain, however, 
that other citizens, especially members of the balìa of 2 
July and of the Anziani for the September-October term would 
have been supportive of the nomination.  It is also very 
probable that the elevation of Paolo had been discussed by 
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in fact, that in certain times and places was the best form 
of government. Lucchese governors had also come to see some 
of the disadvantages of republics, chiefly that the rapid 
rotation of offices did not allow much continuity (and thus 
efficiency) in the administration of civic rule. Another 
common criticism was that republican governments tended to 
lead to violent factionalism, as had occurred in Lucca in 
1392 when civil war erupted between the Guinigi and 
Forteguerra factions. 
 Considering the many emergencies confronting the 
Lucchese at the beginning of the fifteenth century, it is 
understandable that they would have believed that in their 
present circumstances a republic would not be suitable to 
their needs. Actually they had apparently begun to question 
the merits of republicanism soon after regaining their 
independence in 1369, as Lucca fell under the real power of 
several balìe from 1374-1400, which effectively usurped much 
of the power of the councils. The last thing that was needed 
in 1400 was for internal dissension to hamper their already 
difficult state of affairs. In October 1400, Lucca resorted 
to a monarchy under the assumption that the circumstances 
called for it as the best chance for a regime in Lucca to 
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 Thus the Lucchese Anziani and the balìa of twelve in a 
sense came to something of a mutual agreement with Paolo -- 
the power and prestige of being the most powerful citizen of 
Lucca in exchange for protection of their lands.  
Renaissance wars were characterized not so much by killing 
and bloodshed as by the plundering and looting of lands 
belonging to one’s enemy.15 This group made up mostly of 
merchants who comprised the Anziani and the balìa would have 
thus wanted Paolo to assume supreme power since his 
protection would have extended to the Lucchese port of 
Motrone, and thus helped secure their livelihood in trade.  
In the countryside of Lucca, the majority of middle-class 
farmers, if they had a political voice, also would have 
plausibly supported Paolo’s new position because he would 
have been able to provide greater defense of the region than 
there had been in the previous months, so that they could 
get back to a less disruptive life of work on their farms.   
 During the reign of Paolo Guinigi in Lucca the desire 
to remain free from foreign intervention continued to 
dominate governmental policy. This explains why the bulk of 
Lucchese money and effort went to the maintenance of 
mercenary armies, the building of bridges and walls, the 
                                                          
15See Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters: 
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repair of city bells and ditches, and the assignment of 
information-gathering agents to various places throughout 
Italy, rather than to the patronage of schools of artists 
and scholars to study classical languages, or to finance 
their own efforts at expansion. The Lucchese were not trying 
to “propagandize” their city -- they were trying to preserve 
it. 
 Yet, in 1400 Paolo Guinigi took over Lucca setting up a 
leadership that until very recently has been characterized 
by most observers as despotic. Foreign and even Lucchese 
chroniclers and historians have tended to depict his regime 
as heavy-handed and arbitrary.16 There are several reasons 
for this historiographical misconception. Perhaps the most 
important is that we tend to view the situation from a 
                                                          
16A typical assessment of Paolo may be seen in the 
sixteenth-century Lucchese chroniclers Giovanni di Vicenzo 
Saminiati and Lorenzo Trenta. Saminiati in his chronicle of 
Lucca sub-heads one book with the title “Qui hebbe principio 
la tirannia di Paolo Guinigi,” A.S.L. Biblioteca 
Manoscritti, n.15 (no page numbers); and Trenta, who 
asserted in his work that “nel tempo che dal Signore Paolo 
Guinigi, era detta città governata, e da lui stata levata di 
libertà per tiranneggiarla come fece in trent’anni che egli 
la possedette.” A.S.L., MS. 103, Memorie di uomini illustri 
lucchesi e cronaca della guerra dei fiorentini fatta à 
lucchesi nel sec. xv di Lorenzo Trenta, 33v. It did not take 
until the 16th century for this view of Paolo to emerge, 
however; in 1431, the year after he was removed from power, 
the Podestà of Lucca issued a declaration to the curia 
accusing him of holding the city tyrannically for twenty-
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modern ideological perspective. Classical (and thus, 
Renaissance) republicanism, as James Hankins has recently 
shown, was not opposed to monarchy, and did not exclude 
monarchial institutions. The use of the term “republican” as 
the opposite of monarchial goes back only to Montesquieu; in 
the classical republican tradition, “republican” means 
simply “commonwealth” and its opposite was tyranny or mob 
rule.17 Thus, the Lucchese could accept a government headed 
by a Signore since they believed this form of government 
could produce competent rule which was in the interests of 
the people, just as it could produce tyrants -- and just as 
popolo regimes could rule well or badly.18 
 Another reason the Guinigi, especially Paolo, have a 
maligned reputation is that the years 1400-1430 comprised 
one of the most anti-Lucchese periods in Florentine history 
(and vice versa), and since it is the chroniclers, 
legislators, and literary figures of “republican” Florence 
that have been most studied from this period of Italian and 
Renaissance history, we are familiar with only the most 
                                                          
17James Hankins, “Rhetoric, history, and ideology: the civic 
panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni,” in Renaissance Civic 
Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. James Hankins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 151. 
 
18James Hankins, “The ‘Baron Thesis’ after Forty Years and 
some Recent Studies of Leonardo Bruni,” Journal of the 
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negative comments concerning Lucca, especially in regard to 
their “tyrant” Signore Paolo Guinigi.19 For example, 
students of the Renaissance who have taken the Florentines 
at their literal word, have generally been sympathetic to 
their quest to conquer Lucca in the early fifteenth century 
since the Florentines claimed that in attempting to do so 
they were only trying to restore liberty to the citizens of 
Lucca. This liberty had been removed from the Lucchese, 
Florentine rhetoricians argued, when Paolo Guinigi was first 
set up as ruler of the city in 1400.   
 Thus the failed plan of the Florentine architect 
Filippo Brunelleschi to divert the waters of the Serchio 
River in order to inundate Lucca, only one of several 
attempts to subdue the Lucchese, has been seen by many as a 
                                                          
19For example, the Florentine chronicler Giovanni 
Cavalcanti, Istorie Fiorentine, ed. Guido di Pino (Milan: 
Aldo Martello, 1944), 160-62, states that Paolo was a “uomo 
rozzo e non esperto nel governo,” and he addresses him, “O 
Paulo, tu ti hai un tuo folle modo sempre governato! Non sai 
tu quanto dagli uomini savii si sgrida colui che compera da 
pochi quelle cose che sone di molti?...Ti sei mostrato lieto 
delle fiorentine sventure; Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli, 
Ricordi, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence: Monnier, 1956), 422-
25, abhors Paolo for not allowing the Florentines the right 
of the port of Motrone, and writes that he is the “grande 
nimico del nostro comune, e ben l’ dimostrato molte volte a 
certi disastri avvenuti al nostro;” even the more objective 
Sozomeni Pistoriensis, Chronicon Universale, ed. Guido 
Zaccagnini (Città del Castello: S. Lapi, 1907), 17, was not 
pleased (“Odia tamen suberant”) with Paolo’s alleged sending 
of his son Ladislas to Milan to secretly negotiate with 
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setback for the cause of liberty, rather than an outright 
mark of unprovoked expansionistic aggression.20 The 
rhetorical nature of the Florentine claim to be attempting 
to restore “liberty” to the citizens of Lucca comes into 
clearer light, however, when it is seen that when the 
supposed “tyrant” Paolo was finally removed from power and a 
republican regime re-established in 1430 -- that Florence 
nonetheless continued to pursue domination of Lucca and its 
contado.21 
 A third reason the signoria of Paolo Guinigi has been 
subject to misinterpretation has been due to the inclination 
                                                          
20There are several sources for this episode, and all concur 
that the outcome was a disaster for Florence. See the 
comments of Cavalcanti, Istorie Fiorentine, 176; 
Pistoriensis, Chronicon, 18; and Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Florentine Histories, trans. Laura F. Banfield and Harvey S. 
Mansfield, Jr.(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
169-70. 
 
21One of the recent historiographical debates concerning 
Lucca has been concerned with the existence of the threat of 
Florence during the fifteenth century. Michele Luzzati 
states that in this period there still existed in Lucca a 
“certain autonomy of action” with regard to Florentine 
expansion in “Politica di salvaguardia dell’autonomia 
lucchese nella seconda metà del secolo xv,” in Egemonia 
fiorentina ed autonomie locali nella Toscana nord-
occidentale del primo rinascimento: Vita, arte, cultura. 
Settimo convegno internazionale del Centro Italiano di Studi 
di storia e d’arte, Pistoia, September 18-25, 1975 (Pistoia: 
Centro di Studi, 1978), 580, but M.E. Bratchel in his Lucca 
1430-1494: The Reconstruction of an Italian City-Republic 
claims there was a “covert intervention of the Florentines 
in Lucchese affairs...throughout the fifteenth century, to 
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of chroniclers and historians to depict Italian cities in 
the early modern period as either one in which a republican 
government ruled or as one under the control of a tyrant.  
And since the republican councils and the Anziani of Lucca 
did not exist during the thirty years of Paolo’s reign, he 
has been generally assigned the label of tyrant. We now 
understand, however, the “despotisms” and the “republics” of 
the Renaissance period to have been much more similar than 
previously believed, though the Burckhardtian notion of the 
ruthless, self-serving, and immoral prince has had a large 
and long-lasting impact on the historical imagination. As 
Brian Pullan has observed, there are hardly any cases in 
which a city may be unequivocally placed into one of these 
two categories; in fact, the many similarities of the 
political establishments in the early Renaissance city-
states has led some scholars to point out that no matter 
what form of government a city claimed to adhere to, no 
matter what they called it, it can in reality be most 
precisely defined as oligarchical.22   
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
22Brian Pullan, A History of Early Renaissance Italy (New 
York: St. Mark’s, 1972), 265-68; also see P.J. Jones, 
“Communes and Despots: The City-State in Late Medieval 
Italy,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, ser. 
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 One of the striking themes to emerge from a 
comprehensive study of Lucca at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century is that of continuity, a theme which 
contrasts with the long-established historiographical 
tradition of the larger Italian city-states. The sharp 
break, for example, depicted between medieval and modern by 
Burckhardt which maintained there were significant changes 
in Italy around the year 1400, does not seem relevant to 
Lucca. In Lucca, emphasis above all was placed on making 
sure certain lessons and conditions of the past were not 
forgotten. Foreign policy after 1400 continued to be based 
on the careful acquistion of military alliances, especially 
with the Visconti of Milan. At home Paolo served as the head 
of an oligarchical merchant class, a situation that is 
hardly different from Lucca under Francesco Guinigi in the 
republican years of the 1370s and 1380s when real power fell 
to a special group of Guinigi supporters, the “conservatores 
libertatis.” Nor does Paolo’s regime appear dissimilar to 
the republican government that replaced it in 1430, in the 
sense that real power on this latter date soon fell to 
another balìa specially enacted to deal with the emergency 
situation after Paolo’s removal from power.   
 The continuity evident in Lucchese society from the 
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separates Lucca from the larger cities, many of whom were 
seeking to carve out regional states for themselves in this 
period. The thesis of Gene Brucker’s seminal work on 
Florence in these years, for instance, which considers the 
period from the Ciompi revolt of 1378 to the rise of the 
Medici in the 1430s, is that there was a change from a 
“corporate” order to an elitist order, but this shift was 
one more of “style and mentality” than a radical alteration 
of Florentine institutions.23 Lucca, on the other hand, 
provides an interesting variation from Florence in that the 
changes in Lucca upon the arrival of Paolo Guinigi, who late 
in 1400 was led to dissolve the representative councils 
because of the secret plot to remove him, in the end proved 
to be changes only in the institutions of the city, rather 
than in style and mentality. 
 Paolo Guinigi certainly does not fit the Burckhardtian 
definition of the Renaissance tyrant who ruled arbitrarily 
in order to achieve selfish ends. He ruled in the only way 
possible that a Lucchese ruler at this place and time in the 
city’s history could have ruled in order to survive: he 
adopted a policy of strong defense at home, isolationism in 
foreign affairs if possible, and an aggressive search for 
                                                          
23Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance 
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strong alliances if not. He thus had an activist domestic 
policy and an isolationist foreign policy, but both were 
designed for the ultimate objective of preserving the self-
rule of Lucca. 
 Nor did Paolo often take recourse to violence, as in 
the Burckhardtian model of the Renaissance prince; he was, 
in fact, quite the opposite. On many occasions Paolo 
pardoned criminals, even those who had threatened his own 
life or the security of the state, such as the Bishop of 
Lucca in November 1400 or Jacopo Viviani in 1407, both of 
whom almost certainly would have been executed for like 
crimes elsewhere. Paolo was not the sword-bearing 
executioner. He was not the swashbuckling, aggressive man of 
war that Castruccio Castracani had been as lord of Lucca in 
the early fourteenth century. The use of arbitrary violence 
to impose one’s will was something by which no ruler of 
Lucca at this place and time in its history could have 
gotten away with, however. A strong anti-authoritarian 
mindset had long prevailed in Lucca by the time of Paolo 
Guinigi.24  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
24See John M. Najemy’s essay “The Dialogue of Power in 
Florentine Politics,” in City-States in Classical Antiquity 
and Medieval Italy, ed. Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, and 
Julia Emlen (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 
269-88, which is also relevant to Lucca. Najemy argues that 
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 Paolo was a traditional man, a family man, and a 
sincere Christian. He kept an eye on the conditions of the 
populace and the lands on which they lived. He undertook an 
energetic reform of the monasteries of Lucca because of a 
real concern for what he saw as immoral activities happening 
there. He travelled throughout Lucchese territories in order 
to see firsthand the devastated lands and disrupted living 
conditions of his subjects. This is not to say that from 
time to time he did not “exploit” his position for personal 
or civic gain (at least what the modern age would call 
“exploitative”), but he generally did so only for the 
purpose of protecting Lucca. He also does not fit the 
Burckhardtian type of leader who perceived statecraft as a 
work of art; rather Paolo was forced into a type of rule 
that was defensive and reactionary. He was not able to 
“plan” his reign so much as he was forced to respond to 
outside events in order to save it from collapsing. 
 The single-most important factor in Paolo’s success in 
sustaining his position for thirty years was the general 
support of the Lucchese people. Even the Florentine 
chronicler Minerbetti, though critical elsewhere in his 
remarks about Paolo, acknowledged this:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
their influence on government was such that even when they 
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  “In the month of October 1400 Paolo, son of   
  Francesco of the Guinigi family of Lucca, having  
  sent for troops from the countryside in the   
  Garfagnana, and having troops sent from Pisa from 
  the Duke of Milan, arranged with certain friends  
  of his party in the city that he be made Captain  
  of the People of Lucca. He [Paolo] said that he  
  did this because many of the Guinigi had   
  succumbed to the pestilence, and that more than  
  half the citizens had died from it; and thus for 
  the salvation of the state, its people, and the  
  Guinigi family he desired to be elected Captain  
  and Defender of the People of Lucca; and thus it  
  was done in accordance with the agreement of all  
  the citizens.”25  
 
Though his authority was enhanced somewhat by such 
ceremonial tokens as the imperial vicariate given him by the 
Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund in 1413, or the papal rosa 
dell’ oro awarded him by Pope Gregory VIII in 1408, these 
were rewards given Paolo since he was already sovereign in 
the city, and in order for these traditional authorities 
                                                                                                                                                                             
elite class took on many of the ideas of the popolo, and 
thus they ruled “in the image and language of the popolo.”   
25Cronica Volgare di Anonimo Fiorentino dall’ anno 1385 al 
1409 già attribuita a Piero di Giovanni Minerbetti, ed. 
Elina Bellondi, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, n.s., Vol. 
XXVII, pt.ii (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, n.d.), 251, “Del 
mese d’ottobre 1400 Paolo di Francesco de’ Guinigi da Lucca, 
avendo fatto venire di Carfagnana [sic] molti fanti nella 
città e ancora v’avea della gente del Duca di Milano 
venutavi da Pisa, e per questo sentendosi molto forte, 
ordinò con certi suoi amici cittadini e di sua parte, 
d’esser fatto capitano del popolo di Lucca; e disse che 
questo volea che si facesse però che molti de’ Guinigi avea 
ispenti la moria, e ancora più che mezzi gli altri cittadini 
avea morti la mortalità; e per buono istato della città e 
del popolo e de’ Guinigi volea che lui eleggessono capitano 
e difensore del popolo di Lucca; e cosi fu fatto di 
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themselves to enhance their own standing -- not so that 
Paolo might become sovereign. De facto authority, as has 
been amply illustrated, was given to rulers of Renaissance 
cities in Italy from below, while only titular, or de iure 
sovereignty came from above, from the emperor or from the 
pope.26   
 Indeed, Paolo was able to garner the favor of the 
majority of the Lucchese populace in this relationship of 
mutual agreement between Signore and subjects. When the 
Florentine Filippo Salviati in 1407 offered to remove Paolo 
from power and restore Lucca to a republican state, the 
Lucchese citizen Jacopo Viviani claimed there were three 
things the people believed in steadfastly: “first, that one 
should not touch the purse of another person; second, that 
neither themselves nor through others do they want to hear 
of the dishonesty of women; and third, that up to now Paolo 
has yet to be cruel, on the contrary he has been merciful 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
26F. Ercole, Dal Comune al Principato (Florence, 1929), 271; 
also see Pierangelo Schiera, “Legitimacy, Discipline, and 
Institutions:  Three Necessary Conditions for the Birth of 
the Modern State,” in The Origins of the State in Italy, 
1300-1600, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago: University of 
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and he makes for himself a grand dearth, being very strict 
on expenditures.”27 
 It is thus clear that a new interpretation of Lucca in 
the first thirty years of the fifteenth century needs to be 
forged. There is certainly a historiographical gap for this 
period, as clearly pointed out by the monographs of 
Christine Meek and M. E. Bratchel.28 Important recent 
articles have appeared, such as those by Giuseppe Benedetto, 
Franca Ragone, Franca Leverotti, and Sante Polica that have 
dealt wonderfully with specific aspects of Lucchese history 
during this period.29 What is needed at this point is a work 
                                                          
27Quoted in Franca Ragone, “Paolo Guinigi, i suoi 
collabatori, i suoi nemici: l’emergere di nuovi ruoli 
politichi in una corte toscana del Quattrocento,” Momus 1 
(1994): 17, “Una è che non toccha la borsa a persona, 
l’altra che per sè nè per altri vuol sentire disonestà de 
donne; la terca che fino a qui [Paolo] non è stato mai 
crudele ma molto misericordioso in contrario, e che de sè 
grande carestia et è molto strecto nello expendere.” 
 
28Christine Meek, Lucca 1369-1400: Politics and Society in 
an Early Renaissance City-State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978); Michael Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494: The 
Reconstruction of an Italian City-Republic (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). Several scholars of Lucchese 
history, including Bratchel in this work cited, have 
lamented the lack of a full-length study on the Signoria of 
Paolo Guinigi. 
 
29Benedetto, “Potere dei Chierici e potere dei Laici nella 
Lucca del Quattrocento al tempo della Signoria di Paolo 
Guinigi (1400-1430): Una simbiosi,” in Annuario della 
Biblioteca Civica di Massa (1984): 1-54; Ragone, “Le Spose 
del Signore: Scelte Politiche e Ceremonie alla Corte di 
Paolo Guinigi,” in Ilaria del Carretto e il suo monumento: 
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bringing all the specific issues together into a more 
comprehensive view of the period, and at the same time 
filling in the gap created by the works of Meek and 
Bratchel; this work proposes to do that. There are a 
somewhat limited amount of resources for consideration in 
the Archivio di Stato in Lucca, as well as the Biblioteca 
Governativa, that relate to the first thirty years of the 
fifteenth century. This is because these years are 
distinguished by breaks in a number of archival series, most 
importantly the proceedings of the Anziani, and of the two 
major councils, the Council of the People, and the General 
Council since these governmental bodies were abolished at 
the onset of the signoria. Much of the material that does 
exist has yet to be adequately studied, and thus much of the 
history of early Quattrocento Lucca has yet to be told. My 
research in Lucchese libraries has usually been directed to 
answering specific questions, and thus my understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
S. Toussaint (Lucca: S. Marco, 1995), 119-36;  Leverotti, 
“Gli Estimi Lucchesi del 1411-1413: Una Fonte per lo Studio 
dell’amministrazione del paessaggio agrario e dello 
demografia,” in Scritti in Ricordi di Giorgio Buratti (Pisa: 
Pacini, 1981), 199-222; and Polica, “Le Famiglie del Ceto 
Dirigente Lucchese dalla Caduta di Paolo Guinigi all’Fine 
del Quattrocento,” in I Ceti Dirigenti nella Toscana del 
Quattrocento: Comitato di Studi sulla Storia dei Ceti 
Dirigenti in Toscana, Atti del V e VI Convegno: Firenze, 10-
11 Dicembre 1982; 2-3 Dicembre 1983 (Florence: Francesco 
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certain aspects of Lucchese society has been much 
supplemented by the work of recent scholars.  
 This study proceeds with introductory material which 
will consider the highlights of the fourteenth century and 
of the early Guinigi in Lucca, which will place the reign of 
Paolo Guinigi into clearer perspective. One of the themes of 
this chapter is the valued history of republicanism in Lucca 
in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, a history 
that perhaps saw Lucca in the age of the rise of the popolo 
surpass even Florence in “democratic” tendencies. This is 
essential to understanding Renaissance Lucca, and makes the 
accomplishments of Paolo Guinigi all the more remarkable. 
Chapter three will consider more closely how Paolo was 
thrust into the position as absolute Signore of Lucca in 
October 1400, and the measures undertaken with great effort 
to strengthen the regime thereafter.    
 The fourth chapter seeks to provide a new perspective 
from which to view the Florentine-Milanese conflict of the 
early fifteenth century, that conflict that shaped so much 
of the history (and historiography) of the period. A look at 
the struggle from the Lucchese perspective shows the 
difficult position the small and medium-sized city-states of 
northern and central Italy were plunged into because of the 
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which Lucchese policy moved back and forth between 
supporting Florence or Milan, depending on what their own 
needs and fears were at that time. Chapter four also shows a 
different view of Florence than that which has come to be 
widely accepted which holds that Florence at this time was 
the beacon of liberty and democracy, struggling valiantly to 
preserve these ideals for future generations.   
 Chapter five will be concerned with the territories of 
Lucca, the natural and human resources of the city-state, 
its population, and the relationship of the mother city to 
the contado. This chapter is the first of this study in 
which the discussion moves away from political and foreign 
affairs to other aspects of Lucchese history; yet the 
central theme can be followed through these chapters as 
well. The following chapter, for example, which will be 
centered on Lucchese relations with the Church during the 
period of Paolo Guinigi, will point out that whatever 
Lucchese relations with the Church were at any particular 
time, they were attributable to the level of safety they 
felt at that moment around them. Paolo aggressively sought 
alliances with the popes on some occasions; on others he 
ignored their entreaties for as long as possible. The first 
half of Paolo’s reign coincided with the Papal Schism, and 
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reveal that concern for preserving the independence of Lucca 
was held above all else.   
 Chapter seven will be centered on the cultural ambience 
of Lucca in the early Quattrocento. Certainly Lucca did not 
foster the current humanistic interests and activities that 
were occurring in Florence to nearly the same degree, at 
least in the early Quattrocento. It might be said that Lucca 
was a generation behind Florence in that a classical scholar 
of note appeared for the first time in Lucca only in the 
1450s (Gian Pietro d’ Avenza); and secondly, that from the 
extant inventories of libraries of persons living in Lucca 
in the years of Paolo Guinigi, it is evident that local 
interest was still consumed by the writings of the “Three 
Crowns” of Italian literature (Dante, Petrarch, and 
Boccaccio), especially with Dante. This does not mean, 
however, that Lucca had no interest in the classical world 
in the Guinigi period, only that attention and funds were 
diverted from books on occasion to weapons, defense, and 
mercenaries. This chapter will consist of a characterization 
of the civic humanism of Sercambi, as well as a discussion 
of the role the imperialist thinker Dante had on the thought 
of the Lucchese.  
  The concluding chapter of this work will consider 
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and will continue to show the isolationist tendencies of the 
regime, and his and the Lucchese’ struggle for survival.  
Paolo made alliances with the King of Naples, Pope Gregory 
XII, and Filippo Maria Visconti (among others), all of which 
reveal how difficult a period it was for the medium-sized 
city-states that had a great deal of territory, but not much 
means to protect it; this was the age in which the 
superpowers were aggressively carving out regional states 
for themselves. There was never an entirely peaceful period 
during Paolo’s reign. After the death in 1414 of the King of 
Naples, Ladislas of Durazzo, who had become the major ally 
of Lucca, the Lucchese had to scramble to make other 
alliances to guard against Florentine ambitions. In 1418 the 
Lucchese faced another crisis with the arrival of the 
condottiere Braccio da Montone, who invaded Lucca, laid it 
to waste, and left only after Paolo paid him off with a 
large sum of money. And to make matters worse, it was 
discovered there had been an act of treason committed by 
Paolo’s secretary Guido Manfredi in allowing Braccio’s entry 
into Lucchese territory.   
 The reign of Paolo Guinigi occurred at a time of great 
change in Italy. It coincided with long periods of war, a 
time when Florence, Milan, Venice, Rome, and the Church were 
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out of surrounding territories and the smaller city-states. 
The reign of Paolo Guinigi in Lucca also coincided with five 
bouts of the plague in thirty years and numerous other 
internal problems. That Lucca was able to remain independent 
in the violent and confused period of Paolo Guinigi should 
be remembered as a proud part of the city’s rich history, 
and not as the unfortunate exception to their great 

















 In the year 1300 Lucca was governed by a popolo 
regime.1 The popolo as a class appeared early and was very 
influential on late medieval society in Lucca; it had 
emerged as an important factor in civic life as early as 
1203, the date of the establishment of the Società de’ 
Pedoni, and the year in which the civic militia infantry 
troops of Lucca inflicted heavy damage upon the cavalry 
forces of the nobility.2 From this point forward the 
nobility of Lucca did not have the near unlimited power they 
had grown so accustomed to throughout the late medieval 
period, as they were increasingly challenged, and at times 
                                                          
1The popolo were by no means the masses, but rather the 
upcoming class of merchants, bankers, businessmen, 
shopowners, etc., that was becoming prominent in politics in 
many cities of Italy, to the exclusion of the nobles, or 
magnati, whose traditional hold on power had been based on 
land accumulation; see Lauro Martines, Power and 
Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 45-71. 
 
2Girolamo Tommasi, Sommario della Storia di Lucca, dall’anno 
MIV all’anno MDCC (Florence: G. P. Vieusseux, 1847), 
appendix, documents 5 and 7; also see Ermando Dianda, “Le 
Milizie della Repubblica Lucchese,” Bollettino Storico 
Lucchese 13 (1941): 44-54.  
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overcome by the popolo, or the mercantile, banking, and 
artisanal families of the city and their substantial 
infantry military force. 
 In the popolo Statute of 1308, the nobility and the 
White Guelphs of Lucca were excluded from all important 
civic functions by a measure called “cerna potentium,” in 
which the proscribed families were listed by name.  
Provisions were enacted outlining punishments for noble 
offenses committed against any popolani, whether by physical 
assault, or mere injurious words.3 Noble arrogance was to be 
further held in check by such means as setting a limit on 
the maximum height to which a family’s tower could ascend. 
Thus, from the beginning of the fourteenth century and even 
earlier, there were aspirations to representative  
government in Lucca, and a tendency for the landed nobility 
                                                          
3“Statuimus quod si aliqua persona lucane Civitatis 
Comunitatis vel fortie vel aliunde presumpserit offendere 
vel offenderet vel offendi faceret vel injuriari fecerit 
aliqui ipsarum societatum ex quacumque causa et in quocumque 
loco, si occidendo, puniatur talis offendens et fieri 
faciens capite ita moriatur, si vulnerando, puniatur in 
libris mille, si manumittendo percutendo vel vulnerando cum 
manu vel alia re, si sanguis non exiverit, in libris 
quinque, et si talis offendens vel fieri faciens, et 
committens predicta vel aliquod predictorum capi non 
poterit, ponatur in perpetuo bamno tanquam proditor lucani 
Comunis, et bona eius funditus destruantur, et lucano Comuni 
etiam publicentur, et si insultando sine manumissione, in 
libris L qualibet vice, et si verba injuriosa dicendo, in 
libris XXV qualibet vice...,” Quoted in Tommasi, Sommario,  
appendix, document 10. 
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to be given a much less participatory role in society than 
in the past and than in other places. 
 In fact, Lucca became one of the foremost early centers 
of republicanism in all of northern and central Italy.4  
Ptolemy of Lucca, after all, derived from there -- he who 
according to one recent scholar was responsible for the 
resurgence of interest in classical republican thought in 
the early modern period (rather than Petrarch as has been 
traditionally claimed).5 Louis Green’s recent studies have 
shown that Lucchese resentment of the noble classes in the 
early fourteenth century went beyond even that of the 
Florentines.  By comparing the Florentine “Ordinances of 
Justice” of 1293 with the popolo-inspired Lucchese Statute 
of 1308, Green has shown that the anti-magnate sentiment in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
4Lauro Martines, in Power and Imagination, 130, claims that 
Lucca was one of the four major republics of the early 
Renaissance in Italy. 
 
5Charles T. Davis, “Roman Patriotism and Republican 
Propaganda: Ptolemy of Lucca and Nicholas III,” in Dante’s 
Italy and Other Essays (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 224, 250-53; also see his 
“Ptolemy of Lucca and the Roman Republic,” in ibid., 258, 
263, 272.  Ptolemy’s Determinatio compendiosa de 
iurisdictione imperii and his De regno sive de regimine 
principium both claim the “Fourth Monarchy” to have been the 
ancient Roman republic, and both show clearly the author’s 
admiration for republican heroes, and likewise a deep 
suspicion of the ancient caesars. Ptolemy favored a 
government based on law, rather than an arbitrary despotism 
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Lucca was stronger because a greater proportion of the 
population were declared members of the magnate class by the 
Lucchese, who “included in the category of casastici or 
potenti not just the old nobility, but a substantial section 
of the merchant class.”6 Machiavelli more than two centuries 
later recognized that the anti-authoritarian spirit of Lucca 
had not diminished when he asserted: “The authority of the 
Signoria over the countryside is very great, but over the 
citizens (of Lucca), it is nothing.”7 
 Lucchese foreign affairs in 1300 had long been 
dominated by its traditional alliances with the Guelph 
powers of Florence and the papacy, and by its rivalries with 
all Ghibelline regimes, especially that of long-time enemy 
and neighbor Pisa. The primo popolo regime of Florence, for 
example, took refuge in Lucca after the Guelph defeat at 
Montaperti in 1260, as they were welcomed into the city and 
given a safe place to stay at San Frediano inside the city 
                                                                                                                                                                             
-- not unlike, incidentally, it might be argued, how Paolo 
Guinigi would later come to conceive of his own rule. 
6Louis Green, “Society and Politics in Fourteenth Century 
Lucca,” Altro Polo 4 (1982), 31. 
 
7Niccolò Machiavelli, “Sommario delle cose della città di 
Lucca,” in Arte della guerra scritti politichi minori, ed. 
Sergio Bertelli (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1961), 237, “L’ 
autorità della Signoria sopra il contado loro è amplissima, 
sopra i cittadini è nulla.” 
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walls.8 Later, in 1289, the combined troops of Lucca and 
Florence, along with other Guelph forces defeated Arezzo at 
the battle of Campaldino.9 In 1304, in the midst of violent 
factionalism occurring in both Lucca and Florence between 
“Black” and “White” Guelphs, Florentine officials asked the 
Lucchese to intervene, help them in their troubled state, 
and rid their city of all sources of discord. The Lucchese 
responded by sending a group of twenty-one citizens to root 
out suspicious persons, and according to a letter of Pope 
Benedict XI in 1304 in which he referred to the many fines 
handed down by this body, they were quite active in the 
endeavor.10  
 After the Black Guelphs of both Lucca and Florence had 
overcome the White factions in their respective cities, they 
determined to wage war on the outside, against the 
Ghibelline regimes throughout Tuscany. In May 1302, their 
                                                          
8Ptolemy of Lucca, Annales, ed. B. Schmeidler, in Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum, n.s., 
vol.VIII (Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1955), 143; Giovanni 
Villani, Nuova Cronica, ed. Giuseppe Porta, 3 vols. (Parma: 
Ugo Guanda, 1990), 7: 380-82 (hereinafter cited as Cronica, 
followed by book number and page reference). 
 
9Villani, Cronica, 8: 584-87. 
 
10Dino Compagni, Chronicle of Florence, trans. and ed. 
Daniel Bornstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1986), 65; also see F. P. Luiso, “Dante e Lucca,” in 
Dante: La Vita, Le Opere, Le Grandi Città Dantesche, Dante e 
L’ Europa (Milan, 1921), 182. 
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combined forces lay siege to Pistoia and its subject city 
Serravale, and the Lucchese soon benefitted by assuming 
control over the communes of Marliano, Lizano, Popiglio, 
Savignana, San Marcello, and Lancioula.11 Though harsh 
tactics were used by the Florentine and Lucchese civic 
armies against Pistoia, the latter proved quite resistant, 
surrendering the city to the besiegers only in 1306 after 
several months of having starvation forced upon its 
inhabitants. The victory of the Florentine and Lucchese 
forces at last gave the two Guelph conquerors power over 
Pistoia and its contado, and each was in the future to 
supply in alternating fashion either the podestà or the 
capitano who were to both preside over the city.12   
 The attack on Pistoia would prove to be among the last 
instances in which Lucca and Florence would see eye to eye, 
for by 1308 Florence had become openly critical of Lucca’s 
continued mistreatment of the Pistoiese. Though the two 
cities would unite upon occasion throughout the remainder of 
the fourteenth century, it would be for reasons of temporary 
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convenience, to fight the destructive forces of foreign 
mercenary troops marauding through Tuscany, for example, or 
for the capture of prisoners who had escaped to the other’s 
territory. The common ideological connection of the past 
based on the principles of Guelphism was lost forever in 
1308. In short, Lucca and Florence had much basis for 
friendship in the early fourteenth century, chiefly that 
they were the two strongest proponents of Guelphism in 
Tuscany and northern Italy. Both city-states were highly 
involved in international trade (Lucca in silk, Florence in 
wool) and in international banking, including acting as 
papal bankers during the course of the fourteenth century.  
Most importantly, however, Florence at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century had not yet set out so aggressively as 
they later would to conquer other parts of Tuscany, while 
Lucca at this time had not yet alienated the Florentines by 
seeking close alliances with the powerful Visconti of Milan.   
 The popolo regime in Lucca was doomed to a short 
existence marked by internal factionalism and violence. In 
1314, Ghibelline armies led by Uguccione della Faggioula and 
Castruccio Castracani overran Lucca. The Ghibelline warlords 
devastated lands, stole crops, and even robbed the papal 
treasure that had been temporarily stored at San Frediano in 
Lucca. Their entrance into Lucca culminated in the 
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establishment of the strongest Ghibelline regime in Tuscany, 
the recall of many Ghibelline and White Guelph families that 
had earlier been exiled, and the effective end of both the 
popolo government and a half century of Guelph ascendancy in 
Lucca.13   
    Castruccio Castracani 
 By 1315, Uguccione had assumed complete mastery over 
Pisa and Lucca and further strengthened his position in 
Tuscany with a decisive military victory over Florence at 
Montecatini, a “sorrowful defeat, according to the 
Florentine chronicler Villani, in which not only were 2,000 
Florentines killed in battle and 1,500 taken prisoner, but 
“all the other men of arms fled, some toward Pistoia, some 
toward Fucecchio, and some through Cerbaia, from which it 
befell many to reach the marshes of the Guisciana,” whence 
many were horribly drowned.14 But, after only a short time 
                                                          
13Ranieri Sardo, Cronaca di Pisa, ed. Ottavio Banti (Rome: 
Borromini, 1963), 68-69; the three-year hold of Uguccione on 
Lucca is discussed here in detail, 56-74; also see Villani, 
Cronica, 10: 261-64, “...non si ricorda di gran tempi 
passati che una città avesse una si grande aversità e 
perdite per parte che vi entrasse com’ ebbe la città di 
Lucca d’ avere e di persone.”  
 
14Villani, Cronica, 10: 276, “...la qual battaglia furono di 
tutte genti morti tra uomini a cavallo e a piede da IIM e 
presi da MD. Il prenze con tutta l’ altra gente si fuggì, 
chi verso Pistoia, e chi verso Fucecchio, e chi per la 
Cerbaia, onde molti capitando a’ pantani della Guisciana, 
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as the most dominant figure in Tuscany, Uguccione’s 
arrogance had alienated fellow Ghibelline leaders, and in 
April 1316 he was ousted almost simultaneously in Pisa and 
Lucca.   
 The new leader of the Ghibelline party immediately 
emerged in the person of Castruccio Castracani, who had been 
Uguccione’s top general in the war against the Tuscan 
Guelphs, but who also had become increasingly troublesome to 
him as time went on. This was because of the local favor 
Castruccio received, being of a native Lucchese family that 
had been exiled by the popolo regime a few years earlier.15 
Uguccione also had felt threatened because Castruccio many 
times insisted upon acting on his own initiative in waging 
war against the Guelphs without first receiving instructions 
or consulting with his high commander.   
 Castruccio in fact was imprisoned for a few days at the 
beginning of April 1316 by Uguccione for having started 
                                                                                                                                                                             
del sopradetto numero de’ morti sanza colpi annegarono 
assai.”  
 
15On Castruccio, see Louis Green, Castruccio Castracani: A 
Study on the Origins and Character of a fourteenth-century 
Italian Despotism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Thomas 
Blomquist, “The Castracani Family of Thirteenth-Century 
Lucca,” Speculum 46 (1971): 459-76; and the collection of 
essays in Castruccio Castracani e il suo Tempo, Convegno 
Internazionale, Lucca, 5-10 October 1981 (Lucca: Istituto 
Storico Lucchese, 1985). 
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military campaigns in the region of Lunigiana without his 
permission. Most likely Uguccione intended to have him 
murdered on this occasion, as by that time he had become 
fearful of Castruccio’s growing strength.16 And Uguccione’s 
fear was well-founded, since as soon as Castruccio managed 
to get himself released from prison he quickly emerged as 
the leader of the most dominant military force of Tuscany; 
he has been commonly referred to by contemporary and modern 
historians as the greatest military figure of the first half 
of the fourteenth century in Italy. The Florentine 
chronicler Villani in the last of his many discussions of 
Castruccio wrote that he was: 
“a brave and magnanimous tyrant, wise and shrewd 
and prepared and hard-working and gallant in arms, 
and well-fortified in war, and very adventurous in 
his enterprises, and was much dreaded and feared, 
and in due course of time he did considerable and 
notable deeds.  He was a great plague to his own 
citizens and to the Florentines and the Pisans and          
the Pistoiese and to all of Tuscany in the 
fourteen years that he ruled Lucca: and he was 
very cruel in having men executed or tortured.”17 
                                                          
16Villani, Cronica, 10: 281-82, “[Castruccio] avendo fatto 
in Lunigiana certe ruberie e micidi contra volontà d’ 
Uguccione, preso fu in Lucca dal figliuolo d’ Uguccione per 
giustiziare.” 
 
17Ibid, 11: 628, “Questo Castruccio fu uno valoroso e 
magnanimo tiranno, savio e accorto, e sollecito e faticante, 
e prode in arme, e bene proveduto in guerra, e molto 
aventuroso di sue imprese, e molto temuto e ridottato, e al 
suo tempo fece di belle e notabili cose, e fu uno grande 
fragello a’ suoi cittadini, e a’ Fiorentini e a’ Pisani e 
Pistoiesi e a tutti i toscani in XIV anni ch’ egli 
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 Castruccio was certainly a thorn in the side of the 
Florentines. When he took over Lucca as Captain and Defender 
of the People in 1316, he was content to consolidate and 
strengthen Lucchese border areas, but by 1320 he was in open 
pursuit of lands in other areas of Tuscany.18 In April 1320, 
by now having proclaimed himself master (dominus generalis) 
of Lucca for life, he broke the peace terms established 
three years earlier between the Guelphs and Ghibellines of 
Tuscany when he initiated war preparations against the 
Florentines, and began to seize control of some of their 
border fortresses. On this occasion, in the span of a few 
days Castruccio and his armed brigades inflicted great 
damage on the Florentine army, returned to Lucca in 
triumphal procession, and brought with them several tortured 
prisoners of war, who upon entry into Lucca were at once 
imprisoned where they were forced to languish until they 
died.19  
                                                                                                                                                                             
signoreggiò Lucca: assai fu crudele in fare morire e 
tormentare uomini.”  
 
18Green, Castruccio Castracani, 125-27. 
 
19Villani, Cronica, 10: 309-10, “...in pochi giorni ebbe, 
pero che’ terrazzani per tradimento l’ arenderono, di xxv d’ 
aprile; e Fiorentini non erano proveduti come si convenia: 
credendosi conservare la pace, non poterono acciò riparare; 
e avuta la terra, tornoè a Lucca con grande trionfo, e 
quegli traditori che gli aveano renduta Santa Maria a Monte 
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The Florentines suffered another huge loss at the hands 
of the lord of Lucca in September 1325 at Altopascio, where 
by “holding protected and fortified all the hills of 
Viviana, Montechiaro, Cerruglio, and Porcari up to the 
marshes of Sesto, so that the Florentine army was not able 
to pass through,” Castruccio was able in a brief time to 
capture thousands of the enemy, most of their military 
equipment, and even the treasured war carriage 
(“carroccio”).20 He led several other skirmishes during the 
decade of the 1320s against the Florentines, constantly 
frustrating them by blocking their routes to the sea, 
harassing Florentine holdings in the countryside, and 
threatening to take over border regions. The threat felt by 
Florence, so vividly recounted by the chronicler Villani, 
was so great that the officials of the city decided to 
abandon their own republican constitution by opting to bring 
                                                                                                                                                                             
per sospetto menò a Lucca, e in pregione languendo gli fece 
morire.” 
 
20Ibid., 10: 470; also for this incident, see Ferdinand 
Schevill, History of Florence from the Founding of the City 
through the Renaissance (New York: Fredrick Ungar, 1961), 
203. The Italian communes and later cities often took with 
them into battle “carrocci,” which were carriages that were 
the symbols of that commune, and which were considered 
sacred vehicles, carrying the standard of that commune, 
altars, and other objects deemed important. 
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in Charles, Duke of Calabria, to Florence to take charge of 
the desperate state of their military affairs.21 
 By the end of his reign as Signore of Lucca, Castruccio 
had attained vast territorial holdings throughout the Tuscan 
region, including control over Pisa, Pistoia, and the 
communes belonging to these two cities.22 After the battle 
of Altopascio in 1325, Castruccio had even been at the very 
walls of Florence before having to reluctantly admit that 
his forces and equipment were inadequate to lay full siege 
to the city. After three days encamped there pondering his 
next move, apparently without fear of counter-attack, 
Castruccio began to retreat westward toward Lucca -- but not 
before burning and pillaging the Florentine countryside, and 
even some residential areas, before he left the fearful 
citizens of Florence behind.23 Castruccio’s tie with the 
Holy Roman Emperor Ludwig, who had bestowed upon him the 
title of Duke in return for military protection, was also a 
                                                          
21Marvin Becker, Florence in Transition, 2 vols. (Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 1: 84-87. 
 
22Villani, Cronica, 10: 346; Schevill, History of Florence, 
201-202; Raoul Manselli, “Castruccio Castracani degli 
Antelminelli e la politica italiana nei primi decenni del 
Trecento,” in Castruccio Castracani, 14-16. 
 
23Villani, Cronica, 10: 468-77. 
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constant aggravation to the Florentines.24 But just at the 
very moment when Castruccio had become the greatest threat 
of all to Florence as well as to other areas of Tuscany, the 
Florentines escaped, like they later would in 1402 with the 
death of Giangaleazzo Visconti, because of the sudden and 
unexpected demise of the master of Lucca in September 1328 
at the height of his power. 
    Pisan Years, 1342-1369 
 The Florentines immediately began to exact revenge for 
Castruccio’s acts. The lands of Pistoia which he had 
conquered were seized at once, and Lucca itself “seemed ripe 
for subjection.”25 Throughout the 1330s Florence made 
sporadic, but violent excursions into the Lucchese 
countryside. In 1332, sixteen villages in the parishes of S. 
Gennaro and Segromigno were laid to waste; in the next year 
devastating invasions were made through the Valdilima and 
Valdiserchio up to Barga. An even more intense raid occurred 
in 1336, when many suburbs close to Lucca were raided.26 In 
                                                          
24In November 1327, Castruccio received from the Emperor the 
title of Duke of Lucca, Pistoia, Luni, and Volterra, and 
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25Schevill, History of Florence, 216-17. 
 
26Franca Leverotti, Popolazione, famiglie, insediamento: Le 




short, the decade marks the emergence, or perhaps the 
return, of Florentine attempts to expand their borders.27   
 After the death of Castruccio control of Lucca fell to 
a series of short-lived, absentee lords from northern Italy, 
none of whom in the end could afford to protect the city, 
and all of whom had to quickly sell to the highest bidder.28 
By 1342, after a long struggle with Florence for rights to 
Lucca, Pisa assumed control over the city. The more than 
quarter century of Pisan control over Lucca that followed 
was thought by contemporaries as the low point in the city’s 
rich history; Lucchese chroniclers thereafter referred to 
the period as the age of Lucca’s own “Babylonian captivity.” 
Sercambi asserted that in these years the citizens were 
“treated like dogs, with every villainy and every 
outrage.”29 Modern writers on the subject on the other hand 
have tended to regard the period as perhaps fortunate for 
Lucca, in that since it fell under the control of the 
                                                          
27For the renewed emphasis in Florentine expansion in these 
years, see I Capitoli del Comune di Firenze, 2 vols., in 
Documenti degli Archivi Toscani (Florence: M. Cellini, 
1886), 1: 28, 46, 67, 70, 105.   
 
28For the best discussion of Lucca from 1328-1342, see Louis 
Green, Lucca Under Many Masters: A Fourteenth-Century 
Italian Commune in Crisis (Florence: Leo Olschki, 1995), 
esp. 17-41. 
 
29Sercambi, Le Croniche, 1: 198, “Tractando i ciptadini si 
come cani/ Con ongni villania & ongni oltraggio.” 
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Pisans, it was at least spared from becoming subject to the 
Florentine state, under which it probably would have 
succumbed to an even worse fate. Others have stressed the 
generally mild character of the Pisan subjugation of 
Lucca.30   
 Contemporaries, however, did not see their Pisan 
governors as anything but unwelcome, and on one occasion a 
certain group of Lucchese citizens inside the city even 
plotted with a group of Florentines to allow them secret 
entry inside the city walls at a pre-determined time in 
order that they might oust the reigning Pisans.31 For their 
most cherished liberties, such as the right to conduct their 
own elections, collect their own taxes as they saw fit -- in 
short, to manage their own affairs -- had been removed from 
them, and the Lucchese perceived that the arrogance of their 
Pisan governors was the source of these problems. Finally, 
to make matters worse, although the original agreement of 
1342 had called for a fifteen-year “league” between the two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
30Christine E. Meek, The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 
1342-1369 (Cambridge: Medieval Society of America, 1980), 
119-124. 
 
31Sercambi, Le Croniche, 1: 118, “vedendo alquanti ciptadini 
di Luccha quanto era duro l’ affanno d’ esser soiecto, et 
maximamente quella de’ Pisani, ordinoro col comune di 
Firenza di tale soiectù uscire, con dare ordine & tractato 
di dilevarsi al tucto da Pisa.” 
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which was to last until 1357, two years before this period 
ended, the emperor granted an extension to the Pisans of the 
imperial vicariate over Lucca, and a new “league” was 
established for an additional twenty years.     
 Upon receiving this news the Lucchese were devastated, 
and reacted in a fashion that reveals their true sentiments 
about Pisan rule. They set about to hire armed assistance 
from the Lucchese countryside, and when the Pisan rectors 
tried to return to their residences at the Augusta in May 
1355, the Lucchese rebels attempted to prevent them from 
entering. During two consecutive days of fighting the  
rebels were able to take back control over all the central 
squares and gates of the city, except for one.32 Though the 
rebellion was eventually extinguished by Pisan officials 
with the aid of some Lucchese citizens, this sort of protest 
was not uncommon -- at least in the early years of their 
subjection. 
 The character of Pisan rule in Lucca became more harsh  
under the authoritarian Pisan Signore Giovanni dell’ Agnello 
during the Pisan war against Florence in 1362. The conflict 
began when the Florentines became offended that the Pisans 
passed a measure which called for the taxation of Florentine 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
32Meek, The Commune of Lucca, 94-95. 
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goods in transit through Pisan territory. Florence initially 
responded by seeking another port from which to ship and 
receive their goods (the Sienese port of Talamone), but Pisa 
in turn put up resistance to their use of that port as well.  
When the two had another conflict soon after concerning the 
possession of the commune of Pietrasanta, war broke out 
between them.33   
 Being a subject city of Pisa at the time, the Lucchese 
were forced not only to bear a portion of the total cost of 
the war, but also to supply troops and equipment for it.  
Thus, the Lucchese found themselves in the precarious 
position of being forced to give support to the side in the 
war that many quite possibly hoped would lose.34 In the 
struggle against the Florentines, the Pisans gained the 
early advantage partly as a result of a loan of 100,000 
florins from Bernabò Visconti, but by 1364 the Florentines 
were able to reverse the early course of the war and emerge 
victorious.35 One Florentine chronicler recounted that the 
war came to an end when the Florentine army had captured 
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enough of the Pisan troops to fill fifty wagons full with 
them, having bound them with their own ropes for further 
insult for the long and tortuous ride back to Florence.36   
 After the end of the Florentine-Pisan war matters 
worsened for the Lucchese. Partly due to the plot of the 
Lucchese citizens to help Florence gain entry to the city 
during the war, the Pisans began to implement policies which 
further restricted Lucchese liberties. Meetings of more than 
four persons were prohibited, in part to help prevent the 
possibility of future uprisings by Lucchese citizens. In 
addition, the Pisans at one point forced all Lucchese 
citizens from the ages of fourteen to seventy (except long-
time Ghibellines) out of the city and into the countryside, 
where they would be less able to cause any disturbances 
within the city walls.37 The nature of the Pisan reign from 
1342-1369 over Lucca was arbitrary, oppressive, and most of 
all, unwanted.  Yet, it was not so much the type of 
                                                          
36Ibid., 311-12, “e furono legati i Pisani colle loro funi 
medesime e furonne caricati 50 carra propi de’ pisani, e nel 
primo carro era l’ aguglia loro impiccata, none in forma 
potesse morire, però ch’ella s’appoggiava co’ piedi al carro 
e forte si dibatteva.” 
 
37Sercambi, Le Croniche, 1: 115, “E non stante le spese 
della borsa, che i Luchesi aveano, erano tucto di collati, 
stratiati et rubbati. Et era venuto a tanto Lucha e’ 
ciptadini, che non si poteano raunare in Luccha insieme 
.IIII. ciptadini o più sensa licentia;” also see Meek, The 
Commune of Lucca, 106. 
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government (monarchial) which had been established over 
Lucca that was so much hated by the natives; it was instead 
the results of Pisan rule, which the Lucchese deemed as not 
being in the best interests of the people as a whole. 
Self-Rule at Last 
 It had been nearly a half century since the Lucchese 
had held complete hegemony over their internal affairs of 
government when Emperor Charles IV arrived in Lucca in 
September 1368. He had come to Italy to take the imperial 
crown in Milan, and one of his secondary missions was to 
restore some balance to the disorder in Tuscany. Charles had 
of late become disenchanted with the Pisans, particularly 
with the lack of gratitude shown him by Pietro Gambacorta, 
who had recently proclaimed himself Signore of Pisa; Charles 
would eventually declare the city a rebel of the Empire.38   
 It was in this atmosphere that Lucchese leaders saw 
their chance to try and persuade Charles, who earlier had 
extended the length of Pisa’s vicariate over Lucca an 
additional twenty years, to change his mind and cancel the 
Pisan hold over their city. They began to bribe the emperor 
with large sums of money, precious gifts, and promises of 
much more to come in the future. And, unlike in 1355 when 
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Charles sided with Pisa by extending the vicariate, this 
time he favored the Lucchese, formally releasing the city 
from the hold of the Pisan governors on 6 April 1369.39   
 The Lucchese agreed to pay the sum of 100,000 florins 
to Charles to secure from him the imperial edict which 
allowed for their independence from Pisa, beginning with a 
payment of 50,000 florins and the rest agreed upon to come 
later. Sercambi wrote that the total cost for Lucca to 
purchase its independence was 300,000 florins, a remarkable 
sum in that it would have been an amount approximately equal 
to four and one-half years of city revenues, though most 
modern scholars believe Sercambi over-estimated this 
amount.40 At any rate, the Lucchese were to commence the new 
period of self-rule in a severe state of economic crisis.  
Loans were taken out from the papacy, Florence, the Este 
ruler of Ferrara, the Carrara ruler of Padua, and other 
city-states in order to help defray the expenses of paying 
off Charles and in order to take defensive measures to 
strengthen the new regime.41 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
39Sercambi, Croniche, 1: 138, 161-65. 
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41Christine Meek, Lucca 1369-1400: Politics and Society in 
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Press, 1978), 54. 
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 The dominant theme running through the Lucchese 
Riformagioni in the months after Charles’ arrival in Lucca 
was the financial straits of the city. Not only were there 
frequent shortages of essential provisions, especially of 
grain, but there were also difficulties in paying for even 
the most basic of necessary expenses to get the new 
government off and running, such as the salaries of 
officials, the manning and repairing of Lucchese fortresses, 
gates, and walls, and the maintenance of at least the most 
rudimentary regiment of mercenary soldiers. In order to help 
meet ends the government was forced to increase taxes, which 
was an additional burden on the populace. In addition, the 
new government enacted other provisions to help raise 
revenues such as forced purchases of salt and other 
commodities, and obligation of citizens to military duties 
or to stand guard over parts of the city or contado.42   
 When Charles first entered Lucca in September 1368, he  
took over the government of the city himself, allowing the 
Lucchese time to consolidate and prepare themselves to 
defend their new status as an independent state. Pisan 
officials and soldiers were forced out of the Augusta by 
Charles, and his imperial troops took command of it. He also 




aided the Lucchese in restoring some of their previous 
strongholds in the countryside, particularly at Pontetetto, 
in the Garfagnana, and near the port of Motrone, all of 
which helped ensure the Pisans would not be as tempted to 
attempt a return to Lucca once Charles decided to depart.43 
In addition, before departing Charles awarded the city the 
right to coin money, establish a studium (never fulfilled), 
confer lauree, create notaries as they saw fit, and hold the 
authority to legitimize and authorize adoptions.44  
 In November 1370, the governors of the new free city of 
Lucca began the process of drawing up a new Statute for the 
city, as the current one was long outdated, having been 
instituted in 1342 during the period of Pisan rule. Even 
before the Emperor had departed Lucca the city had been 
redivided into three terzieri, which took the names of the 
three principal churches, San Martino, San Paolino, and San 
Salvatore. Under the previous division of the city into five 
porte there had over time arisen a number of inequalities 
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pertaining to certain civic duties such as military 
obligations, or in the assessment of taxes.45  
  At the basis of the new Statute was the method of 
election for the most powerful governing body of the city, 
the Anziani, and for the two major councils. It was 
determined that three citizens from each terziere be chosen 
as members of the Anziani, who along with the Gonfaloniere 
di Giustizia would comprise a body of ten. They were to be 
chosen by method of direct election (rather than the general 
practice of Italian cities of drawing lots) for two-month 
terms by the outgoing group of ten Anziani, the Council of 
Thirty-Six, and eighteen other invitees, six from each 
terziere. The Council of Thirty-Six, whose chief duty was 
the defense of Lucca and its contado, was made up of four 
“neighborhood” gonfalonieri and eight others from each 
terziere. They served six-month terms, and they too were 
elected directly by the outgoing Anziani and four other 
citizens from each of the three divisions of the city.  
  In addition, the membership of the General Council was 
established at 180, 60 from each terziere, and this group 
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was to hold office for one-year terms. The General Council 
was also elected by the departing members of the Anziani and  
part of the Thirty-Six.46 In short, the 1372 Statute reveals 
a quite different form of electoral procedure in Lucca than 
in other Tuscan cities such as Siena and Florence, where the 
process involved the drawing of lots of those citizens 
deemed politically eligible. The Lucchese, after having just 
attained self-rule after a long period of foreign 
subjugation, apparently desired as much participation as 
possible in the election of their officials. They wanted to 
take no chances of pulling unsuitable names out of the 
election borse. 
 There were other variations in the particulars of 
Lucchese electoral methods from those elsewhere in Tuscany.  
In Lucca, for example, the only requirements for holding 
office as an Anziani or on one of the two major councils 
were that one be twenty-five years old, a male citizen of 
Lucca, and of legitimate birth.47 There were no property 
qualifications which, at least in theory, made the possible 
number of those eligible for office greater than in other 
cities where ownership of land was required. Another 
                                                          





distinctive feature of the electoral procedure in Lucca was 
that offices were still determined solely according to 
geographical district. The Anziani, for example, consisted 
of three members from each of the three districts of the 
city. Though this was common elsewhere in Italy much 
earlier, many cities by the fifteenth century dispersed the 
highest political offices on the basis of guild, or artisan 
membership, rather than according to the geographical 
district of the city in which one lived. In post-1369 Lucca, 
occupation never played such an important role in 
determining who their highest governors were. 
 Finally, the republican Statute of 1372 reveals the 
decision of the Lucchese to have a government “a popolo” 
rather than a government “a comune.” This meant that 
thereafter it would fall under the rule of the merchant 
class, the bankers, goldsmiths, and other small businessmen 
of the city; that certain members of the traditional landed 
elite would be excluded from attaining the highest offices 
in the city; and that above all, the Lucchese were hopeful 
of the rebirth of their republican past.48 Yet, although it 
may be true that, as Sante Polica argues, those men who 
wrote the Statute of 1372 were true members of the “partito 




popolare” who feared the loss of republican institutions -- 
it also stands true that a good portion of the period from 
1369 to the arrival of Paolo Guinigi in 1400 saw Lucca under 
the de facto rule of government by balìe.49  
 Thus, despite the lack of property qualifications for 
holding office and other features of the Lucchese electoral 
method which may have been enacted to give the appearance of 
a desire to keep the government in the hands of many, there 
occurred over the course of the latter fourteenth century a 
gradual, yet definite narrowing of the number of 
politically-eligible citizens.50 The Lucchese for the 
remainder of the century would frequently fall under the 
real control of a balìa whose powers usurped those of even 
the Anziani at times. Yet this all occurred while Lucca was 
still within the framework of their “republican” 
                                                          
49Sante Polica, “Le Famiglie del Ceto Dirigente Lucchese 
dalla Caduta di Paolo Guinigi alla Fine del Quattrocento,” 
in I Ceti dirigenti nella Toscana del Quattrocento:  
Comitato di Studi sulla storia dei ceti dirigenti in 
Toscana, Atti del V e VI Convegno: Firenze, 10-11 Dicembre 
1982; 2-3 Dicembre 1983 (Florence: Francesco Papafava, 
1987), 361.  
 
50For example, in the Statute of 1308 the General Council 
consisted of 550 members who served six-month terms, thus 
allowing 1,100 different citizens to hold this office 
annually, and as we have seen, the Statute of 1372 calls for 
the General Council to consist of 180 members who served 




constitution; this is evidence that the Lucchese were 
beginning to question whether that very republican system 
set up by the constitution was right for them in such 
dangerous times as those that they presently lived in. 
    Francesco Guinigi   
 One notable change to occur in Lucca after its 
liberation from Pisa was the consolidation of the Guinigi 
family into a position of supreme power. The Guinigi had for 
years been an important factor in the social, economic, and 
political affairs of the city, but after 1369 they quickly 
managed to secure an unparalleled position in Lucchese civic 
life because of their wealth, foreign connections, marriage 
alliances, and the ability to help defend the city-state, a 
position which would persist until the removal of Paolo in 
1430.   
 The first documented citation of the family is under 
the name Vuinitio, and dates to the ninth century. Around 
the beginning of the tenth century they apparently moved 
from the Orvieto region and settled into the countryside 
surrounding Lucca.51 The noted Lucchese geneologist G. V. 
Baroni claimed the early Guinigi were “nobili di Torre, di 
                                                          
51L. Fumi, Nuovi Aumenti al R. Archivio di Stato in Lucca 
(Rocca S. Casciano: Cappelli, 1904), 5. 
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Loggia, di Corte, di Chiesa, e di contrada.”52 The family 
moved into Lucca in the eleventh century and established 
themselves as one of the more important families in the 
city, and for the next two centuries were involved in land 
ownership in the Florentine, Pisan, and Lucchese 
countrysides, as well as in other areas of central Italy.53  
Around 1250, the Guinigi began to expand their activities, 
becoming increasingly involved in international trade, and 
less dependent solely on land ownership as their main source 
of revenue. 
 The family was recorded in the Memorie of Michele 
Guinigi as holding a merchant company as early as 1284, 
which dealt especially in the thriving Lucchese silk trade, 
but also in other types of products (by the time of 
Francesco Guinigi in the latter half of the fourteenth 
century, the Guinigi Company was the largest mercantile 
company in Lucca, consisting of twenty-two members and 
having branches in many of the major cities of Europe, 
including London, Rome, Naples, Avignon, Pisa, Bruges, and 
others).54 At the beginning of the fourteenth century the 
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family was driven into exile by the popolo regime of Bonturo 
Dati as Ghibellines and as among the members of the 
“potentes et casastici.” By 1310, however, they had been 
able to return and thus participate in the economic revival 
of the 1320s in Lucca, a time which coincided with the rule 
of Castruccio Castracani.55     
 Records for all Lucchese families are scarce for the 
period in which Lucca was under foreign rule; the first 
mention of Francesco Guinigi, the father of Paolo, by the 
chronicler Sercambi dates to the period of Pisan rule when 
he refused to give a “loan” of 6,000 florins to the hated 
Signore of Pisa, Giovanni Dell’ Agnello.56 Francesco was the 
center of the family in the years following the liberation 
from Pisa in 1369, along with his two brothers Niccolò and 
Michele, their cousins Dino, Lazzaro, and Jacobo, and the 
several sons of these six men.57 Francesco at the time was 
the single wealthiest individual in the city; his fortune 
along with that of Dino had been assessed at 200,000 florins 
                                                          
55Sante Polica, “An Attempted ‘Reconversion’ of Wealth in 
XVth Century Lucca:  The Lands of Michele di Giovanni 
Guinigi,” Journal of European Economic History 9 (1980), 
657-58; also see Louis Green, Castruccio Castracani, 112-13. 
 
56Sercambi, Le Croniche, 1: 134. Francesco had been the head 
of the family since 1358 with the death of his uncle 
Francesco di Bartolomeo Guinigi. 
 
57Meek, Lucca 1369-1400, 207. 
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in 1369, which was greater than the usual annual income of 
the city of Lucca.58 Guinigi wealth was a major reason that 
they were able to attain and hold their supreme position in 
Lucca.     
 In addition, the Guinigi became involved in another 
profitable activity besides land ownership and trading goods 
during the lifetime of Francesco: they became bankers to the 
papacy. After Florentine bankers were shunned by the papacy 
as a result of the War of the Eight Saints, the Guinigi 
Company for fifteen years (1376-1391) took the place of the 
Florentine bankers, which undoubtedly added much to the 
family coffers.59 Although there were two branches of the 
Guinigi family, both prospered from their trading and 
banking activities and as a unit the family managed to stay 
remarkably united in their ambitions in these very difficult 
years after Lucca regained its independence. Francesco was 
thus able to remain the undisputed leader of the family and 
of the city until his death in 1384.   




59Ibid., 142-43, 200; also see George Holmes, “How the 
Medici became the Pope’s Bankers,” in Florentine Studies: 
Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai 
Rubinstein (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), 357-80. 
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 It is no easy task to explain how one individual became 
the unofficial leading citizen of the city in a government 
that called itself a republic. One must remember, first of 
all, that Lucca in the late Trecento was a clannish, 
neighborhood-oriented city where familial and neighborhood 
ties were the basis of one’s loyalties. Unlike other places, 
Florence for instance, occupation played little part in 
Lucchese political society or in the making of allegiances, 
especially at this late date. Francesco’s wealth has been 
mentioned, and that was the basis of much of his power; as a 
result of his wealth, for example, he was able to provide 
the commune with a significant loan in the financially 
troublesome months after Pisan liberation, in effect, 
helping Lucca purchase its independence.60     
 Francesco apparently gained a place in the hearts of 
the Lucchese for a variety of reasons, but especially for 
his leadership in the period of liberation from Pisa. He 
represented Lucca in the negotiations with the Emperor. He 
appears to have had a large influence over the Emperor’s 
vicar (Cardinal Guido), who remained in Lucca for a short 
time after Charles departed. He persuaded Guido, for 
instance, to resist the entrance of Alderigo Antelminelli 
                                                          
60Riformagioni della Repubblica di Lucca (1369-1400), 333-
35. 
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and Bernabò Visconti into Lucchese territories in 1370.61  
Earlier, in August 1369, Francesco convoked the first 
meeting of the General Council for the newly-freed city, 
which was held to discuss the sending of embassies to the 
superpowers to inform them of Lucca’s new status as a free 
city.62 He was also responsible for the enactment of public 
projects, such as canalization of waters he brought about 
for the use of the city as a whole.63 These types of things 
help explain how Francesco came to be highly regarded in 
Lucca; above all, he was their “pater patriae” who had done 
a great deal to allow them to escape from the Pisan 
stranglehold.        
 The decisive point for the Guinigi fortuna in Lucca 
arrived in November 1374 with the establishment of the 
conservatores libertatis, a body of twelve men who assumed a 
large degree of authority in decision-making for the city, 
and whose mandates began to take precedence over the 
Anziani, General Council, and the Council of Thirty-Six. It 
was Francesco himself who proposed the establishment of this 
body, and in a short time the Guinigi were not only able to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
61Sercambi, Le Croniche, 1: 176-77, 180-81. 
 




see to the passage of this act, but also to fill the twelve-
member group with loyal supporters. Moreover, the same 
twelve men stayed in the office for the entire period of 
1374-1381, and with the addition of twenty-four others, 
until 1385. This brought about an unusual degree of 
continuity in governmental affairs for this period, 
especially for a city which claimed to adhere to a 
republican constitution.64 The Lucchese under Francesco were 
obviously subverting this republican constitution on a 
frequent basis, and were starting to move more quickly now 
toward a highly centralized regime.   
 This commission of the conservatores libertatis 
differed in both purpose and duration from previous balìe in 
that earlier special commissions had been set up to have a 
predetermined life span, that is, to come to an end at a 
definite point in the future, usually half a year or less.65 
Also, the specific duties of the conservatores libertatis 
were much broader than those given balìe in the past, to the 
point that at times their actions “modified the statutes of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
64Meek, Lucca 1369-1400, 237-38. 
 
65This sort of extended emergency commission with such 
extraordinary powers was not unusual by the late fourteenth 
century; Florence, for example, also had a single balìa with 
similar powers from 1386-1406. 
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the commune, and they should properly have been decided in 
one of the statutory councils.”66 Thus Francesco, while 
staying within constitutional parameters in only the 
broadest sense, was able to use this special “emergency” 
commission to bring about greater security for both the 
Guinigi family as well as for the city-state of Lucca. 
 The chief concern of the Lucchese by 1374 remained the 
preservation of independence. It was increasingly evident to 
the leading families of the republic that greater measures 
were going to have to be taken for defense of their lands.  
The Lucchese could not have been too experienced in 1369 at 
knowing how to protect their territories since defense of 
the city-state had been someone else’s responsibility ever 
since 1314. But large bands of mercenary companies and the 
threat of returning exiles convinced civic leaders that more 
direct attention needed to be given to defense.67  
                                                          
66Meek, Lucca 1369-1400, 237-245, for quote, 240. 
 
67The company of Conrad Wettingher, for example, later 
discovered to be in agreement with Florence, invaded 
Lucchese territory in late 1373; the Republic was forced to 
make substantial payments to him in November and December 
1373, and again in January of the next year in order to turn 
him away from the city. Payments to other mercenary 
companies were made by Lucca in August 1374, including the 
one led by the Florentine condottiere John Hawkwood. See 
Sercambi, Le Croniche, 1: 209, “si pensi che gostò molto al 
comune di Luccha d’ onorare & prezentare li capi di tali 
brigate;” also see Meek, Lucca 1369-1400, 61, 67. 
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 The main factor, however, that persuaded the Lucchese 
to take steps to tighten up their defenses was the 
increasing threat that Florence had come to be. Though the 
Florentines had actually aided Lucca in 1369 in attaining 
its independence by supplying a loan to the commune to help 
cut down on their costs of paying off Charles, by 1372 
troubles between the two began when the Florentines built a 
road in territory that both claimed as their own.68 
Throughout 1373 armed companies passed through Lucchese 
territory, always raising suspicion of Florentine 
enticement. It is true that Francesco carried on a friendly 
correspondence with the Florentine priors for a brief period 
in 1374, but it was mostly a show of words. He never trusted 
Florentine intentions concerning Lucca. Considering the 
territorial acquisitions the Florentines had made in the 
half century before that time, no wise ruler would have. 
Writing at a later time, Sercambi recalled that when 
Francesco ruled Lucca, he “knew well of the ill will that 
the Florentines had for Lucca, and that he, always in 
                                                          
 




consultation with his friends, determined in good faith to 
never agree to be united with Florentines.”69    
 The conservatores libertatis from the beginning had as 
their main task to strengthen Lucchese defenses against 
invasion. They were concerned not only with the maintenance 
of the walls and other fortifications of Lucca, but also 
with the fortresses, bridges, town bells, and ditches of the 
Lucchese contado. The conservatores also brought about the 
hiring of additional mercenaries for the protection of both 
city and countryside. They also seized authority over the 
cerne, or over the mustering of troops from the countryside.  
The threat of foreign invasion, especially from Florence, 
was behind the origin (and the duration) of the 
conservatores libertatis. The republic meant a great deal to 






                                                          
69Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 309, “...bene cognoscea la mala 
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    CHAPTER 3 
 
 
  THE RISE OF PAOLO TO POWER 
                                       
Coup d’ etat 
 
 The pestilence which began to take the lives of 
hundreds of Lucchese beginning in 1399 took a turn for the 
worse during the steamy summer months of 1400.1 Many avid 
supporters of the Guinigi house such as Niccolò Ser Pagani 
succumbed to the plague during this summer, as well as some 
of the remaining important members of the Guinigi family 
itself. Lazzaro di Niccolò Guinigi died on 27 June, and on 5 
July his son Giovanni suffered the same fate.2 In addition, 
many citizens fled from Lucca during the first half of the 
year in an attempt to escape the contagion, though they had 
been ordered by civic leaders not to do so. Sercambi wrote 
that there “remained few persons of note in Lucca, and that 
those who did stay who held the power of money were largely 
                                                          
1Sercambi estimated that 150 persons were dying on a daily 
basis from this bout with the bubonic plague, although this 
is generally accepted as an overstatement on his part, Le 
Chroniche Lucchesi, ed. Salvatore Bongi, 3 vols., in Fonti 
per la Storia d’ Italia (Lucca: Giusti, 1892), 3: 4. 
 
2Ibid., 3: 4-5. 
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compelled to remain for the salvation of the city and the 
state, standing under the hope of God to guard the city.”3    
 As a result of these difficulties, which led to a much 
depopulated city-state, the Lucchese suffered a variety of 
problems. Farmlands suffered, taxes went uncollected, rents 
went unpaid, the people of the contado became more restless 
-- not to mention the incalculable psychological effects 
that a half-century of sporadic plagues must have caused.4  
In addition, a large number of seats in the various 
consiliar bodies of the Lucchese government became vacant 
due to the widespread death and flight of citizens. The net 
                                                          
3A note on Sercambi is necessary at this point; he was a 
central figure in Lucca during the period of Paolo Guinigi. 
Not only was he the chronicler for the city during this 
period of its history, as he wrote a history of Lucca from 
the 12th century to his own day, but he also wrote the 
Novelle, the literary masterpiece of the Guinigi period. It 
was a fictional series of 166 tales told by a group of youth 
wandering the countryside in an attempt to escape the 
plague, very much a work influenced by Boccaccio’s 
Decameron. In addition, Sercambi was active in the public 
sphere his whole life, holding many important offices during 
Paolo’s regime, thus providing a unique source for the study 
of early Quattrocento Lucca. For quote, see ibid., 3: 4, 
“...in Lucca rimaseno poche persone da facti. E quelli che 
aveano potentia di denari, li quali ristetteno in Luccha, 
funno gran parte costretti a rimanere in Luccha per salvezza 
della ciptà et dello stato, stando socto la speranza di Dio 
a guardare la ciptà.”  
 
4See, for example, the effects of the plague on the painting 
of the years 1350-1400, as shown by Millard Meiss, Painting 
in Florence and Siena after the Black Death: The Arts, 
Religion, and Society in the Mid-Fourteenth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). 
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effect of all the above meant that the perception of the 
Lucchese state and of the Guinigi house across Tuscany and 
beyond was that of a much weakened power, thus making it 
more susceptible to foreign intervention.5 
 One of the main threats to Lucca in the early part of 
the fifteenth century was from that of their exiles, as was 
the case with most other Italian cities of this time. Many 
who had been banished at various points in the recent past 
began to look upon this troublesome situation in Lucca as 
their opportunity to make a successful return; the deaths of 
Francesco’s three eldest sons in the early months of the 
year 1400 made this even more of an attractive proposition.  
Even some who had recently supported the Guinigi faction 
began to question whether they still had the ability to 
preserve that one thing desired by most Lucchese more than 
anything else, self-rule.   
 When Domenico Lupardi was chosen to serve as Anziano 
for the term of September-October 1400, he declared that not 
only would he not return from Bologna to assume the office, 
but also that he did not even desire that the Guinigi 
                                                          
5Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 11, “E molto per la morte di tale 
et delli altri nomati aveano preso chuore, stimando lo resto 
de’ Guinigi esser messo al disocto, dicendo ogimai: la casa 
de’ Guinigi non vale uno boctone, però che si congnosce in 
essa non esser persona, che alle potentia di chi mal vuole 
loro, possano resistere.”   
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maintain hegemony in Lucca.6 Earlier, Turco Balbani, another 
one-time supporter of the Guinigi, departed Lucca in the 
summer in opposition to the family, even though he had been 
selected to the prestigious office of Gonfaloniere di 
Giustizia.7 The Florentines, in addition to the exiles, were 
another danger likely to meddle in Lucchese affairs while 
they were in this weakened state.8 In short, the future 
prospects for Lucca had not looked so bleak since before 
1369 as they did at this point in the late summer of 1400. 
 The Anziani chosen for the July-August term of office 
that year believed that the decline of the Guinigi house, 
the wealthiest family of Lucca, meant possible disaster for 
the city-state as a whole. They understood that the fall of 
the Guinigi meant not merely that another Lucchese family 
would emerge and assume leadership in the city, but rather 
that it would most likely lead to some kind of foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
6Ibid., 3: 9-12. 
 
7Giuseppe Civitali, Historie di Lucca, ed. Mario F. 
Leonardi, 2 vols., in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores 
Recentiores (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per L’Età 
Moderna e Contemporanea, 1988), 2: 261. 
 
8Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 10, “E molto altamente se ne 
parlava, intanto che il comune di Firenza, con alquanti 
usciti di Lucca et etiandio con alquanti asentati, preseno 
pensiero e molti ragionamenti del modo di mandare per terra 
la dicta casa de’ Guinigi e loro amici.”  
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intervention. Thus, the Anziani chosen for this term began 
to take steps to enhance Guinigi supremacy in Lucca for the 
ultimate purpose of preserving the independence for all 
citizens. An extralegal substitution to the office of 
Gonfaloniere, for example, was made in the summer of 1400 
with Giovanni Testa, a loyal Guinigi supporter. Testa had 
been elected to this same office earlier in the year, which 
made a subsequent assignment in the same year illegal, since 
according to Lucchese statutes a person was not eligible to 
serve again in this office until one year had elapsed. This 
was only one of many instances in the summer of 1400 in 
which offices were given to people who were, according to 
the constitution, ineligible for them. But, desperate times 
called for a high degree of political centralization.   
 The Anziani and General Council of the July-August 1400 
term took a more decisive step in bringing about 
cohesiveness in regard to the governing of the city by 
naming a special commission of twelve men to have full 
authority in all matters.9 This group, according to 
                                                          
9Ibid., 3: 8, “si facesse con consiglio generale dodici 
ciptadini di balìa, li quali avessero piena autorità, mero 
et misto imperio, di tucto ciò che fusse di bizogno a riparo 
di Luccha; e quello che a loro piacea, così dentro come di 
fuori, quanto potesse mai avere il comune e ’l popolo di 
Luccha;”  Sercambi here claims for himself a large role in 
persuading the Guinigi to enact the special commission.  
See, however, Giuliano Lucarelli, I Visconti di Milano e 
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Sercambi, was bestowed with powers that allowed it to 
override the decisions of all other legislative bodies, 
including that of the Anziani. But this was nothing new to 
the Lucchese. By the middle of the year 1400, the people of 
Lucca had for thirty years lived under a regime republican 
in name, but in reality governed by bankers, merchants, and 
business elites; they had become increasingly accustomed to 
having the authority of their republican institutions 
usurped by the special powers given to a number of 
successive balìe, including the one enacted in this year. By 
the end of the fourteenth century republican government no 
longer worked in Lucca. The various emergency situations the 
Lucchese found themselves in required a more centralized 
approach to government. Civic leaders over the past 
generation had become convinced of that, as seen in the 
number of special commissions enacted between 1369-1400.  
Lucca thus turned away from republicanism -- but not out of 
fear or pressure from a tyrannical warlord; they turned away 
from republicanism because it no longer worked for them. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lucca risorta a stato  autonomo (Lucca: Maria Pacini Fazzi, 
1984), 98, where it is stated the proposal for a balìa was 
suggested by Tommaso da Ghivizano.  In addition to Sercambi 
and Ghivizano, the other members of the balìa were Nuccio 
Giovanni, Francesco Berindelli, Franceschino Buzolini,  
Antonio da Volterra, Bonacorso Bocci, Dino Guinigi, Giovanni 
Bernardini, Giovanni Testa, Nicolao di Filippo, and Paolo 
Guinigi. 
       75
  Despite such measures as the establishment of special 
commissions taken by the city fathers to keep Lucca an 
independent city-state, the danger of external aggression 
still remained. Foreign states certainly realized the touchy 
situation in Lucca. In September, the pestilence which had 
driven so many from the city began to ease, meaning that now 
invasion by armed bands of soldiers replaced the threat of 
highly contagious disease. The threat of exiles returning 
accompanied by bands of soldiers, such as the Obizzi family, 
which had been harbored in Florence for years, was the 
overriding concern of the Lucchese councils during these 
weeks in the latter part of the summer and early fall 1400.  
Finally, when the highly esteemed Michele Guinigi died on 11 
October, one of the last remaining elder spokesmen of the 
family, we can see in retrospect that the outlook for Lucca 
and the Guinigi family at that point was at its gravest 
point. If the Lucchese wanted to keep foreign armies out of 
their territory and keep their independence intact, then 
immediate action was necessary. In short, it was time to 
attempt a “coup d’ etat.”10   
                                                          
10Girolamo Tommasi, Sommario della Storia di Lucca dall’ 
anno MIV all’ anno MDCC (Florence: G. P. Vieusseux, 1847), 
286-87. 
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 The first step taken by this group of Lucchese elites 
in order to preserve the self-rule of the city-state was to 
ensure there was sufficient armed support to deter outside 
aggressors, as well as to lay claim to establishing an 
internal order. Nine companies of arms were hired from the 
Lucchese countryside, the most prominent of which was an 
infantry force from the region of the Garfagnana.11 Next, 
the Twelve met with the elites of the Lucchese countryside 
to secure assurances from them to do everything in their 
power to help the Guinigi. In addition, the Twelve secured 
military aid from the vicar of the Duke of Milan in Pisa, 
Giovanni da Nuola. In early October, Guido Manfredi of 
Pietrasanta, who was soon to become the primary secretary of 
Paolo, had been sent to Pisa to garner reinforcement from 
the Visconti vicar. Da Nuola had been instructed earlier by 
the Duke of Milan to do whatever he could to assist the 
Lucchese.12  When fifty Visconti lance approached the 
perimeter of Lucca in the early morning of 14 October, the 
                                                          
11Cronica Volgare di Anonimo Fiorentino dall’ anno 1385 al 
1409, già attributa a Piero di Giovanni Minerbetti, ed. 
Elina Bellondi, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, n.s., Vol. 
XXVII, part ii (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, n.d.), 251.  
 
12Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 13-14. 
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stage was set, and the coup d’ etat staged by the most avid 
supporters of the Guinigi family was now in progress.13 
 Paolo was thrust into position as the head of the coup 
because it was believed that his financial standing offered  
Lucca the best possible chance of avoiding foreign 
intervention. There apparently was some thought to placing 
the elder stateman Dino Guinigi into the position as head of 
the Lucchese state, but his age and physical condition led 
the group of twelve to settle on Paolo.14 The balìa 
understood the defense of the city was of paramount 
importance because of the imminent threat of returning 
exiles or other foreign powers who might have intentions of 
taking Lucca for themselves. Paolo, then, was in a sense 
pushed into a position of supreme power via a plot hatched 
by several patriotic, pro-Guinigi members of the balìa;  
since he happened to emerge from the summer of 1400 as 
suddenly the oldest son of the “pater patriae,” Francesco 
Guinigi, and as one of the wealthiest men in all of Tuscany, 
he was bestowed with the honor of leading their civic and 
                                                          
13Other Lucchese chroniclers such as the Cronica di Lucca da 
Giovanni di Messer Vicenzo Saminiati, 3 vols., A.S.L., 
Biblioteca Manoscritti, n. 15 (no page numbers), claim there 
were forty lance, not fifty, which had been sent from Pisa 
to aid in the Guinigi takeover. 
 
14Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 11. 
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foreign affairs -- as well as with the responsibility of 
protecting them.15       
 At the beginning of the year 1400, it would have seemed 
as if there were little chance Paolo Guinigi would emerge as 
not only the leader of the family, but also as the ruler of 
Lucca by the end of the year. In January, Lucca was a 
republic and Paolo was fourth son of Francesco Guinigi; by 
December, Lucca was a Signoria and he was its head. The 
memory of life before 1369 was still vivid to the Lucchese, 
and they were willing to take any step, including enacting a 
Signoria, in order to maintain self-rule. To them, the 
“means” of good rule, that is the form of government either 
republic or signorial did not so much matter; what was 
important was that there was competent leadership which kept 
an eye on the interests of the people. 
 At dawn on the morning of 14 October 1400, Paolo with 
armed support from the countryside, along with the lance 
sent from Pisa at the Lucchese request, took the symbolic 
step to attaining supremacy in a city by seizing the central 
piazza, S. Michele. The armies of Paolo seized the corners 
of the piazza and then began to set up barricades 
                                                          
15See Franca Ragone, “Paolo Guinigi, i suoi collaboratori, i 
suoi nemici: l’ emergere di nuovi ruoli politici in una 
corte toscana del Quattrocento,” Momus 1 (1994), 12-13. 
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prohibiting passage inside, and after a few hours and an 
essentially bloodless takeover, Paolo was able to ride the 
principal streets of Lucca proclaiming “Viva il popolo e 
libertà!”16  
  Early Contests to Paolo’s Rise to Power 
Though the seizure of supremacy in Lucca by Paolo was a 
move supported, and even set up by some members of the 
Twelve, it was not a move undertaken with the knowledge of 
all the members of this elite group. Dino Guinigi and 
Giovanni Testa, two ardent supporters of Paolo, were 
initially unaware of the scheme to push him into the highest 
office in Lucca. The plan seems to have been the work 
primarily of Sercambi, Tommasso da Ghivizano, Guido 
Manfredi, and Marco Martini, along with Paolo who consented 
to take on the new office of Captain and Defender of the 
People. While he with his supporters took the piazza of S. 
Michele on the morning of 14 October, the Gonfaloniere 
Sercambi positioned himself, armed under his clothes, and 
ready with other soldiers to protect the governor’s palace, 
the Palazzo Decemvirale, from any possible opponents of the 
Guinigi.17 But as expected, an opposition never emerged. 
                                                          
16Civitali, Historie, 2: 263-64. 
 
17Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 12-17. 
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   The members of the balìa who had not been made aware 
of Paolo’s assumption were summoned to come to the Palace to 
be informed of the new situation. When they became aware of 
what was occurring literally before their eyes, certain 
members of the balìa began to question Paolo’s motives.18  
The Gonfaloniere Sercambi responded to their questions by 
telling the group that such action had been taken because 
the imminent threat of exiles and foreign powers had become 
so great that again outside rule loomed in the near future 
if immediate steps were not taken to prevent it. But they 
pointed out that Paolo was not the only one who wanted to 
preserve the independence of their city, and that they were 
not so certain that his way was necessarily the best way.19  
 Two members of the balìa, Giovanni Testa and Antonio da 
Volterra, wanted an explanation for the events of that 
morning from Paolo himself, and so proceeded to piazza S. 
Michele.  We are not sure of what they saw or were told 
there by Paolo; in his Chronicle, Sercambi wrote only that 
                                                          
18Ibid., 3: 15, “et alcuni de’ dicti .XII. meraviglarsi come 
a tale hora fusseno richiesti, domandando i dicti di balìa 
quali chagioni poteano esser quelle che aveano induto Paolo 
ad armarsi per quello modo.” 
 
19See A. N. Cianelli, “Dissertazioni sopra la storia 
lucchese:  Sistema di Governo in Lucca dal 1369 fino al 
1430,” in Memorie e Documenti per Servire all’ Storia della 
Città e Stato di Lucca, vol. II, part i (Lucca: Francesco 
Bertini, 1814), 117. 
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Paolo told the two when they arrived to return to the 
Gonfaloniere and to do as he ordered. Whatever it was that 
was revealed to them seemed to satisfy them, however, as 
they returned to Sercambi and the others, and soon 
proclaimed they were ready to follow their lead.20     
 When the members of the balìa assembled again at the 
Palace, Sercambi gave them further justification for the 
sudden exaltation of Paolo to the head of command in Lucca: 
“You can be certain that through the exiles,                
and through some other communities the                      
destruction of Lucca has been sought, and                   
especially that of the Guinigi house and their              
friends...And therefore Paolo, wanting that he              
and his family live securely, has taken steps               
to see to it that anyone who wants to put the               
liberty of Lucca and its state into a confused 
  situation would not be able to do so.”21 
Thus, through the persuasive words of Sercambi, Ghivizzano, 
and the other supporters of the move to exalt Paolo, the 
remaining members of the balìa were quickly brought over to 
the notion that it was the best move for the overall safety 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
20Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 15-16. 
 
21Ibid., 3: 15, “Voi dovete esser certi che per li usciti di 
Luccha, and simili per alquanti altri insieme con alcuna 
comunità, s’ è cerchato il disfaccimento della libertà di 
Luccha, e massimamamente della casa de’ Guinigi e de’ loro 
amici....E pertanto il dicto Paolo, volendo lui e i suoi 
vivere securi, à preso pensieri di voler e tener modi, che 
chi volesse la libertà di Luccha e lo stato mettere in 
confusione, non possa.”  
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of Lucca. Perhaps the sight of soldiers with Visconti 
banners in support of Paolo helped persuade them. What sort 
of government would have emerged from this situation will 
never be known, however, as within a month a domestic plot 
to overthrow Paolo Guinigi had been hatched, leading the 
Twelve to take the further step of elevating him to absolute 
Signore.22 What it seems that Paolo and the balìa initially 
had in mind was for him to coexist alongside the Anziani, to 
maintain their previous political institutions, and to keep 
as much of an outward resemblance to the republic as 
possible.23 In the end, however, it was security, not a 
republican form of government, that the Lucchese so badly 
wanted. 
 As mentioned, what Paolo and the other members of the 
balìa ultimately had in mind for the government of Lucca as 
it stood after 14 October never came to pass. In early 
November, the Bishop of Lucca, Nicolao Guinigi, a second 
cousin of Paolo, along with some canons of the cathedral of 
S. Martino and the surgeon Bartolomeo di Duccino da Aramo, 
plotted to poison Paolo.24 Sercambi claimed the reason for 
                                                          
22Ibid., 3: 21-22.  
 
23Ibid., 3: 17, “E così dimorò chapitano in palagio, & come 
antiano, tucto il mese do octobre.”  
  
24Cianelli, “Dissertazioni,” 119. 
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the attempt to remove Paolo was jealousy on the part of the 
young Bishop of Lucca, and no other accounts of the event 
give any further explanation of the Bishop’s motives.25  
Paolo handled the situation with leniency; the Bishop of 
Lucca in fact had returned to his full duties as bishop only 
days afterwards.26 But the real significance of the failed 
plot was that it gave the balìa justifiable reason to 
further centralize Lucca under the Guinigi house, as it led 
to the declaration of Paolo as absolute Signore. 
 The Bishop of Lucca and the canons of S. Martino were 
pardoned for their crime of treason against the state, which 
in most instances would have met with the fate of immediate 
execution. Bartolomeo da Aramo was eventually executed, but 
even this decision seems to have been one in which city 
leaders pondered carefully for a while before proceeding.27  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
25Sercambi, Le Croniche,  3: 21, “...avendo invidia di tale 
capitanatico preso per lo dicto Paolo, e come iovano, sì 
comferiò con alcuna chalonaco di santo Martino.” 
 
26Giuseppe Benedetto, “Fra Corruzione e Riforme: I Monasteri 
Femminili della Città e del Territorio di Lucca nella 
seconda metà del Trecento e nel primo Trentennio del 
Quattrocento,” in Ilaria del Carretto e il suo Monumento: La 
Donna nell’ Arte, la cultura, e la società del ’400, ed. S. 
Toussaint (Lucca: S. Marco, 1995), 189. 
 
27Ibid., 3: 21, “...per qual cosa, doppo alquanti giorni, al 
dicto maestro Bartolomeo, in vernadì, adì .XVIIII novembre 
in 1400, li fu per lo capitano del popolo in sulla piassa di 
santo Michele la testa tagliata.”   
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Though Paolo has been characterized as being lenient in 
response to some of the criminal activities that went on in 
his territory, even such serious wrongdoings as treason, on 
this occasion he had motive in doing so. The mild treatment 
accorded the Bishop by Paolo had little to do with the fact 
the he was a member of the Guinigi house; when Lazzaro was 
murdered by their own brother Antonio in February 1400, 
Paolo was in favor of a quick redemption for this crime of 
an immediate death sentence. What really mattered to Paolo 
at this point was consolidating his new regime, and by 
pardoning the high church official he figured to stand a 
better chance of getting on the good side of Pope Boniface 
IX. 
 The reason that Paolo wanted to gain the immediate 
approval of Boniface IX was that Lucca had for three-
quarters of a century been forced to make a costly annual 
payment to the Church, as well as having to fulfill other 
shameful obligations as a result of the crimes against the 
Church committed by Castruccio Castracani. It was one of the 
new Signore’s first objectives to end this mandatory 
contribution to the coffers of the Church, and he was able 
to do so, as will be discussed in Chapter six, below. Thus, 
through good friends, some astute political maneuvering, and 
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good fortune, Paolo was able to withstand the initial 
attempts to question his new authority in Lucca. During the 
first few months of his reign, the new leader of Lucca was  
concerned with strengthening his rule both inside and 
outside the Lucchese state, but his initial efforts were to 
be centered within his own city-state. 
     Consolidation of the Regime  
 Despite the fact that Paolo was able to successfully 
maintain power through the important early weeks, the 
overall situation of Lucca upon his assumption to Signore 
was hardly better than before. The city-state still faced 
problems on many different levels, and thus, the primary 
objective of Paolo at the outset was to strengthen his 
recently-won power. One of the first steps taken in order to 
gain favor at home was the freeing of certain individuals 
who had been imprisoned for debt to the commune of Lucca, as 
may be seen in his decree of 24 November 1400.28 In 
addition, Paolo stipulated on this same day that those 
officials who had been forbidden to leave Lucca during the 
height of the plague, but had done so anyway, were granted 
                                                          
28A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 1, c. 13v., p. 22. 
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pardons and were allowed to return freely to Lucca with no 
penalty.29    
 Another attempt to bring immediate favor to the regime 
was the liberation of certain families of exiles. These 
families were required only to pay a modest tax to the new 
government to be able to return, and several groups resumed 
residence in Lucca after the decree was handed down.30  
Paolo undoubtedly enacted these measures in order to at once 
enhance the popularity of the regime, but they were also 
intended to help solve some problems of a more practical 
nature, specifically the economic crisis that the city faced 
at the beginning of the fifteenth century. For example, the 
tax requirement for returning exiles provided money for the 
coffers of the new government, the return of high-ranking 
officials who had fled the pestilence would have helped fill 
the offices of the de-populated state, and it may be argued 
that it was a sound political move to free prisoners who had 
fallen into debt because of the burden on the state simply 
to keep them imprisoned. 
 In addition, Paolo consolidated his regime by making 
the institutions and offices of government as similar as 
                                                          
29Ibid.  
 
30Civitali, Historie, 2: 270-71. 
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possible to those associated with the republic. Even after 
he assumed the title of absolute Signore on 21 November 
after the failed plot of the Bishop of Lucca, Paolo allowed  
the Anziani of the November-December term to fulfill their 
offices until the end of the year. Though the councils were 
abolished at the end of the year when the duration of their 
term had expired, on the first day of 1401, the Council of 
the Signore (“Consiglio Domini”) was established, which in 
many ways resembled the college of the Anziani.31 Thirty-six 
individuals were selected for the purpose of serving as one 
of the private counselors to the Signore. The names of these 
thirty-six, twelve from each of the three terzieri of Lucca, 
were then placed in a tasca and drawn out nine at a time, so 
that these officials served for three-month terms in this 
privileged office.32   
 Though the terms of office were slightly longer for the 
new consiglieri of the Signore than the two-month terms 
previously held by members of the Anziani, many of the same 
powers and responsibilities concerning civic matters were 
held by the two bodies. Paolo was quick to make provisions 
not only for who the consiglieri were to be for the ensuing 
                                                          
31A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n.1, c. 23, p. 43. 
 
32Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 34; also see Cianelli, 
“Dissertazioni,” 119-122. 
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year, but also what specific powers they were to have. On 1 
January 1401, the day after the College of the Anziani had 
been dismissed, Paolo defined the rights of the new 
officers. They were to have the ability to do the following: 
to handle any sort of appeal, or petition concerning the 
present form of the Statutes; to elect the provisores of the 
fortresses and citadels of Lucchese territory, as well as 
providing for the “victualia arma et alia infortilitiis” for 
these military structures; to handle all matters concerning 
revenues (“super introitibus”), including the selling and 
alienation of the goods of the rebels and exiles of the 
state; to take a role in whatever pertained to the offices 
of the Dovana and the Abbondanza; to legally bear arms in 
the city and countryside of Lucca (along with one of their 
servants); and to watch over and guard the widows, pupils, 
the poor, and the religiosi, in addition to all of the pious 
places of the city -- just to note some of the powers that 
Paolo bestowed upon his private counselors.33 
  The new Signore of Lucca not only gave these officials 
extensive powers throughout the realm, but he also enacted 
strict measures to protect them under the law in a document 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
33A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 1, c. 22-22v., p. 41-
42. 
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that fittingly begins, “If any malicious person kills one of 
our counselors, they will be dragged through our city of 
Lucca without a tabula up to the place of Justice, and there 
suspended from a noose as a thief until they die.”34 Paolo 
also stipulated that if one of his consiglieri were wounded 
in such a way while inside the Palace that there was a 
showing of blood, then the offending person would be 
executed; if, on the other hand, the attack came outside of 
the Palace and there was evidence of bloodshed, then the 
assailants would have both of their hands cut off.   
 Paolo was not a cruel man, by his contemporaries 
standards, but he did intend on having the edicts of his 
court officials carried out throughout his territories, 
without them having to fear any form of retribution.35 For 
this was the mark of a solidified state. Without internal 
order, independence from other powers would persist only a 
short period of time. In his Oath of the Counselors 
(“Iuramentum Consiglieri”), another measure passed by Paolo 
in the early days of January 1401, it was decreed that the 
new consiglieri should never in any way consent to any 
                                                          
34Ibid, n. 1, c. 23, p. 43, “Et si qua persona dolose 
interfecerit aliquem ex nostris consiliariis strascinetur 
per civitatem nostrum lucanii sive tabula usque ad locum 
Iustitie et ibi furcis laqueo suspendatur ita que moriatur.” 
 
35Ibid. 
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dimunition of their powers, another piece of evidence that 
what the Signore wanted above all was to strengthen the 
Lucchese state, not his own personal perogatives.36 
 The Signore kept in place many other offices under 
their same names that had served Lucca in the republic. He 
appointed other citizens to fill such ancient offices as 
those of the podestà, the camerarii, the notaries for the 
civil and criminal courts, those of the Fondaco, and many 
others. In addition, the new government kept the system set 
up for the Lucchese contado during the late fourteenth 
century of having nine vicarie, and Paolo accordingly 
appointed nine vicars at the beginning of 1401 to head these 
sub-regions of the Lucchese state. 
 Another method in which Paolo sought to strengthen the 
new regime at home was to ensure that the best defense 
mechanisms possible were at the disposal of the citizens in 
the contado. He was very insistent that the defenses in the 
countryside be kept up to par, as seen in the letter that he 
received on 19 December 1400 from a relative of the vicar of 
Valdariano explaining to Paolo why there had been a delay in 
building the trench there. The Signore had apparently 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
36Ibid., n. 1, c. 23v., p. 44. 
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inquired why work on the project had not already begun.37  
Upon taking over Lucca in late November 1400, Paolo had 
ordered all the vicars to immediately set in order their 
town defenses, and on 23 December, the podestà in the 
commune of Montecarlo, Nicolao Gelli, wrote to him claiming 
the workers there had need of tools in order to carry out 
the digging of the trench around the fortress.38 Five days 
later apparently the tools had arrived, because Gelli wrote 
again claiming that the work on the trench had begun.39 The 
news was not all bad from the outerlying areas in these 
early days, however; on 10 January 1401, the Signore 
received word via letter from his vicar at Castiglione that 
the fortresses of Castelnuovo, Palleroso, and Castiglione 
were all in good shape.40 
 City bells were also an important means of defense for 
early Renaissance cities and towns for calling men to arms 
or sounding warnings of approaching invaders, and Paolo was 
also insistent that those in the smaller communes of the 
                                                          
37Carteggio di Paolo Guingi 1400-1430, in Regesti del R. 
Archivio di Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi and Eugenio 
Lazzareschi, Vol. III, pt. i (Lucca: Giusti, 1925), regesto 
n.12, p. 166. 
 
38Ibid., regesto n.18, p. 167. 
 
39Ibid., regesto n.26, p. 168. 
 
40Ibid., regesto n.44, p. 170. 
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state be in place and in good repair. On 30 December 1400, 
Paolo received a letter from his vicar at Massa Lunense, 
Petrus de Bernardinis, that the new bell the Signore had 
ordered for them had been placed in the tower and the old 
one sent back to Lucca.41 One letter in particular to Paolo 
in these early active days of the new regime shows the 
intense effort put forth to secure the border territories of 
Lucca. The vicar of Montecarlo, Nicolao Martini, informed 
the Signore that at Avellano, Sorana, Castelvecchio, and 
Pietrabuona all they do day and night is make bertesche, 
palancati, and other fortifications for their towers, and 
that at Montecarlo work went on continually on the trench 
around the fortress.42   
 Paolo also provided for the defenses of Lucca itself, 
spending large sums throughout his thirty-year reign on the 
maintenance and upkeep of the city walls and gates. The 
frequent appearance of foreign armies in Tuscany during the 
initial months of the fifteenth century meant that keeping 
uninvited invaders out of Lucca and its border regions was 
going to be a difficult, if not impossible task, but Paolo 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
41Ibid., regesto n.28, p. 168.  
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at the onset of his regime set out to do everything he could 
for its well-being, both in the city and in the countryside.   
 One of the primary ways that Renaissance rulers 
consolidated their positions within a certain geographical 
region was through marriage alliances, and in this respect 
Paolo Guinigi presents us with a prime example. Though there 
is little extant evidence concerning Paolo’s first marriage 
to Maria Caterina of the Antelminelli family, the only 
remaining direct descendent of Castruccio Castracani, it was 
this marriage because of the immediate wealth that it 
bestowed upon him that should be held as at least partly 
responsible for his ascent to the head of the family.43   
 Franca Ragone recently argued that Paolo’s marriages 
were generally political decisions designed to enact 
powerful alliances in order to strengthen their anti-
Florentine position.44 The first outside support that Paolo 
sought after his assumption to the Signoria was that of the 
Duke of Milan. He sent agents to Lombardy as early as 
November 1400 to inform him of the change in Lucca, and to 
                                                          
43Salvatore Bongi, Di Paolo Guinigi e delle sue Ricchezze 
(Lucca: Benedini Guidotti, 1871), 8, 108. 
  
44Ragone, “Le spose del Signore: Scelte Politiche e 
Cerimonie alla Corte di Paolo Guinigi,” in Ilaria del 
Carretto e il suo Monumento: La donna nell’ Arte, La 
Cultura, e La Società del ‘400, ed. S. Toussaint (Lucca: S. 
Marco, 1995), 122. 
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seek his good will toward the new regime there.45 One of the 
chief reasons that Paolo wanted to make early contact with 
the Duke was so that he could settle on a second marriage 
partner who was agreeable to Milan. Paolo’s earliest state 
correspondence, as seen in his Carteggio, was directed to 
the Duke and some of his officials, especially Francesco 
Barbavaro, concerning this question. Paolo balked, however, 
when he received the suggestions of Giangaleazzo because of 
the fact that the girls mentioned were of too young an age, 
implying that he was also very interested in having heirs as 
soon as possible.46   
 The eventual choice made for his second wife turned out 
to be Ilaria, daughter of Carlo del Carretto, whose family 
has been shown to have had ties with the Visconti, and so 
this marriage may have been made through the agency of Milan 
as well.47 After the sudden death of Ilaria in 1405 due to 
complications from the birth of their second child, which 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
45Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3:21. 
 
46Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n.4, 6, p. 4. 
 
47Ragone, “Le spose,” 126; also see Francesca Imperiale, “I 
Marchesi del Carretto di Finale dell’ Ambito della Politica 
Genovese tra fine ‘300 e primi ‘400,” in Ilaria del Carretto 
e il suo Monumento: La donna nell’ arte, la cultura, e la 
società dell ‘400, ed. S. Toussaint (Lucca: S. Marco, 1995), 
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led to the production of the marvellous funerary monument 
for her by the artist Jacopo della Quercia still situated 
today in the duomo of the city, the Signore established a 
period of extended mourning in the city revealing his true 
love for her. Paolo was heartbroken, but the business of 
managing the state soon had to go on, and a big part of 
managing the state in fifteenth-century Italy had to do with 
the production of as many descendents as possible.   
 Before the end of 1405, Paolo was already beginning to 
hear proposals for his next marriage alliance from those in 
his court; on this occasion he settled on Piacentina of the 
Camerino family. Ragone writes that this marriage was partly 
the result of Paolo’s friendship with Rodolfo da Varano, but 
also was due to the ascent of Gregory XII to the papal 
throne, both of whom had troubled relations with Florence.48 
Finally, Paolo’s last marriage in 1420 to Jacopa Trinci was 
an attempt to actually improve relations with the 
Florentines. Florence had recently dispatched the armed 
brigades of the condottiere Braccio to devastate Lucca, and 
this marriage alliance was an attempt to appease them, 
according to Ragone.49 In short, the marriage alliances of 
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Paolo were all made with an eye toward the continuation of 
the principle of self-rule, and toward the consolidation of 
the Guinigi regime in Lucca. 
 Another means in which we may see Paolo seeking to 
consolidate his rule in the early weeks was by having a 
citadel constructed, since he was “hearing that in Florence 
and elsewhere there were discussions about bringing down his 
dominion.”50 Sercambi relates that the construction of the 
citadel, which was built on the ruins of the building once 
used as a fortress by Castruccio Castracani, was begun on 9 
May 1401, and was already completed by October of that 
year.51 Even though some of the groundwork had obviously 
already been laid, the speed at which the construction of 
Paolo’s citadel was carried out marks the urgency of the new 
regime to consolidate power. According to the description 
provided by Sercambi, the citadel appears to have been quite 
extensive.52 Such a project required a large number of 
                                                          
50Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 36, “...sentendo che in Firenza 
e altro’ si faceano ragionamenti di abassare il suo dominio, 
e altra volta se n’ era alchuno scoperto; posto che a tucto 
si riparasse, nondimeno dispuose il dicto Paolo di fare una 




52“Ibid., 3: 36-37, “la qual comprende dal canto che va allo 
spidale della Misericordia, distendendo verso mezzodi, fine 
alle mura della ciptade, che è circa braccia 280 di 
lungessada quella parte; dalla parte di verso sectentrione 
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workers, both unskilled laborers from the countryside and 
skilled craftsmen from all parts of Italy, including 
“maestri di pietra, di legname, e di ferro,” such as 
Ambrogio and Donato da Fiesole, Pietro da Brescia, Giovanni 
Ganti, Jacopo da Marti, Domenico and Giuntino Guide, and 
Jacopo da Siena.53    
 Finally, one last example of Paolo’s early attempts to 
strengthen the regions of his domain was his trip throughout 
Lucchese territory in 1403 with his new wife Ilaria to see 
first hand what sort of living conditions his subjects in 
the countryside had to deal with, an affair that reveals his 
concern for the well-being of the state.54 Though his 
consiglieri appear to have been somewhat leery about the 
possible dangers that the Signore might be subjected to 
while on such an endeavor, he insisted that the trip be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
distendendosi fine alle mura del prato della ciptà, che è 
circha braccia 120 di lungessa. E dal quella parte conpuose 
una porta maestra, avenso per difesa da quella parte du’ 
torrioni.”  
  
53Eugenio Lazzareschi, “Paolo Guinigi: Magnifico Signore di 
Lucca,” Rassegna Nazionale, ser. 2, 55 (1927), 105. 
 
54A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 1, c. 104v., p. 206, 
“Cogitans et mente revolvens quod segnius irritant animos 
dimissa per aures quam que sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus et 
longe melius et clarius per visum quam auditum omnia 
comprehenduntur voluit tam situm, statum et conditiones 
terrarum suarum quam conditiones et mores suorum 
subditorum.” 
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carried through. Moreover, in order to provide some 
stability at home while he was away, Paolo established a 
Council of Regents who were given full authority in all 
matters of the state.55   
 It was determined that the twelve-member Council be 
divided into two groups of six, with each group being 
responsible for residing in the Palace twelve hours each 
day, one group from breakfast (prandium) to dinner (cena), 
the other from dinner to the next day’s breakfast. Upon the 
end of one shift, at least two members of the departing 
group were required to stay with the incoming group for one 
or two hours to discuss or take action on any necessary 
business of the state. Thus, Paolo’s sincere desire for the 
interests of Lucca as a whole may be seen both in the trip 
to personally survey the conditions of his people and the 
lands of Lucchese territory upon which they lived, as well 
as in the careful provisions he made for the governing of 
the mother city while he was away.56 In order to best know 
                                                          
55Ibid.,  n.1, c. 104v.-105, p. 206-207, “Quod infrascripti 
Lucanun cives quos inter ceteros sibi devotissimos et 
fidelissimos preelegit de quibus que non aliam quam de 
seipsos gererit confidentiam singularem toto tempore 
visitationis...possint providere, disponere, et ordinare 
Consilium prefati Domini de quibus apparet in actis 
Cancellarie.” 
 
56See Cianelli, “Dissertazioni,” 126-128. 
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how to protect Lucchese independence he wanted to know 
first-hand what were the weakest links in the Lucchese 
contado. 
 It can hardly be underestimated the troubles Lucca that 
faced at the beginning of the fifteenth century. One 
obstacle that the Lucchese shared in common with other 
cities of Tuscany at the beginning of the century was that 
of finding a way to keep armed bands of soldiers out of 
their territory. Lucchese officials were constantly 
searching for information concerning the movements and 
intentions of foreign troops from their vicars in the 
countryside and others residing throughout the Tuscan 
region. Sercambi noted that “while there are being made some 
remedies throughout Lombardy...in Tuscany what governs are 
those things that naturally the planet of Mars has arranged, 
that is, battles.”57 The difficulty for Lucca, of course, 
was that in order to maintain security in the state, large 
costs were necessary in order to keep up their defenses from 
these territorial invaders. Not only were the military 
constructions expensive to man and maintain, but the single 
                                                          
57Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 48, “Mentre che in Lombardia si 
faceano i ripari...in Toscana simile s’ ordinava di quelle 
cose che naturalmente il pianeto di Marte dispuone, cioè 
bactaglie.” 
   
       100
largest cost for the Lucchese was in keeping men of arms 
under constant hire.58 
 In addition to the threat of armies masquerading across 
the peripheral regions of the Lucchese countryside, the 
other major obstacle that called for immediate attention on 
the homefront was the depopulated state of the city and its 
contado. Wars, famine, and especially the recent bout with 
the plague in the year 1400 had severely decreased the 
number of people in the countryside of Lucca. Many of the 
communes in these regions felt oppressed because of what 
they considered exorbitant taxation, chiefly because of the 
fact that there now fewer people to help derive the communal 
sums required by Lucca. Petitions from the rural areas to 
Lucca to lower taxes had begun much earlier, but continued 
into the period of Paolo.59 One measure taken in order to 
help re-populate the countryside of Lucca was the entreaty 
                                                          
58Christine Meek estimated that in 1400, the cost of keeping 
men of arms was at least 23,000 florins per year, or 
approximately one-third of annual revenues; see Lucca 1369-
1400: Politics and Society in an Early Renaissance City-
State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 124-25. 
 
59Unrest in the subject communes over taxation was almost 
universal throughout Italy in the early fifteenth century, 
and actually Lucca seems to have been more responsive to 
matters in the countryside than elsewhere. See, for example, 
David Nicholas, The Later Medieval City, 1300-1500 (London: 
Longman, 1997), 89-90, where Lucchese exploitation of the 
contado is defined as “problematical;” this will be 
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the Signore made to foreign citizens to come and live in the 
Sei Miglia, that part of the Lucchese state that was 
situated closest to the city itself. Those persons who 
accepted this offer were given fiscal immunity from taxation 
for a subsequent ten-year period, except for the tax on salt 
and the gabelle.60 And while this may have brought a few new 
families into Lucchese territory, it must have produced some 
adverse feelings from those citizens already living in the 
Sei Miglia who still paid taxes; this exemplifies the 
various difficult decisions that the new regime had to face 
in the initial weeks and months on the homefront. But Paolo 
had more to deal with than the problem of consolidating the 
new regime at home. Just as important as it was for the new 
Signore to bring together Lucca and its neighboring regions, 
it was perhaps even more vital to immediately attain, and 
then maintain, friends outside of the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
discussed further in Chapter five, below. 
 
60A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 1, c. 134v., p. 266. 
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         CHAPTER 4 
 
 
  LUCCA IN THE FLORENTINE-MILANESE CONFLICT 
 
    A Time of Crisis, 1400-1402  
 The historiography of early Quattrocento Lucca has 
generally stressed that Paolo Guinigi, following the 
precedent set by his older brother Lazzaro in 1399 and by 
other Lucchese leaders of the fourteenth century, took a 
position of strong and undeterred support for Milan during 
the course of Milan’s final conflict with Florence from 
1400-1402.1 This quite naturally follows Florentine 
historiography, which has claimed that in this period of 
crisis against Milan, Florence was without allies and forced 
to struggle against the Duke of Milan alone.2 Undoubtedly 
there were many occasions during this time in which the 
Signore of Lucca proclaimed a willingness to do everything 
                                                          
1A typical assessment may be seen in Francesco Landogna, La 
politica dei Visconti in Toscana (Milan: Società Dante 
Aligheiri, 1929), 103, “Paolo Guinigi, sin dal momento in 
cui era giunto alla Signoria di Lucca, non aveva dubitato un 
istante di dover seguitare in tutto la politica della 
Repubblica lucchese, quella cioè di tenersi amici i signori 
di Milano.”  
 
2See especially Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian 
Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age 
of Classicism and Tyranny, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1955).  
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in his power to further the dominion of the Duke.3 Toward 
the middle of 1401, however, as the territorial gains of 
Giangaleazzo Visconti continued to pile up, there began in 
Lucca a policy suddenly less inclined to show such pro-
Visconti favoritism, and one in which Paolo and his court 
came to favor the Florentines because of their growing 
concern of the real dangers inherent in any additional 
Milanese expansion. Lucchese, as well as a small part of 
Florentine historiography, therefore, may need to be 
slightly amended on this note. Most of all, however, the 
shift toward Florence in Lucchese foreign policy in 1401 
points out their overriding concern for the liberty of their 
own state. 
  In 1401, the Lucchese were forced to consider the 
long-term repercussions for their own city of a total defeat 
of Florence by the troops of Milan, which was beginning to 
seem like a real possibility. Their policy of tending to 
support one of the two powers (Florence or Milan) because 
the other at that moment was the one which they perceived as 
the bigger threat to their own independence thus continued 
                                                          
3For example, see A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n.5, c. 
26, p. 51, “...Decreveram tamen non calamo sed vivis vocis 
rem hanc Dominationi Vestrae personaliter explicare et 
pedibus et circumfusum vestris desideratissimum conspectum 
Excellentiae Vestrae quem semper internis oculis video vivis 
intueri luminibus et gratas voces arridentis oris Vestri..” 
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to hold true. Throughout 1400 and part of 1401, the Lucchese 
feared Florence most of all, and thus had looked to maintain 
positive relations with the Duke of Milan for protection if 
needed.  
 But at this end of this period, sometime between April 
and October 1401, it began to appear to the Lucchese that 
the Milanese tyrant was perhaps a bigger menace than had 
been thought, as the Florentines had been proclaiming all 
along. Correspondence with the Duke of Milan continued to be 
reverential in tone, masking the true change of heart in 
Lucca. It is certainly impossible to note the change in the 
writings of Sercambi, who was throughout his life hostile to 
what he perceived as the ever-expansionistic ambitions of 
Florence. 
 After the disaster of the imperial troops (whom the 
Florentines had hired) against the armies of the Duke of 
Milan at Brescia in October 1401, matters began to look much 
worse for all the Italian city-states that still clung to 
hopes of keeping their liberty, for now the Duke appeared 
truly unstoppable.4 Though Tuscan cities all around them had 
fallen to Milan, Lucca had remained independent up to that 
point, and the Guinigi regime had even received signs of 
                                                          
4Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 176-79. 
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support from Milan; but, why would the Duke continue to 
allow this if Florence and the rest of northern and central 
Italy were defeated, the Lucchese must have wondered. 
Indeed, Lazzaro Guinigi had come to some agreement with the 
Duke in 1399, but that was before Milanese armies had 
proceeded to take possession of Pisa, Perugia, Siena, 
Assisi, Spoleto, Nocera, and various other communes of 
Tuscany in the following months -- not to mention nearly the 
whole of Lombardy.5 The fall of Bologna to Milan in June 
1402 meant that now nothing lay between the ducal lands and 
Florentine territory. And it was at this “Baronian” point of 
crisis that Lucchese sentiment turned as pro-Florentine as 
it had been in some time. 
 Another matter to consider is why the Duke of Milan did 
not attempt to subjugate Lucca in 1399 or afterwards, during 
the period when he was conquering Pisa, Siena, Perugia, and 
various other cities. The Florentine Leonardo Bruni claimed 
that Lucca had not yet given itself up to the protection of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
5For the military successes and territorial gains of Milan 
in these months, see Nino Valeri, L’ Italia nell’ Età dei 
Principati: dal 1343-1516 (Verona: Arnaldo Mondadori, 1949), 
284-85; Francesco Cognasso, “Il ducato visconteo da Gian 
Galeazzo a Filippo Maria,” in Storia di Milano (Milan: 
Treccani degli Alfieri, 1955), 6: 43-46. 
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Milan, but that “they were not far from obedience.”6 One may 
surmise that considering the military strength Milan could 
muster, the obedience of Lucca might have readily been 
achieved had the Duke wanted to bring it about. He had 
conquered all of northern and much of central Italy by 1401; 
all that remained in this area out of his grasp were 
essentially the territories of Florence, Venice -- and the 
city-state of Lucca.   
  One reason the Lucchese were able to maintain their 
independence through the first two years of the turbulent 
fifteenth century was that by the beginning of the century 
the Duke had begun to feel the ill economic effects of 
having extended the Milanese state so far in such a short 
period of time. One biographer has claimed that the growing 
size of the Milanese state by 1400 had even become something 
                                                          
6“Lucenses quoque haud multum a parendo distabant,” 
Commentarius rerum suo tempore gestarum, 1378-1440, ed. 
Carmine Di Pierro, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, n.s., vol. 
xix  (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1926), 433; elsewhere 
Bruni pointed out that in 1400, “Lucenses vero Pisanis 
finitimi, sive sponte sive metu coacti, ad Mediolanensis 
amicitiam magis respicere videbantur, nec foedus renovare 
cum Florentinis voluerant,”Historiarum Florentini populi 
dalle Origini all’ anno 1404, ed. Emilio Santini, Rerum 
Italicarum Scriptores (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, n.d.), 
279. 
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of an embarrassment to the Duke.7 He may have believed that 
he could maintain a degree of control over Lucca simply by 
supporting the local ruler there (whoever it was), thus 
escaping the need to keep officials and a costly military 
presence there. Or perhaps the Lucchese, based on the wisdom 
gained from their experience of foreign subjugation from 
1342-1369, had been more careful in the enactment of foreign 
alliances over the years than those cities which had 
recently lost their independence to the Duke; perhaps 
Lucca’s insistence on maintaining close ties with the 
Visconti over the years did actually pay off in friendlier 
treatment from Milan in these months of crisis. 
 Giangaleazzo certainly thought that control over Pisa 
and its port was the greatest priority in Tuscany. He may  
have had it in his plans in the summer of 1402 to appease 
Lucca, get their support against Florence, and then 
afterwards, make an about face and assume command of Lucca.  
Much of the Duke of Milan’s intentions in this period of 
crisis in Tuscany remains unclear; what lay at the basis of 
Lucca holding onto its independence in this period of the 
height of the Visconti aggression is in the end difficult to 
explain fully. The Duke’s position toward Lucca is no more 
                                                          
7E. R. Chamberlain, The Count of Virtue: Giangaleazzo 
Visconti, Duke of Milan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
                   108
puzzling, however, than other decisions that he made, 
especially the question of why he did not attack Florence in 
the summer of 1402 when he held the decided advantage, a 
question that has been raised by historians of this conflict 
since that very day. 
 Upon assumption of the Signoria of Lucca in November 
1400, Paolo immediately dispatched agents to Milan to seek 
the good will of the Duke. He expressed a strong devotion to 
Giangaleazzo in his earliest correspondence with Milan, 
referring to him as “illustrissime princeps excelse et 
gloriose domine pater,” and stating that he desired above 
all to do “that which ought to please your Dominion.”8 In 
addition, Paolo was quick to let Lucchese officials in the 
countryside know who his ties were with; in January 1401, 
the Vice-vicar of the Lucchese commune of Pietrasanta wrote 
to Paolo stating that his order had been fulfilled, as the 
bridge at Motrone had been constructed so that the Duke of 
Milan, or any of his knights, messengers, or family members 
would have free passage and access to Pisa.9 Paolo’s letter 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1965), 63-67. 
8A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 5, c. 26, p. 51. 
 
9Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi 1400-1430, in Regesti del R. 
Archivio di Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi and Eugenio 
Lazzareschi, vol. III, pt. i (Lucca: Giusti, 1925), regesto 
n.47, p. 170. 
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to the Duke on 8 April 1401 is especially revealing as to 
the Lucchese reliance on Milan, for Paolo was apologetic for 
not having come to visit him personally in Milan, claiming 
that he was ever desirous of seeing him, but “could not yet 
leave without danger to my state, which is your state.”10   
 Meanwhile, Florence by 1401 had grown desperate to 
reverse the course of this latest struggle with the 
Visconti. They had by now witnessed the fall of several 
neighboring cities of Tuscany to the aggression of Milan.  
The deliberations in their councils during the first part of 
1401, which Brucker characterized as “nervous, vacillating, 
and uncertain,” produced little, save an offer of 100,000 
florins to the Holy Roman Emporer to come to Italy and 
assist them in the war against the Duke. The Florentines had 
been attempting through diplomacy the previous few weeks to 
convince other powers such as Rome, Naples, Venice, and 
Genoa (as well as Lucca) that the Duke’s presence in Tuscany 
was bad for everyone.11   
 After the defeat of the troops of the Holy Roman 
Emperor Roberto by the Milanese condottieri at Brescia in 
                                                          
10A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n.5, c. 26, p. 51, “Sed 
quoniam sine periculo status mei qui vester est nondum 
abscedere possum.” 
 
11 Brucker, Civic World, 175. 
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October 1401, the Florentine outlook became increasingly 
bleak. In this state of despair, the Florentines decided to 
adopt a more aggressive strategy against Milan as they 
attempted to cut off all passes between Pisa and Milan. At 
this point, once again the Florentine Signoria appealed to 
Paolo to join their side against the Visconti aggression in 
Tuscany. Yet Lucca, despite having made some recent moves in 
the direction of an understanding with Florence, claimed 
they were still opposed to making any firm commitments and 
were only willing to listen. Paolo proclaimed to the 
Florentine agents that he wanted to remain neutral, not 
wanting to go to war with anyone, but rather to live in 
peace.12 The delay-tactics of the Lucchese were soon to end, 
however, as the Milanese threat continued to mount. 
 When the fighting season opened in the spring of 1402, 
and the city of Bologna was surrounded, and then quickly 
captured by ducal troops (in June), it appeared to almost 
all witnesses who left an account of the events that the 
next likely move of the Duke of Milan would be to attack 
Florence. The Florentines, without the forces of the emperor 
                                                          
12Giovanni Sercambi, Le Croniche Lucchesi, ed. Salvatore 
Bongi, 3 vols., in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (Rome: 
Giusti, 1892), 3: 50-51, “Alla quale fu facto alcuno 
presente; et exposta loro inbasciata, fu per lo dicto 
singnore risposto a conpimento, in forma debita, in modo che 
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who departed Italy in shame in April 1402, and now without 
its ally Bologna, were in desperate need of friends. 
Although they probably did not expect much in terms of a 
firm commitment, the Florentines continued to appeal to 
Paolo Guinigi to join forces against the tyrant of Milan. 
The fact that they did continue to appeal to him, moreover, 
shows that Paolo had not ceded governorship of the city to 
Milan (as is implied by some Florentine rhetoricians like 
Bruni), and that the Florentines were holding on to the hope 
that Paolo would change his mind. 
  The Lucchese had begun to attract more interest from 
Florence as the Milanese threat in Tuscany became more 
urgent. By inspecting the Carteggio of Paolo, it appears 
that during the first full year of his reign, his authority 
in Lucca was hardly acknowledged by the Florentines, much 
less accepted. Only two letters from the year 1401 arrived 
to Paolo from Florence, both from Nuccio Giovanni. In the 
next year, however, from March to September alone (the 
latter the month in which the Duke died), there were at 
least seventeen letters sent from Florence to the Signore of 
Lucca, seven of which were from the Ten on War (“Decem 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pogo overo nulla acquistaron della intentione che Fiorentini 
aveano preso.”  
                   112
Officiales Balìe Comune Florentie”), and four others from 
the Florentine Priors (“Priores artium et vexillifer.”)13 
 The Florentines at this time were undoubtedly looking 
to make any alliances they could in order to better oppose 
Milan, but they became especially friendly to Paolo in the 
spring of 1402 because they thought for a time that they 
would be able to use the Lucchese port of Motrone. In a move 
that many presumed a precursor to an upcoming assault on 
Florence, earlier that spring the Duke’s condottiere had 
begun to take control of the roads leading into and out of 
the Arno city. This blockade led to a tight restriction of 
goods able to enter Florence and, as evidenced by the 
outcries of Florentine merchants, forced them to abandon 
their usual ways of sending their own goods abroad; they 
looked to Lucca for some relief in regard to this problem. 
 In April 1401, the Florentine Antonio di Ser Chello was 
sent to Lucca to inform them that the Duke of Milan had cut 
off their usual roads to transport goods and to ask that 
permission be allowed to use the port of Motrone. Antonio 
was given instructions to flatter Paolo if necessary, tell 
him how much hope they had in him, and to urge him to 
                                                          
13See Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi (1400-1430), in Regesti del 
R. Archivio di Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi and Eugenio 
Lazzareschi, Vol. III, pt. i (Lucca: Giusti, 1925). 
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maintain amicable relations with Florence.14 Paolo, whether 
because of the revenue this would bring to Lucca,15 or 
perhaps because he was by now beginning to perceive what the 
defeat of Florence would inevitably mean to his own state, 
agreed to help -- despite the expected displeasure of 
Giangaleazzo.16 After Antonio returned to Florence, Paolo 
received a letter from the Ten on War stating they were 
appreciative of his recent response in agreeing to help 
oppose the unjust demands of the Duke.17 
 Other Florentine correspondence to Lucca in the late 
spring and summer of 1402 also verifies that some mutual 
                                                          
14Commissioni di Rinaldo degli Albizzi per Il Comune di 
Firenze dal MCCCXCIX al MCCCCXXXIII, 3 vols., (Florence: M. 
Cellini, 1867), 1: 10-11, “Serai a Lucca con quel Signore, e 
salutato amorevolemente, farai introito della novità fatta 
per lo Duca contra’ Fiorentini, sì dell’ arrestare le 
mercatanzie, e sì del vietare ch’ e nostri cittadini a Pisa, 
o vero a Siena, non possano usare.  E poi dirai come li 
nostri mercatanti deliberano di fare scala a Mutrone [sic] e 
per lo suo terreno...mostrandoli quanto questa Signoria e 
tutta la cittadanza e università dei mercatanti hanno 
speranza in lui; e confortandolo sì per mantenere l’ 
amicizia e fratellanza con noi....”  
 
15The Florentine chronicler Morelli claimed that it was to 
cost Florence 36,000 florins per year to have use of 
Motrone; see Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli, Ricordi, ed. 
Vittore Branca (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1956), 424. 
 
16Chello reported back to Florence that Paolo agreed to help 
them with the transit of their goods “non obstante quod ipse 
putaret predicta cedere in displicentiam Ducis,”  
Commissioni di Rinaldo, 1: 11. 
 
17Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n.101, p. 178. 
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agreement had been reached.18 On 29 April, nine days after 
Chello made his report of his visit to Lucca to the 
governors of Florence, the Ten on War wrote Paolo asking 
permission to move an army of lance through Lucchese 
territories from Genoa to Florence.19 In May, the Ten   
requested from Paolo that free passage through Lucchese 
territory be given to Antonio del Fiesco, a condottiere 
under their hire, along with his 100 balestrieri.20 Later in 
the summer the Ten asked that the Signore of Lucca help the 
Florentine agents in Pietrasanta, who were not able to 
return to Florence without his assistance.21 These are the 
sorts of requests that would not have been made between two 
belligerent states.  
 One incident particularly reveals the Florentine 
desperation to get Lucca to oppose the Visconti. During the 
summer of 1402, while the Florentine Buonaccorso Pitti held 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
18In April 1402, Paolo did promise the Florentines use of 
Motrone, but would not sign a formal contract concerning 
this matter; D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 
Duke of Milan (1351-1402): A Study in the Political Career 
of an Italian Despot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1941), 286. 
 
19Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n.94, p. 177-78. 
 
20Ibid., regesto n.109, p. 179. 
 
21Ibid., regesto n.163, p. 186. 
 
                   115
the office of Captain of Barga, a commune of the 
Florentines, he was ordered by the Ten on War to shut down 
the roads between Milan and Pisa, and to confiscate all the 
goods that were seized on them. Part of the booty seized on 
the roads turned out to be eleven mules carrying twenty-two 
bales of English wool belonging to the merchants of Lucca, 
however, and Paolo responded by demanding from the 
Florentines, with “scarcely veiled threats” that they be 
returned at once. Pitti wrote in his Diary that the 
Florentine Signoria, fearful that Paolo would become an 
enemy, made an exception to their rule, gave in to his 
threats, and asked Pitti to return the goods to the 
Lucchese.22   
 Cordial relations with Florentine merchants were short-
lived, however. When Giangaleazzo received word that the 
Florentines were being given access to move their 
merchandise by way of the road through Lucca, he sent 
immediate warning to Lucca to desist from such allowances to 
                                                          
22Pitti also noted that Bartolomeo Corbinelli, who was 
friends with Paolo, apparently pressured the Signoria to 
release the goods to Paolo; see Two Memoirs of Renaissance 
Florence: The Diaries of Buonaccorso Pitti and Gregorio 
Dati, trans. Julia Martines, ed. Gene Brucker (Prospect 
Heights, Illinios: Waveland Press, 1991), 76; also see 
Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 148, p. 185.   
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the Florentines.23 Sercambi noted that the Duke made clear 
what he wanted by sending 800 lance from Pavia to the 
borders of Lucca.24 In addition, a Visconti ship was 
positioned in the mouth of the Magra near Motrone to ensure 
Florentine goods did not enter or exit from there.25  
  The Lucchese were quick to follow the Duke’s order, 
and deny access to the western coast of Italy to the 
Florentines. The Signore of Lucca justified the change to 
Florence by claiming that Lucchese roads in those bellicose 
days had become too dangerous to leave open to traffic.26  
On the other hand, in June 1402 Paolo sent an embassy to 
Milan led by Nicolao da Berla Guinigi and Nicolao Cecchorini 
di Poggio to appease the Duke, but apparently some sort of 
snag was hit along the way. Sercambi does not elaborate on 
why the embassy turned back; perhaps en route to Pavia 
problems arose, or perhaps the Lucchese agents were denied 
admittance to see the Duke once they arrived at their 
                                                          
23See Francesco Cognasso, “Il ducato visconteo da Gian 
Galeazzo a Filippo Maria,” Storia di Milano, 17 vols. 
(Milan: Treccani degli Alfieri, 1955), 6: 66. 
 
24Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 59-60. 
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destination.27 Later in the summer, however, the Lucchese 
were able to appease Milan to some degree; another embassy 
led by Paolo’s secretary Guido Manfredi and Stefano di 
Jacopo di Poggio went in August and returned having 
reconciled with the Duke.28 
 There are signs that Paolo continued to support the 
Florentine side underhandedly during the late summer months 
of 1402, however. Undoubtedly closing the Lucchese road was 
not popular in Florence; that it was done to prevent 
immediate attack on their own city did not seem to matter.  
Buonaccorso Pitti, the Florentine Captain of Barga during 
the summer of 1402, wrote to the Ten of War after the 
blockade was re-established that he was willing to start a 
rebellion against the Signore of Lucca, claiming he would 
take personal responsibility if the Florentine government 
wanted to distance itself from the act.29   
 Yet, there is evidence that other Florentines saw Paolo 
in a more positive light. On 20 July, Loccius de Tuscanella 
                                                          
27Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 59, “...andassero ambasciatori 
al dicto duga, con intentione che s’ adolcisse la mala 
voluntà del dicto duga contra del prefato signore, et 
chaminoro del mese di giugno...E del dicto mese ritornoro, 
non con tale inbasciata.”  
 
28Ibid., “li quali andonno del mese di ogosto e tornorno con 
reconciliatione.”  
 
29Pitti, Diario, 76-77. 
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wrote in gratitude to Paolo for the kindnesses shown to 
their Captain Bernadone da Serri.30 Five days before the 
death of Giangaleazzo on 2 September, Paolo received a 
message from the Visconti agents in Pisa, Guido dal Bagno 
and Giovanni da Cremonte, stating that the mercenary Captain 
taken into custody and imprisoned in Lucca was a Visconti 
Captain, and therefore an enemy of the Florentines.31 It is 
highly unlikely that Paolo was not aware of such fact. 
Finally, it was Paolo who first informed the Florentines of 
the death of the Duke of Milan, setting off a days-long 
frenzy of celebration in that city.32   
 Thus, for a short period of time, Paolo and the 
Lucchese seem to have decided that the ambitions and 
successes of the Duke of Milan had grown to the extent that 
Lucca itself would be threatened if Florence were conquered 
by Milan. The fall of Bologna to the Duke, the fatal blow 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
30Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 151, p. 185. 
 
31Ibid., regesto n. 178, p. 189. 
 
32Many Florentine sources concur that Paolo was the first to 
reveal news of the Duke’s death to the Florentines, 
something he probably would have shied away from doing if he 
expected acts of revenge from Florence for supporting the 
Duke; e.g., see Cronica Volgare di Anonimo Fiorentino dall’ 
anno 1385 al 1410 già attributa a Piero di Giovanni 
Minerbetti, ed. Elina Bellondi, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 
n.s., vol. XXVII, pt. ii (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, n.d.), 
251; and Morelli, Ricordi, 400. 
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coming in the early summer of 1402, was an event of 
monumental importance in the minds of the Lucchese, as 
evidenced by the amount of space Sercambi gave to it in his 
Chronicle. The development of friendlier relations with 
Florence in these few months of 1402 was not to last for 
long, however; after the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti in 
September 1402, the Lucchese ironically looked again to 
establish cordial relations with Milan. 
 Thus, throughout the period of crisis in Tuscany in 
which Giangaleazzo came to threaten the entire region, the 
Lucchese were not blindly devoted to the powerful lord of 
Milan out of some remembrance of past ties. Paolo did not 
“trust” the Duke so much as it appears that he did from 
their correspondence. When Lucchese independence in late 
1401 suddenly came to appear more threatened by Milan than 
by Florence, then the Lucchese were quick to abandon their 
Milanese ties (though subtly) and to seek to appease 
Florence. 
The Aftermath of the Death of the Duke of Milan 
The sudden death of Giangaleazzo Visconti in September 
1402 brought forth drastic changes throughout the Italian 
peninsula. The event was of such note that many people 
believed there had to have been divine intervention. The 
Florentine chronicler Dati, picking up on this popular 
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notion, wrote that on the night of his death there were 
terrible winds, thunder, and lightning storms throughout all 
his lands.33 Sercambi claimed that for many months a large 
comet had been appearing in the skies, but that upon the 
Duke’s death, it had abruptly disappeared.34 Leonardo Bruni, 
the future Chancellor of Florence, noted that all things in 
Italy amazingly turned around, as the cities that had 
previously been terrified of Visconti aggression now became 
joyful, and those that had supported the Visconti cause, or 
had succumbed to it, now became fearful.35 Niccolò d’ Este, 
for example, had immediate hopes of restoring into his 
domain Parma and Reggio, lands recently seized from him by 
the Duke of Milan’s soldiers; the Carrara ruler of Padua 
likewise began immediate efforts to regain territories once 
his which had recently come under the banner of the 
Visconti.36   
                                                          
33G. Dati, Istoria di Firenze dal 1380 al 1405, ed. L. 
Pratesi (Norcia, 1904), 245, “la notte ch’ e’ morì fu in 
tutta la sua terra tanto terribile tempo di cioè d’ acque, 
di venti con le folgori e tremuoti.”   
 
34Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 60, “E più mesi dinanti che ’l 
dicto duga morisse, fu veduta in cielo una chometa con 
grande coda dirieto. E morto tal duga, la dicta cometa non 
appario più in queste contrade.”  
 
35Bruni, Commentarius rerum suo tempore, 433. 
 
36De Mesquita, Giangaleazzo, 299. 
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 The Roman Pope Boniface IX was also pleased with the 
demise of the Visconti lord, since he was able to resume 
control of lands which had belonged to the Church, 
especially those of Bologna and Perugia. Perhaps the loudest 
cries of happiness, however, came from Florence, the city 
that had been Giangaleazzo’s arch-enemy for well over a 
decade. Florence had been the most active power in 
attempting to stem the tide of Visconti expansion southward 
through Italy; as the leader of the anti-Visconti movement 
in the early years of the Quattrocento, the Florentines 
would be among those that benefitted most from his death. 
 On the other hand, those cities that had become subject 
to Milan in the recent wars were pushed into an increasingly 
precarious situation. In these cities Visconti officials, 
with the support of Milanese troops, had previously seized 
control at the expense of the native families who would now 
certainly begin to take steps to regain power in their 
homeland. In Pisa, Perugia, Siena, and Bologna, as well as 
in many parts of Lombardy, Visconti officials were soon to 
see the rise of local rebellions.37 In addition, they were 
to see the supply of provisions, reinforcements, and other 
necessities coming from the mother city of Milan slow to a 
trickle. Many of the ducal troops guarding Bologna, for 
                                                          
37 Valeri, L’ Italia, 304-323 passim. 
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example, were summoned to Milan after the Duke’s death in 
order to guard the interests of his sons there. The Visconti 
would face many severe tests in the months after the Duke’s 
death in holding on to the territorial acquisitions he had 
made during the latter stages of his lifetime. 
 The reaction in Lucca to the new political realities, 
and the unstable conditions that the death of Giangaleazzo 
produced across northern and central Italy was at first more 
ambivalent than elsewhere. It has been seen that for a 
period in 1401 until the Duke’s death in September 1402, the 
Lucchese perceived the Duke as more of a threat than earlier 
believed, and they had thus established friendlier relations 
with Florence. There can be no doubt that the Lucchese 
remained skeptical about the Duke’s intentions in regard to 
Lucca through the end of his life, despite the conciliatory 
tone of their official correspondence with Milan.     
 The Duke’s death did not mean the Lucchese were ready 
to throw themselves at the feet of the Florentines in a 
state of submission; rather, just the opposite. For what 
soon emerged in Lucca in the aftermath of the change in 
Milan was the adoption of a foreign policy that was 
remarkably consistent with that of the previous decade, that 
is, a policy that sought protection from the one superpower, 
either Florence or Milan, which had come to a temporary 
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disadvantage in their overall conflict. The Lucchese took 
this policy since whichever of the two powers had gained the 
advantage in the overall conflict generally became a threat 
to the border regions of Lucca, and was thus the power 
feared the most by the governors of Lucca. 
 One reason that the Lucchese were able to pursue this  
foreign policy was that they were confident neither Florence 
nor Milan (nor the other major Italian superpowers) would 
tolerate the other gaining full and permanent control of 
Lucca, and thus control over the many important roads and 
passes in its territories. Neither power was thus willing 
(or possibly able) to log the tremendous expense that a long 
siege of a city like Lucca would have required. Thus the 
geographical situation of Lucca is again seen as a major 
factor in understanding the importance of this city-state in 
the early modern period. On the other hand, this very 
geographical situation that the Lucchese found themselves in 
was also responsible for their having to adopt a foreign 
policy in the first place -- at a time when they would have 
preferred to have been left alone to worry with their own 
affairs.      
 Thus, in the weeks following the death of the Duke of 
Milan, the Lucchese were to abandon the friendlier relations 
they had briefly established with the Florentines, moving 
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instead back towards a reconciliation with the new governors 
of Milan.38 The Lucchese were quick to suspect that 
Florentine aggression in the face of the new political 
atmosphere would again become a paramount problem not only 
to them, but also to the rest of Tuscany. As it turned out, 
they were right.  
Barely a month had passed after the Duke’s death before 
the Florentines had enacted an alliance with Pope Boniface 
IX to rescue certain lands of the Church that had previously 
been seized by the Duke. The two allies in addition agreed 
to take on the more difficult task of eliminating the 
Visconti presence from all of Tuscany.39 When Paolo Guinigi 
was asked by the Florentine government to join the alliance 
he refused, claiming that what he really wanted was peace in 
Lucca, and that any alliance with another state would 
jeopardize this.40 He gave the same reply to Rome, as he 
                                                          
38The oldest son of Giangaleazzo at his death was Giovanni 
Maria, who was 14, while the second oldest, Filippo, was 
only 10 at Duke’s death; thus the immediate powers of  
government fell to the Duke’s wife Caterina and to Francesco 
Barbavara, an official who had risen from a humble 
background to become one of the Duke’s most ardent 
supporters at the time of his death. 
 
39Morelli, Ricordi, 400-401. 
 
40See Franca Ragone, “Ambizioni territorali sulla Lunigiana 
Viscontea dopo la morte di Gian Galeazzo: La cessione del 
Vicariato di Carrara a Paolo Guinigi ad opera di Giovanni 
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wrote in November to the notary of Pope Boniface IX, Ser 
Nicolao de Imola, that even though he was most devoted to 
the Pope, he was very hesitant to contract alliances that 
would possibly create enemies for Lucca.41   
 Undoubtedly Lucca would have faced a more vengeful 
neighbor in Florence in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Visconti state in Lombardy had the Florentines not been 
distracted by such a strong desire to conquer Pisa. Control 
of Pisa would provide the Florentines a port from which to 
ship their goods, and would help diminish the Visconti 
presence in Tuscany. The blockade of Florentine roads 
imposed by Milan, as well as the recent wars in general had 
severely hurt Florentine mercantile interests. An outlet to 
the sea would have put the wool shops and other businesses 
back into working order. Florentine interest in Pisa 
dictated “friendly” relations with the Lucchese in the 
initial weeks following the Duke’s death. Not only did the 
Florentine desire for Pisa make Lucca of secondary 
importance to them, but it also necessitated extracting 
permission from the Lucchese for their officials, soldiers, 
provisions, weapons, reinforcements, and other necessities 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Colonna (1402-1404),” Archivio Storico Italiano, ser. 4, 146 
(1988), 550. 
 
41A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n.5, c. 31, p. 61. 
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of war to cross through Lucchese territory on a more or less 
constant basis.    
Meanwhile, the new governors of the Visconti state, 
seeing rebellions breaking out across their dominions, began 
to salvage what they could. Their efforts to retain 
supremacy in those areas under the Visconti banner were 
subverted by the civic turmoil in Milan that occurred after 
the Duke’s death. Before long, they had to abandon efforts 
to maintain the faraway territories, and center their 
efforts on the central area around Milan and the other vital 
places of the Lombard region.42        
 Giovanni Maria, the oldest legitimate son of 
Giangaleazzo, was only fourteen years old at his father’s 
death in 1402; his brother, Filippo, was only ten. A third 
son, Gabriele, had only recently been legitimized by the 
Emperor Wenceslaus, and though slightly older than the other 
two, never held their status as possible heirs.43 Yet it was 
this son with whom the Lucchese were to have extensive 
relations with, since Gabriele had been accorded mastery of 
nearby Pisa in the Duke’s last will. Since the Duke’s heirs 
were still minors, executive power was divided amongst a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
42Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 61-67. 
 
43Valeri, L’ Italia, 293-94.  
                   127
group of seventeen ministers also determined by the will, 
but the government was to be headed by the Duke’s widow 
Caterina and Francesco Barbavara.44    
 By the end of 1402 the shift in Lucca towards 
friendlier relations with the state of Milan can readily be 
seen. Apparently Paolo had made these pro-Visconti 
sentiments known in Pisa, where Milanese officials braced 
for what they perceived as an imminent Florentine attack.  
In November, the Podestà of Pisa, Gosadinus de Gosadinis de 
Bologna, who had been assigned this office by order of 
Milan, wrote to Paolo informing him he had taken office in 
Pisa, and offering him his services as condottiere if the 
Lucchese had need of military assistance.45 It is very 
possible Gosadinus had been advised, or perhaps ordered, by 
the governors of Milan to maintain good terms with the 
Lucchese. Later in November 1402, Milanese officials in Pisa 
wrote to Paolo of the news they received that Florence, “in 
eorum prava malitia,” wanted to begin war not only in Pisa 
but also in Siena, and they requested Paolo send them any 
information he might have on the matter.46 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
44Cognasso, “Il ducato visconteo,” 72. 
 
45Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n.217, p. 194. 
 
46Ibid., regesto n. 266, p. 201. 
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 The following months, which saw an increase in 
Florentine hostility towards Pisa, also witnessed Paolo 
continuing to give support to the Visconti cause. When 
Gabriele Visconti, his mother Nieza (the Duke’s ex-
mistress), and a band of troops arrived in Pisa in November 
1403 to take over governorship of the city, they were not 
well-received by the local population. Paolo, on the other 
hand, was relieved at their arrival because he had hopes it 
would quieten things down in Pisa (and thus also around 
Lucca). An embassy had earlier been sent to Gabriele and his 
mother from Paolo at Massa Lunigiana to honor and escort 
them.47 The Lucchese Signore was likely hopeful at this 
early stage of Gabriele’s rule in Pisa that he would somehow 
be able to assume power, restore order, and remove the 
Florentine threat from Pisa. If so, it would not be long 
before he saw Gabriele for what he turned out to be -- an 
enemy to Pisan independence.   
 After the Church backed out of the alliance it made 
with Florence and came to terms with the governors of Milan 
in August 1403, Paolo had another power on which to appeal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
47Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 68-69; Sercambi elsewhere 
claimed Gabriele and his mother had a dispute over the 
former’s supposed close ties with Paolo, although it is not 
clear why this would have offended her. 
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in order to restore order to Pisan affairs. Through the 
Lucchese agent Jacopo Faitinelli, who had been sent to Rome 
in 1401 to act as the representative of Lucchese and Guinigi 
interests, Paolo constantly requested during the winter and 
spring of 1404 that Boniface IX make use of the young and 
militant King of Naples, Ladislas of Durazzo, in order to 
bring about a peaceful solution to the question of Pisa.48  
The Florentines, Paolo informed the Pope in one letter, had 
grown truly arrogant concerning their control over Pisa, as 
it “seemed to them they were able to touch the sky with 
their finger.”49 
 Nor did Paolo did not limit his support of the Visconti 
cause in Pisa to attempting to get others involved. In April 
1404, he dispatched Lucchese troops to Sarzana, a city north 
of Pisa that Florence had also become covetous of 
possessing.50 In July 1404, he received a receipt from the 
governors of Pisa for having made loans to them of more than 
1,000 florins of gold for the costs of paying for the “guard 
                                                          
48A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 5,  c. 32, p. 63;  n. 
5, c. 32v-33, p. 64-65;  n. 5, c. 34, p. 67;  n. 5, c. 36,  
p. 71. 
 
49Ibid.,  n. 5, c. 33v., p. 66, “fanno gran festa et 
triunfano assai di queste nuove et pare a loro toccare lo 
cielo col dito.”  
 
50Brucker, Civic World, 195-97. 
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and protection of the city of Pisa.”51 That same year 
Giovanni Maria sent a letter of gratitude to Paolo from 
Milan for dispatching reinforcements to certain parts of 
Lunigiana for help in conserving Visconti rule there.52  
Though the net effect of the forces of Lucca on the Visconti 
fortuna was minimal, their efforts were appreciated by the 
Milanese, at least on the surface.   
 Paolo did not limit his concern for the Visconti cause 
only to Pisa, as he was in constant search of information 
about the general conditions of Lombardy and Lunigiana, as 
seen in his correspondence from this period. He was in 
frequent contact with the vicars of his realm, Lucchese 
ambassadors in other cities, private citizens who had gone 
abroad for mercantile or other purposes, and even foreign 
heads of states to learn of the movements of bands of 
soldiers, the plots of exiles, the state of wars, and other 
such important matters. This information then would be used 
to fortify Lucchese borders if necessary, or it would be 
forwarded along by corrieri to their allies. 
 The Lucchese Signore was also in frequent 
correspondence with the heirs and officials of the Duke in 
                                                          
51Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n.367, p. 216. 
 
52Ibid., regesto n.312, p. 209. 
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Milan, who kept him informed of certain new developments in 
the Milanese state. In December 1402, for example, the 
Duchess and Duke of Milan (Catherine and Giovanni Maria) 
addressed a letter to Paolo informing him of the alliance 
just signed with the Signore of Padua, and suggesting to him 
that it be publicly proclaimed in Lucca.53 Later they wrote 
to Paolo concerning the restitution of the city of Piacenza 
to Visconti rule.54 Other correspondence between the two was 
of a more typical nature between two Renaissance city-
states, such as the several recommendations made by the 
Milanese minister Francesco Barbavara for Milanese citizens 
to be considered for positions in the Lucchese government.55  
In short, it has been seen that the Lucchese made another 
policy change concerning whom to tie their fortunes with 
after the Duke of Milan’s demise; since Florence was now 
again seen as their greatest menace, then improved relations 
with the Duke’s heirs were soon after being sought by Lucca. 
Florentine Aggression Increases   
 Though initially after Giangaleazzo’s death the 
Florentines attempted to avoid overtly offending the 
                                                          
53Ibid., regesto n.248, p. 198. 
 
54Ibid., regesto n.320, p. 210. 
 
55Ibid., regesto n.296, p. 206. 
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Lucchese, eventually their dogged pursuit of Pisa and their 
growing confidence would conflict with the Lucchese desire 
to be left alone. When Paolo complained of the still-
unsettled issue over a certain quantity of wool in November 
1402, the Florentine Priors, perhaps still hopeful he would 
take part in their league with Boniface IX, appeased the 
Lucchese Signore by assuring him his requests for the 
restoration of the wool would be carried out.   
 Yet only a month later, the Florentines had apparently 
grown tired of the belligerent demands from Lucca, and in a 
tone that showed their displeasure, wrote Paolo that they 
wanted the issue over the wool settled once and for all.56  
The different tone evident in Florentine correspondence to 
Lucca was reflective not only of their unhappiness with  
Paolo, but of a general trend by the end of 1402 towards a 
more aggressive foreign policy. In Brucker’s words, “By 
year’s end...the leadership had rejected the arguments for 
peace and economy and had opted for a major offensive 
against the Visconti.”57   
 Though losing their military alliance with the Church 
at the end of the summer in 1403, the Florentines had by 
                                                          
56Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 255, p. 199. 
 
57Brucker, Civic World, 188. 
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then contracted other alliances to help diminish the 
Visconti state. Agreements reached with the powerful 
Malatesta family of Rimini, the Carrara lord of Padua, and 
the Rossi family of Parma allowed the Florentines to carry 
out this objective not only in Tuscany, but in some of the 
northern regions of Italy as well. The rise of Florentine 
aggression after 1402, however, was most evident in Pisa.   
 In April 1403, the Florentine Ten on War ordered their 
agent in Pisa, Bartolomeo Valori, to make an offer of 
100,000 florins to the Visconti representatives there for 
the purchase of the city.58 Although nothing decisive 
emerged from this offer, the Florentines continued to debate 
ways to possess Pisa. In January 1404, the Ten sent a band 
of invaders to gain entry through what was thought a weak 
part of the Pisan wall, but they were unsuccessful.59  
However, after Florentine troops entered the area of 
Lunigiana in March 1404 in an attempt to stir local 
sentiments against the Visconti and to gain a stronger 
foothold in this important region surrounding Pisa, the 
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French as well as Genoa came to the aid of the Pisans.60     
 French and Genoese intervention, however, only staved 
off Florentine aggression for a while, by no means killing 
off the tendencies of the Florentines in these months.61  
When the French became involved, this brought about a 
general increase in the power and prestige not only of the 
French monarchy in Italy, but also of the French papacy --- 
a circumstance which stirred the anger of the Roman Pope 
Boniface IX. Boniface responded by drawing into the conflict 
his protector Ladislas of Durazzo, the young King of Naples.  
The French and the Genoese, not foreseeing the impact the 
arrival of Ladislas would have, began to back off from the 
earlier restrictions placed on Florence, thus paving the way 
for their subsequent takeover of Pisa.62 Florence’s takeover 
of Pisa in 1406 certainly did not sit well with Lucca; now 
their lands were bordered on many sides by Florentine 
                                                          
60The French came to see Florentine hegemony in Pisa as a 
threat to their own interests in Liguria; see Valeri, L’ 
Italia, 346-49. 
  
61James Hankins noted that the four years between the death 
of the Duke of Milan in 1402 and the taking of Pisa in 1406 
“was probably the moment when Florence exercised more power 
in Italy than at any other time in her history;” see 
“Rhetoric, history, and ideology: the civic panegyrics of 
Leonardo Bruni,” in Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals 
and Reflections, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 145. 
 
62Brucker, Civic World, 204-07. 
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territory. This resulted in a renewed effort to establish 
closer ties with Ladislas, as well as with the sons of 
Giangaleazzo; it also resulted in Paolo having all the trees 
within a mile of the city cut down in 1406 with the order 
that nothing else be replanted there.63 The Lucchese 
cherished their self-rule, and they wanted to know as soon 
as possible when it might become threatened in any way.  
 In conclusion, Lucchese relations with the Duke of 
Milan during his last conflict with Florence were not 
entirely cordial as has been sometimes assumed. Lucca’s 
foreign policy always tended to be pro-Milan in the Guinigi 
period, but by no means was that absolute, as seen in the 
period 1401-02. Lucca was not blindly loyal to Milan based 
on some shared ideology or some ancient tie with the past; 
rather Lucca was supportive of Milan (when it was) because 
it was that alliance that gave them the best opportunity to 




                                                                                                                                                                             
 
63Giuseppe Civitali, Historie di Lucca, ed. Mario F. 
Leonardi, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores Recentiores, 2 
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      LUCCA AND ITS COUNTRYSIDE 
     
         Geography 
 
  Lucca today is a medium-sized Italian city, but at the 
beginning of the fifteenth century it was the capital of a 
rather extensive city-state. Less than a century before that 
time, moreover, Lucchese territorial holdings in Tuscany had 
been even greater; now in the year 1400 they were merely 
trying to hold on to what they still had -- an increasingly 
difficult task in this age of the rise of powerful regional 
states throughout Italy. Nevertheless, in 1400 the Lucchese 
city-state was still quite impressive: it has been asserted 
that in the year of its independence (1369), 277 communes 
were restored to the possession of the mother city of Lucca 
by imperial edict.1  
 The city itself is circled by a fertile plain situated 
between the Serchio and Arno rivers in western Tuscany. The 
Serchio runs through the plain just to the north of Lucca 
toward the sea, and its various tributaries have over time 
supplied the city and its contado well; so well that one 
                                                          
1Janet Ross and Nelly Erichsen. The Story of Lucca (London: 
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1912), 59; the authors unfortunately do 
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modern scholar of the Tuscan countryside has claimed that 
“all that around Lucca is watery.”2 To the northwest of 
Lucca are the Alps, to the northeast are the Apennines, 
meaning parts of Lucca territory are rugged and mountainous.  
These foothill areas are not worthless, however, as is 
sometimes implied. The Sei Miglia and some of the towns in 
the plain such as Camaiore and Pietrasanta were undoubtedly 
the most prosperous agriculturally, but the other areas 
contributed also. In the mountainous regions there was 
pasturing, the production of chestnuts, and olive-growing, 
among other things.3 Lucca lies 12 miles to the northeast of 
Pisa, 40 miles northwest of Florence, 130 miles south of 
Milan, and 170 miles north of Rome, all cities with a large 
influence on Lucchese history in the fifteenth century. 
 One of the more important parts of the territory of 
Lucca was the port of Motrone on the Tyrrhenian coast.  
Though Lucca is located roughly fifteen miles inland, the 
port had belonged to it since 1081 when Emperor Henry IV 
ceded it, as well as the surrounding district up to six 
miles (Sei Miglia), to the commune when he recognized its 
                                                          
2Chris Wickham, Community and Clientele in Twelfth-Century 
Tuscany: The origins of the rural commune in the plain of 
Lucca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 48. 
 
3Christopher F. Black, Early Modern Italy: A Social History 





             139
independence from imperial authority.4 The port was 
important to Lucca not only because it allowed their 
merchants an accessible place from which to ship and receive  
goods, but it was also a source of revenue, as they 
frequently let the port to others for their own shipping 
purposes. Thus Motrone, despite that it was sometimes closed 
or of limited use because of blockaded roads, wars, plague, 
or other factors, nevertheless was a vital part of the 
Lucchese state. It not only made international trade much 
more conducive for Lucchese merchants, but it also gave them 
a bargaining chip with other cities.5 
 On the road from Lucca to Motrone on the coast was 
another vital area of the Lucchese state, the town of 
Pietrasanta, some twenty miles to the northwest. One reason 
for its importance was that it lay in the most 
agriculturally-rich part of Lucchese territory, an area 
known especially for its fruit production.6 Pietrasanta, the 
                                                          
4Duane J. Osheim, An Italian Lordship, The Bishopric of 
Lucca in the Late Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 5. 
 
5Florence, for example, was forced to pay a high price to 
use Motrone in the early fifteenth century after they had to 
abandon the Pisan port and the Sienese port (Talamone); see 
Giovanni Morelli, Ricordi, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence: 
Felice le Monnier, 1956), 422-24. 
 
6Some argue that the plain near Pietrasanta and Camaiore was 
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largest Lucchese commune at this time, was valued also for 
its minerals, especially iron and marble.7 Local wool and 
leather products were exported from there as well, and Lucca 
benefitted from a superb fishing industry at the Lake of 
Perotto, which was close to Pietrasanta.8   
 Pietrasanta was important to many Lucchese citizens who 
owned land in the vicinity and who were thus able to derive 
income from it, but it was personally dear to Paolo. He had 
a palace built there which he and his immediate family used 
as a retreat, and where he would lodge foreign embassy-
members or heads of states at times.9 On other occasions 
such as when plague struck Lucca, for safety purposes, or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
outside of the Sei Miglia, and that for the most part all 
other regions were too mountainous for productive farming. 
See Christine Meek, Lucca 1369-1400: Politics and Society in 
an Early Renaissance City-State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), 97; also see M. Berengo, Nobili e mercanti 
nella Lucca del Cinquecento (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1965), 
292-93. 
 
7Meek has established a population of 2,500 for Pietrasanta 
based on a 1383 account which had 2,172 bocche for the salt 
tax, Lucca 1369-1400, 16; Michael E. Bratchel, in Lucca 
1430-1494: The Reconstruction of an Italian City-Republic 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 235-37, has claimed it was 
closer to 1,000.  
 
8Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494, 174-80, 236-37. 
 
9F. Buselli, “La rocca di Pietrasanta e il suo palazzo,” 
Giornale storico della Lunigiana, n.s., XIV (1963): 92-139.  
Ladislas of Durazzo, King of Naples, for instance, stayed in 
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for summer vacations Paolo would send his family off to 
Pietrasanta, many times accompanying them there himself.10  
He brought in individuals from all corners of the contado to 
work for the Lucchese government in some capacity, but he 
was especially drawn to hiring the citizens of Pietrasanta, 
including his secretary of many years, Guido Manfredi.11  
Perhaps Antonio Gigli, Lucchese official in Pietrasanta, was 
aware of Paolo’s inclination to favor the Pietrasantanese, 
as he wrote to Lucca about a native from there (who was 
apparently unknown in Lucca from the context of the letter) 
named Lorenzo di Lemmuccio Martini who had returned home 
after twenty years of military service to find his 
possessions destroyed, and who now wanted to enter the 
service of the Signore of Lucca.12  
 After 1420, the year in which the palace was finished, 
Pietrasanta became almost an alternative place from which to 
                                                          
10Giovanni Sercambi, Le Croniche, ed. Salvatore Bongi, 3 
vols., in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (Lucca: Giusti, 
1892), 3: 373. 
 
11Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494, 246. 
 
12Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, Cancelliere della Repubblica 
di Lucca, Segretario della Signoria di Paolo Guinigi, in 
Regesti del R. Archivio di Stato, ed. Luigi Fumi, vol. III, 
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conduct the affairs of the city-state for Paolo.13 He also 
began to bring about large improvements to the industry of 
the commune. In March 1420, construction of new grain mills 
and olive presses (“molina di badia et olio”) were begun, 
which included among other things, the hiring of expert 
engineers to divert the waters of the Corvaia River and to 
lay out the foundations for the new buildings.14 The next 
month it was decided to build a storehouse for the iron 
industry there (“un fondacho di vena e di ferro.”)15 Though 
the commune of Pietrasanta as a whole certainly benefitted 
from these improvements since it brought them additional 
revenues, not all were happy with the intrusions of Lucca. 
After the granary and olive-presses were begun in 1420, the 
tavernario Giuffredo Moroni went to Lucca to complain that 
he had two shops that relied on the waters that the 
engineers were presently taking steps to divert, and that 
this would destroy his business.16 The new storehouse for 
the iron industry of the region also had its opponents; 
                                                          
13Franca Ragone, “Paolo Guinigi, i suoi Collaboratori e i 
suoi Nemici: L’emergere di nuovi ruoli politici in una corte 
toscana,” Momus 1 (1994): 14.   
 
14Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 887, p.165.  
 
15Ibid., regesto n. 938, p.175. 
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Giovanni Nicolai Nuti wrote that if constructed “it would 
bring great damage to many.”17 Paolo nevertheless continued 
to diligently carry out his construction plans in 
Pietrasanta, and it remained a vital center of the Lucchese 
government until Paolo’s fall from power in 1430. 
 Other communes were important not so much as 
administrative centers, but for providing a measure of 
protection to the interior of the city-state (Lucca). In 
many of the larger communes along the peripheries of the 
state, such as Montecarlo, Nozzano, Castiglione, Gallicano, 
Coreglia, Collodi, and Pietrasanta, recently built or newly-
repaired fortresses helped ward off invaders.18 But it was 
not only the larger towns of the city-state that had this 
means of defense: Ruota, Sasso, Pedona, and many of the 
smaller villages had fortresses as well.19 In 1401, the 
                                                          
17Ibid., regesto n. 938, p. 175, “serà grande danno di 
molti.”  
 
18This was a period in which the Italian city-states as a 
whole began to put much more effort and money into the 
fortification of their countrysides. In the years 1363-1371 
alone, for example, the Florentines constructed or restored 
forty fortresses in the communes of their contado. See 
Charles M. De la Ronciere, “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelles’ at 
Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs 
and Problems of Collection,” in Florentine Studies: Politics 
and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 
142. 
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vicar of Castiglione reported to Paolo that not only was the 
fortress (“rocca”) of Castiglione in good shape, but also 
that the fortresses of Palleroso and Castelnuovo, two of the 
smaller communes in his vicariate, had no immediate need of 
repairs.20 
 There was much communication between Lucca and those 
towns in its outer territories that were essentially the 
first lines of defense for the state. This communication 
generally concerned the condition of communal walls, 
fortresses, trenches, city bells, and other mechanisms of 
defense, as well as any information concerning the passage 
of foreign troops. In January 1401, Paolo was informed by 
two of his officials in Montecarlo that improved defensive 
mechanisms were essential there. Nicolao Honesti, vicar of 
the commune, focused on the immediate need for Lucca to 
supply munitions and troops to guard the fortress in his 
letter to Paolo, while the commissario, Lunardo di Massa, 
wrote concerning the clearing out of the trenches in front 
of the fortress.21   
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
20Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, in Regesti del R. Archivio di 
Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi and Eugenio Lazzareschi, Vol. 
III, pt. i (Lucca: Giusti, 1925), regesto n. 44, p. 170.  
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 In May 1421, the vicar of the Lucchese commune of 
Massa, Bectus Antelminelli, informed Paolo that the buttress 
of the fortress there was in need of much work, and that the 
community was unable to be protected unless work was done on 
it; apparently the vicar considered it urgent as he proposed 
to use the funds of the “condanne dei danni dati” for the 
repairs.22 Dino Avvocati, the vicar of Castiglione in 1415, 
wrote to Lucca that part of the wall there had fallen, and 
that much evil might happen if it were not restored.23  
Paolo was willing to respond to appeals such as these, 
either by funding the restoration, or by sending engineers 
or other specialists to the commune to get the work 
underway. He knew that he must, for the safety of the state 
as a whole depended upon it.   
  The territory of the Lucchese city-state in the early 
fifteenth century may be divided into two broad categories; 
first, Lucca itself and the area outside the walls, but 
nearest to the city known as the Sei Miglia (Six Miles), 
which was under the direct jurisdiction of Lucca; and 
second, the areas that lay outside the Sei Miglia which fell 
                                                          
22Ibid., regesto n. 1461, p. 453.  
 
23Ibid., regesto n. 93, appendix, p. 486, “uno pezzo di muro 
castellano apresso a santo Piero, lo quale è caduto et ista 
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under the indirect control of the mother city.24 This latter 
area had seen many administrative changes over the years, 
but in the period of Paolo Guinigi it was divided into nine 
vicariates, each under the rule of Lucchese officials called 
vicars.25 The vicars were appointed by Lucca, generally for 
six-month terms, although the same person often continued to 
hold the same office for longer periods of time. 
 Geography has played a large role in the history of 
Lucca. Being a Roman town, it was situated on the major 
road, the Via Francigena, which connected Rome to northern 
Italy, as well as to the rest of Europe.26 To the extent 
                                                          
24The Sei Miglia was an area surrounding Lucca that 
encompassed about 250 sq. km., an area corresponding to the 
ancient comitatus; it had been declared under Lucchese 
jurisdiction by the Emperor Henry IV in 1081. See Franca 
Leverotti, “La famiglia Contadina Lucchese all’Inizio del’ 
400,” in Strutture Familiari Epidemie Migrazioni nell’Italia 
medievale, ed. Rinaldo Comba, Gabriella Piccinni, and 
Giuliano Pinto (Naples: Scientifiche Italiane, 1984), 237. 
 
25Carrara was made an additional vicariate in 1404, 
Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 78-79; also see Franca Ragone, 
“Ambizioni territoriali sulla Lunigiana viscontea dopo la 
morte di Gian Galeazzo: La Cessione del vicariato di Carrara 
a Paolo Guinigi ad opera di Giovanni Colonna (1402-1404),” 
Archivio Storico Italiano, ser. 4, 146 (1988): 542-82; 
Augusto Mancini, La Cessione di Carrara a Paolo Guinigi 
(Lucca: A. Amadei, 1909). 
 
26There was a network of roads leading into and out of Lucca 
by this time, ranging from a very poor quality to those in 
frequent use and good condition. See Sante Polica, “An 
Attempted ‘Reconversion’ of Wealth in XVth Century Lucca: 
the Lands of Michele di Giovanni Guinigi,” The Journal of 
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that the Lucchese military was capable at any given time, it 
could control traffic between northern and southern Italy 
since the road went through Lucca. The Via Francigena 
undoubtedly brought the city much prosperity in trade during 
the ancient and medieval periods, but by the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, it was just as likely to bring to Lucca 
armed brigades as travellers and traders.  
      Population  
 The population of Lucca is difficult to determine with 
certainty in the early fifteenth century, but most estimates 
have been around 10,000.27 In addition, the total number of 
people living in the nine Lucchese vicariates was around 
30,000 and those living in the smaller communes of Lucchese 
territory outside the vicariates numbered about 9,000. Thus 
the total number of people in the city-state of Lucca at the 
beginning of the Quattrocento was slightly less than 
50,000.28 This does not come close to the size of the 
                                                          
27Christine Meek, in Lucca 1369-1400 states the population 
in 1400 was 10,000; Bratchel, in Lucca 1430-1494 claims that 
in 1380 it stood at 10,000; J.C. Russell’s estimate in 
Medieval Regions and their Cities (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1972) of 23,800 in the mid-
fourteenth century is thus probably too high, although 
certainly the city undoubtedly suffered widespread 
population losses during the latter fourteenth century due 
to the plague. 
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Florentine city-state, which had a population in the city 
alone of around 100,000 before 1348;29 Lucca’s population 
did, however, compare to the other Tuscan cities of Siena, 
Arezzo, and Pisa.  
 Although the Florentine population at the beginning of 
the fifteenth century was larger than Lucca’s, the basic 
structure of the Lucchese contado was very similar to that 
of the Florentine contado in that there were large families, 
large numbers of people of foreign origin, and a large 
number of widows and orphans.30 The Lucchese estimo of 1411-
13 shows a clear trend toward “enlarged and complex” 
families (and a trend away from “nuclear” families) in the 
Sei Miglia, which was also a circumstance found in the 
                                                          
29It is the often-cited estimate of Villani that Florence 
had 100,000 people at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century that is referred to here; undoubtedly by a hundred 
years later, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the 
Florentine population had suffered dramatically as had other 
Italian cities due to the plague. It has been estimated at 
40,000 for the city itself in 1427. See Lauro Martines, 
Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 168. 
 
30Franca Leverotti has published a number of masterful works 
based on her study of the Lucchese estimo of 1411-1413, 
which was a survey made by Lucchese notaries and surveyors 
of the population and lands of the Sei Miglia. In one of 
these studies, “La famiglia Contadina” (see note 24, above), 
Leverotti has compared her findings for the makeup of the 
families in the Lucchese Sei Miglia with those in the 
Florentine contado, as determined by D. Herlihy-Ch. Klapish-
Zuber, in Les Toscans et leurs familles: Une etude du 
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Florentine contado.  The Sei Miglia in addition consisted of 
a large percentage of families who had recently (within ten 
years) migrated there from foreign lands; sixty-five percent 
of families living in the outermost circles of the Sei 
Miglia, for example, were families native to Pisa, Florence, 
or Pistoia. The Florentine contado also had a large number 
of people of foreign origin, as shown by Herlihy and 
Klapish-Zuber (although it is hardly true, as Leonardo Bruni 
argued in his Laudatio Florentinae urbis, that Florence was 
the common patria of all Italian exiles). Finally, the 
population of the Lucchese countryside was very young. Of a 
group of over 4,000 persons from the estimo taken into 
account, forty-five percent were under nineteen years old, 
and another forty percent were between twenty and fifty-
nine, again percentages which are very similar to those 
found for the contado of Florence.31   
 The most significant aspect of the population of the 
city-state as a whole, as contemporaries of the early 
fifteenth century would have perceived it, was that it had 
decreased so significantly over the previous half century.  
The chief reason was of course the plague. After wiping out 
half of the population (in some places) in the first assault 
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of 1348, the plague continued to spread through Italy, 
striking cities sporadically every ten or fifteen years 
afterwards well into the fifteenth century.32  
 This brought forth a number of new realities in the 
Italian city-states, including the virtual emptying of many 
villages to take up better opportunities left by those in 
the mother cities who had died or fled.33 The population of 
the Lucchese countryside was so depleted in the early 
fifteenth century that when officials began taking the 
estimo, they found that certain farmlands in the outerlying 
regions were not being cultivated, and that property owners 
in many cases could not even be found.34 Thus, Lucca faced a 
difficult challenge during the period of Paolo Guinigi’s 
government: how to not only beef up security along the 
borders in order to better repel foreign invaders, but how 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
32Franca Leverotti, Popolazione, famiglie, insediamento: Le 
Sei Miglia Lucchesi nel XIV e XV secolo (Pisa: Pacini, 
1992), 78-80. 
 
33It is of course true that the most immediate consequence 
when plague struck was not an emptying of the countryside, 
but rather flight to the countryside; the process soon 
reversed itself, however, after the pestilence began to 
ease. Besides, while the plague did drive people into the 
rural areas, two other factors of not uncommon occurrence at 
this time (war and famine) tended to drive people into the 
cities. 
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to stabilize the contado itself so that the basic processes 
of local administration were able to be carried out. 
    Lucca and its Contado 
 One of the traditional themes in Renaissance 
historiography has been concerned with what degree the 
cities of Italy used the physical and natural resources of 
their contado to enhance their own interests.35 It has been 
often held, particularly until very recently, that the 
mother cities of the Italian city-states did overburden 
their countrysides rather mercilessly for their own 
benefit.36 Lucca in the years of the supposed “tyranny” of 
Paolo Guinigi, however, does not fit this interpretation 
since to the extent that Lucca exploited its contado in the 
first thirty years of the fifteenth century, it was done out 
of a real concern for its safety, and for the good of the 
state as a whole. Much of the money collected from the 
                                                          
35The term “contado” has been used by historians to denote 
various things, and as Anthony Molho points out, is still 
used ambiguously. In this discussion, “contado” will simply 
refer to all those areas belonging to a state outside the 
city walls of the mother city. See Molho, Florentine Public 
Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), 25, n.5. 
 
36To use the most extreme example, David Herlihy found that 
in the late thirteenth century, the contado of Pistoia was 
paying some six times the amount of direct taxes as the 
inhabitants of the city; see his Women, Family and Society 
in Medieval Europe: Historical Essays, 1978-1991 
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contado through taxation would in fact come to be spent on 
the protection of it. Again, arbitrary exploitation is not 
something the Signore of Lucca could have gotten away with, 
either inside Lucca or in the contado, for his stay in power 
was based largely upon the maintenance of popular support. 
 Perhaps the best evidence that there was a sincere 
interest in the welfare of the contado by Paolo Guinigi and 
his consiglieri is the visit the Signore made with his new 
wife Ilaria in 1403 to view first-hand the conditions of the 
lands and the people of the rural areas.37 It is 
understandable that the contado would be highly valued, for 
like those of other Italian cities, the Lucchese countryside 
had much the mother city knew it could benefit from, such as 
grain, barley, taxes (both direct and indirect), military 
enlistments, and many other things.38   
 Yet, the Lucchese really had no choice in how to handle 
the border regions; they could not overburden the rural 
population any more than they already were.39 There was fear 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
37A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n.1, c. 104v., p. 206. 
 
38See David Nicholas, The Later Medieval City, 1300-1500 
(London: Longman, 1997), 87-91, concerning the methods in 
which Italian cities generally came to dominate their 
contado. 
 
39Guido Manfredi received a plea from a Lucchese nun (Sister 
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that the people still inhabiting a given town or village 
would simply pack up their scanty belongings and leave if 
the conditions became any worse. The population of certain 
parts of the contado in 1411 stood at only about one-third 
what it had been before the “Era of Plagues” began in 
1348.40 This was chiefly due to the plague, but also famine 
and frequent wars were contributing factors. Thus, Lucca 
time and time again was forced to ease the burden on the 
tax-payers of the countryside. Small communes were allowed 
in some instances to unite in order to lower the tax 
requirements of each.41 Financial incentives for foreigners 
to come and live in the Sei Miglia were established by Paolo 
in 1404 (being exempt from all taxes for ten years except 
the salt tax) in hopes of repopulating the state.42 Lucca 
was certainly in no position to burden the people of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
non si può cavar sangue,” the monastery’s recent bad harvest 
meant they would be unable to pay the gabella; Carteggio di 
Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 1165, p. 214.  
 
40Leverotti, Popolazione, 31. 
 
41A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 1, c. 48, p. 114. 
 
42Ibid., n.1, c. 134v., p. 266, “voluit, mandavit, statuit 
atque iussit quod omnes et singuli qui venirent ad 
habitandum in territorium et districtum lucanum, gratia et 
laborandi terras bene quam agendi et honeste vivendi, sint 
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countryside with higher taxation because they could not have 
tolerated any more disruption in their lives. 
 Yet most individuals of the countryside still felt as 
if they were being overburdened, as may be seen by the large 
number of petitions made to Lucca that their taxes be 
lowered. And on many occasions the government did not turn a 
deaf ear to their appeals; there were instances in which 
Paolo allowed communes to not only have their taxes lowered, 
but dismissed altogether.43 Undoubtedly, one reason the 
rural regions believed they were paying an unfair share of 
Lucca’s revenues was that in 1397, three years before the 
Guinigi Signoria was established, the estimo had been 
discontinued in the city -- but retained in the 
countryside.44 The countryside had become increasingly 
filled with people who did not like this new arrangement at 
the time Paolo came to power. 
 The villages and towns of the Lucchese contado were 
also required to pay other taxes, in addition to the estimo.  
                                                          
43For example, in August 1420 Paolo arranged with the tax 
official at Massa not to carry out the tax exactions for 
grain extracted from Massa, as there was need of the grain 
there; A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 141, p. 
283. 
 
44The central city of Lucca shared the burden of the estimo 
with its contado for much longer than some cities, however.  
Florence, for example, discontinued the estimo for 
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Indirect taxes on such things as food and wine were also 
assessed to them. Most Italian cities at this time relied 
heavily on the countryside to feed the population, and Lucca 
was no different in this respect. Though Lucca’s contado was 
able to feed the population of the mother city better than 
most, still there were rarely years in which imports were 
not needed.45 In addition, military service was required 
from the contado, and though this was by no means unusual 
since all cities drew recruits from the rural areas, it 
nevertheless was not always well accepted. Finally, the 
inhabitants of the communes were responsible for carrying 
out prescribed amounts of labor for Lucca, such as the 
building, repairing, and guarding of fortresses or walls.  
The individuals living in the rural areas thus had definite 
responsibilities, but comparatively speaking as will be 
shown, they lived in a less repressive situation than did 
the country-dwellers of most other Italian city-states.  
 The people in the contado of Lucca were fortunate in 
that they were not faced with the expansionistic ambitions 
of a mother city. Because the larger city-states such as 
Florence and Milan were attempting to widen their 
territories at this time, much greater military expenditure 
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was necessary -- and who bore the brunt of this was the 
rural areas (and their new acquisitions).46 Thus, measures 
that came to be used in some places to increase revenues, 
such as forced loans (prestanze), were not resorted to in 
Lucca.47 The records that might show us the percentage of 
both city and contado contributions to the annual income of 
Lucca are not available for much of the Guinigi period (and 
before), but other factors point out the people of the 
countryside were not being arbitrarily exploited by the 
ambitions of selfish governors. When a wine tax was forced 
on the contado earlier in 1388, for instance, taxes on wine 
were also increased in Lucca. In that same year purchases of 
                                                          
46In the year 1400, Lucca spent approximately 23,000 florins 
for mercenary troops (which was still about one-third of 
revenues for the year), which were used mainly for the guard 
of the city and contado -- while the Florentines for the 
twelve years from 1390-1402 used approximately five million 
florins on military expenditures, or an average of over 
400,000 florins per year. See Molho, Florentine Public 
Finances, 9; Meek, Lucca 1369-1400, 125-27. 
 
47In comparing the financial state of Lucca with its 
neighbors, the Gonfaloniere of Lucca in 1390 reported that 
people in other lands were “non senza graveze e molestie di 
compagne non senza graveze d’imposte e di smesurate carestie 
e mortali guerre sono state, dove Idio, a noi a conceduto 
gratia, di ripararsi da le insidie de’ vicini, da le graveze 
de le compagne, senza cavare di borsa sforsatamente denaio a 
persona,” A.S.L., Consiglio Generale, 11, p. 371, 16 
December 1390; though this was ten years before the reign of 
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salt, which had been enforced on the villages and towns of 
the contado, began to be imposed on Lucca as well.48 
 Perhaps the best measure of determining whether the 
towns of the Lucchese countryside were oppressed by the 
mother city is to look at the inhabitants themselves. There 
is not an abundance of source material here, but there are 
some clues. Giorgio Chittolini has pointed out that around 
the beginning of the fifteenth century, when Florence began 
aggressively seeking to extend its frontiers they met fierce 
resistance when they began to enter communes in the diocese 
of Lucca. Taking over the border communes of Montecatini, 
Buggiano, Fucecchio, Pescia, and Castelfranco proved much 
more difficult for Florence than other areas had been, 
Chittolini argues, not because of resistance from the 
Lucchese, but because of the determination put up by the 
communes themselves who did not want to live under harsh 
rule, such as Florence imposed upon its new acquisitions.49  
                                                          
48Nicholas, Later Medieval City, 89. 
 
49Chittolini, “La Formazione dello Stato Regionale e le 
Istituzioni del Contado: Ricerce sull’ Ordinamento 
Territoriale di Dominio Fiorentino agli Inizi del Secolo 
XV,” in Egemonia Fiorentina ed Autonomi Locali nella Toscana 
Nord-Occidentale del Primo Rinascimento: Vita, Arte, Cultura 
(Pistoia: Centro di Studi, 1978), 58-59; also see S.R. 
Epstein, “The Peasantries of Italy, 1350-1750,” in The 
Peasantries of Europe: From the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth 
Centuries, ed. Tom Scott (London: Longman, 1998), 78, where 
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 In addition, in October 1413 Paolo wrote to the rulers 
of Folignano concerning complaints that he had received from 
the Lucchese communes of Cervarolo, Gazano, and Cervardo 
that certain noble families of Folignano had been trying to 
force these communes into submission. Apparently in their 
appeals for help to Lucca the communes made clear what they 
wanted since in his letter to Folignano, Paolo wrote that 
the communes “were content to remain under my jurisdiction 
and protection.”50 Finally, in 1418, Paolo received word 
from Casale, a small commune in the region of Lunigiana to 
the northwest of Lucca that was under the rule of the 
Malaspina at that time, that many men and lands of that 
region would willingly give up power over the commune to 
him. Giovanni of Castiglione wrote Paolo in December from 
Casale that all the people of the neighboring commune of 
Verrucola, out of fear they would be overtaken by Florence 
due to their allegiance to the Malaspina, had departed the 
city under cover of the night to escape. Moreover, Giovanni 
informed him that many of these people, as well as those of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conquered areas “more like a subject hinterland than a 
confederacy of equals, depriving them of their own contadi 
altogether and extending Florentine fiscal jurisdiction to 
the entire state.” 
 
50A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 44, p. 87, 
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the commune of Regnano, wanted to give themselves over to 
Paolo’s protection.51 It is clear that if Lucca was 
repressive over its contado in the first part of the 
fifteenth century, then others, especially the large, 
expanding city-states of Italy -- were even more so. 
 This is not to imply that the rural parts of Lucchese 
territory were free from problems. Constant watchfulness 
over the contado by Lucca was essential, and great efforts 
were made to maintain order in the peripheral regions. Yet, 
violence was commonplace in the countryside of the Italian 
cities of the fifteenth century, and in many parts of 
Lucchese territory it was no different. There were disputes, 
for example, between the communes lying along Lucchese 
borders and the communes nearby belonging to other city-
states. In 1412, Paolo complained in a letter to the 
Florentine Priors about certain men from the Florentine town 
of Portovenere who had violated the borders of Pietrasanta 
“not once but several times.”52 In the early years of the 
century the Lucchese vicariate of Coreglia had an ongoing 
struggle with the community of Fiumalbo, a possession of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
51Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesti nos.1207, 1404, p. 
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Este rulers of Ferrara. In June 1402, some 300 sheep 
belonging to the citizens of Fiumalbo were stolen by the 
people of Coreglia, prompting Niccolò III, ruler of the 
Este, to write to Paolo in protest.53 Fighting between the 
two communes lingered, however, as in May 1404, Paolo 
received a message from the Podestà of Sestola that much 
damage had been done to the forests and pastures of Fiumalbo 
by the citizens of Coreglia.54 In 1409, the tables were 
turned, and the aggressor became Fiumalbo, as farm animals 
were stolen from the Lucchese communes of Tereglio and 
Vitiana.55 Despite the measures taken by Lucca to maintain 
order in the contado, at times the peace terms established 
between two communes turned out to not last long.  
 In addition, there were often disputes between two 
Lucchese communes that had to be smoothed over by Paolo and 
the vicars. In 1415, the Lucchese vicar in Camaiore, Nicolao 
                                                                                                                                                                             
52A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 3, p. 6, “Licet 
homines de portoveneris quod cavere decreveram meos fines 
non semel sed iteratis vicibus violaverint et invaserint...” 
53Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesti nos.126, 200,  p. 182, 
192. 
 
54Ibid., regesto n. 317, p. 210.  
 
55Ibid., regesti nos. 673-675, p. 267-68; the problems 
continued between the two communes for the entirety of the 
reign of Paolo Guinigi as he wrote again in 1428 to the 
“Commune and Men of the Land of Fiumalbo” concerning the 
differences between Fiumalbo and Coreglia, see A.S.L., 
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Dardagnini, wrote to Paolo that he had received a petition 
from a group of fishermen from the village of Schiava 
concerning fighting that was occurring at the marina with 
some fishermen of Camaiore. Dardagnini went on to say that 
he had informed the parties they would have to wait for 
their differences to be settled by the Signore of Lucca.56  
The fishermen of Camaiore apparently had many rivalries; in 
January 1428, they became involved in another dispute, this 
time with Pietrasanta. Paolo wrote to Antonio de Gigli, 
vicar of Pietrasanta, to see to it that the fishermen there 
stop using barriers to block the mouth of Motrone as it was 
hurting the fishing for the people of Camaiore since fish 
were being impeded.57 
  Lucca was asked many times to settle territorial 
disputes that had arisen between two of its communes. In 
1413, the Anziani of Pietrasanta wrote to Paolo that 
Cappella, a small village that had recently legally 
separated itself from the vicariate of Pietrasanta, was now 
urging their neighbor Serravezza to appeal to the authority 
of Lucca to try and also separate from the jurisdiction of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
56Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesti nos. 1106, 1118, p. 
387-88. 
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Pietrasanta.58 The Anziani of Pietrasanta asked that Paolo 
not consent to this, as they stated it would be harmful to 
them.59 On other occasions it seems as if there were little 
anyone could do to prevent violence in the countryside. In 
1418, the Podestà assigned to Collodi, Michael of 
Casabasciana, wrote to Guido Manfredi informing him that 
upon Paolo’s request he had attempted to settle the fighting 
between the communes of Coccilia and Limano by establishing 
the limits of Coccilia’s pasturing grounds. He saw no hope 
for accord, however, and warned Guido that “unless the said 
communes are not made to remain at peace with a stick, then 
their animosity will spread to other communes.”60 Fighting 
amongst Lucchese communes was not restricted to the 
outermost lying areas; in 1410 violence broke out between 
                                                          
58The fact that Pietrasanta had an Anziani is perhaps the 
best proof of the important place it held among Lucchese 
communes. Though most of Lucca’s communes had no independent 
government of their own, some of the larger and vital 
communes had special arrangements. For example, Camaiore was 
divided into four quarters, each under the authority of a 
Captain, and Coreglia also had four Lucchese officials 
assigned there. See Meek, Lucca 1369-1400, 16. 
 
59Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 867, p. 318. 
 
60Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n.137, p. 25, “se non 
si fano li ditti comuni stare in pace col bastone la ditta 
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the citizens of Migliano and Fibbiano, both communes of the 
Sei Miglia.61 
 There were several other types of disturbances in the 
countryside that the Lucchese had to keep a constant eye on. 
The regime and the city-state were only as strong as its 
weakest point in the contado, for at that spot exiles and 
other dangers would soon appear. There were problems not 
only between Lucchese communes and communes belonging to 
other city-states, and between two Lucchese vicariates, such 
as we have seen with Camaoire and Pietrasanta, but there 
were also differences that arose between vicariates and the 
communes under their jurisdiction over military enlistments, 
payment of taxes, and other issues. Some Lucchese communes 
even raged with their own internal factionalism.62 There 
arose struggles even between two Lucchese officials assigned 
                                                          
61Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesti nos. 795, 796, p. 302. 
 
62In writing about an earlier period, Chris Wickham in 
“Rural Communes and the City of Lucca at the Beginning of 
the Thirteenth Century,” in City and Countryside in Late 
Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Essays Presented to Philip 
Jones, ed. Trevor Dean and Chris Wickham (London: Hambledon 
Press, 1990), 6-7, implies that in general this may have 
been less a problem in Lucca than in other city-states, 
since there were not many villages in the contado that had 
native, powerful landowners and thus not much tension 
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to one town.63 One of the great accomplishments of the 
thirty years that Paolo remained in power was that the 
countryside was kept as stable as it was. This often proved 
difficult, and even impossible at times, but it was 
certainly not because of a lack of concern from Lucca. There 
is no better place to view the activist domestic policy of 
the Guinigi period than in Lucca’s relations with its 
contado; but, as has been seen, the establishment of 
internal law and order was not the “end,” but only a “means” 
to the continuation of self-rule. 
       Officials in the Contado 
 Lucca was able to maintain security in the countryside 
in a variety of ways. A number of different types of 
officials were assigned to the various towns of the contado 
for such things as making sure taxes were paid on time, 
recruits were being enlisted if necessary, and that law and 
order in general were being upheld. The vicars held supreme 
power in the contado in most cases; they were responsible 
for collecting taxes64, mustering troops65, making sure laws 
                                                          
63For example, in 1419 Guido Manfredi received word from 
Massa Lunense of a quarrel that occurred between the vicar 
of Massa (Guaspare Sbarra) and the Chancellor (Aluiso 
Gucci), and apparently it became serious as the vicar tried 
to arrest Gucci; see Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 
432, p. 81. 
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relating to the town which had been passed in Lucca were 
publicly proclaimed66, keeping the area free from exiles67, 
overseeing town defenses68, making sure the ban on fires was 
carried out69, and a variety of other tasks. The vicars 
were, however, generally thought to have authority only in 
those criminal matters punishable by fine.70 For crimes 
which merited further punishment the Lucchese were prepared 
to send officials with the proper authority to handle the 
matter. In particularly troubled times additional officials 
or special agents of the government might be sent to restore 
order to an area.   
 The two offices which did the most to maintain order in 
the countryside were the Captain of the Contado, an office 
that had been established after 1369, and which came to have 
its greatest powers under the Guinigi rulers; and secondly, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
65Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 1228, p. 407. 
 
66Ibid., regesto n. 1468, p. 455. 
 
67Ibid., regesto n. 1136, p. 391. 
 
68Ibid., regesto n. 40, p. 169. 
 
69Ibid., regesto n. 761, p. 135. 
 
70See the discussion of this in Antonella Casali, “Aspetti 
della Criminalità nel contado Lucchese intorno alla metà del 
1400, secondi i registri del ‘Capitaneus Comitatus,’” 
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the establishment of the podesteriè of the Sei Miglia in 
1411, which came about as Paolo began to perceive the 
situation in the countryside as getting out of hand.71 This 
is a point upon which to dwell for a moment: Paolo was ready 
when the occasion warranted it to create new offices or to 
propose innovative sorts of legislation when the security of 
the state was at issue. Moreover, he was willing to create 
new offices in emergencies whose powers overlapped the 
jurisdiction of others; when he elected the “officialis ex 
ordinarium” in 1407, essentially what was created was a new 
office whose powers were the same as those of the Captain of 
the Contado.72 Paolo Guinigi did not conceive of the state 
as a planned “work of art;” rather he handled problems in a 
more pragmatic fashion, as may be seen in the creation of 
new offices with overlapping boundaries and whose “mero et 
mixto imperio” extended to “each and every foreigner living 
in the comitatus or district of Lucca.”73 
                                                          
71A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 2, c. 44v., p. 106, 
“Essi veduto per piccola cosa nascere molte inconveniense e 
crescendo tali inconveniense multiplicando homicidii et 
altri mali. Et per questo principalmente li podestà sono 
stati creati in nelle VI Miglia.” 
 
72Ibid., n.1, c. 81, p. 159; also see Casali, “Aspetti,” 1. 
 
73Ibid., “omnes et singulos forensis habitantes in comitatum 
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 The Lucchese first appointed a Captain of the Contado 
in 1369 as an emergency measure, but by the next year the 
powers of the office were severely curtailed as the state of 
crisis passed. From 1370-1375 the office was maintained, but 
became clearly subordinate to that of the Podestà of Lucca, 
having the authority merely to capture “delinquenti.”74  
Beginning around 1375, however, the office began to be 
increasingly given the authority to deal with “all persons 
and all crimes” of the countryside. In theory, the Captain 
was to handle those cases of a more serious nature that were 
out of the jurisdictional realm of the vicars.75 
 Yet in reality the Captain, as were the vicars, was 
involved in a wide variety of matters to help ensure the 
integrity of Lucchese borders. Some of the tasks given to 
the Captain were seemingly more in the realm of the vicars 
or tax officials; other duties related to the highest 
security of the state. For instance, sometimes the Captains 
were sent to the various communes to extract taxes that were 
due from the local population, or to impose peace upon a 
locality that had erupted in violence, both tasks which in 
                                                          
74Antonella Casali, “L’ Amministrazione del Contado Lucchese 
nel’ 400: Il Capitano del Contado,” Actum Luce 7 (1978), 
131; in the Lucchese Statute of 1372, the Captain of the 
Contado was listed as a “socius” of the Podestà. 
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most cases seem to have been part of the job of the 
vicars.76 On other occasions the Captains were given the 
difficult job of ridding the contado of immoral activities, 
such as when Giovanni de Griffis condemned two Florentines 
to prison for coming to Lucca and gambling with dice having 
two sixes on them.77 The Captains also dealt with the most 
serious matters of state security, such as guarding against 
returning exiles (“banniti”), keeping tabs on the movements 
of foreign mercenaries along the borders, and with more 
serious domestic offenses, such as murder.78   
 Although in theory the Captain had unlimited power to 
prosecute in the countryside, this was very rarely 
exercised. Nor would it have been accepted for long by the 
populace. It is clear from studying the correspondence of 
the Captain Giovanni de Griffis that he was no madman out to 
induce conformity on the people. He, like the regime as a 
whole, was reluctant at times to act without referring to 
higher powers for fear of the possible repercussions. When 
Griffis had captured the criminals Pardo Lotti and Matteo 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
76Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesti nos. 286, 645, 762, 
991, pp. 52, 119-20, 141, 184. 
 
77Ibid., regesto n. 865, p. 160, “che ànno doi sei per 
dado.” 
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Martinelli in August 1415, for example, he knew they were to 
be exiled, but consulted with Lucca first before carrying 
out the order to determine if the mandate of exile meant 
only the guilty party or their entire families.79 When the 
thief Lazzaro, brother of the priest Donato, was arrested in 
1419, Griffis wrote to Lucca asking what should be done with 
him.80 In dealing with some classes or some individuals, 
Griffis’ “unlimited” authority was questionable, at least in 
his own mind. 
 Yet others met with swift treatment by the Captain. 
After the murderer Landuccio was captured (being wounded in 
the process), Griffis in January 1419 sent the accused to 
the bottom (“fondo”) of the prison at Sasso, where “he will 
be able to talk to noone”.81 Another person was committed to 
the prison of Sasso not because of a crime he had committed, 
but because it was believed by the Captain that he might 
commit one: in February 1419, Griffis imposed the order on 
Tomeo Pasquini of promising (“di dare sicurtà”) not to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
79Ibid., regesto n. 74, p. 13. 
 
80Ibid., regesto n. 577, p. 106, “In su le ventitre hore, 
Lazaro capitò al ponte di san Piero, e vistomi in sul ponte 
levatoio di qua rimase lui abatuto; lo distavarcai e fecelo 
ligare, e poi per doi famigli ligato lo mandai a Nozano.” 
 
81Ibid., regesto n. 244, p. 46, “lo mandato al Sasso in del 
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offend in any way his fellow citizen Andrea di Biagio, but 
since Tomeo’s response did not fully satisfy Griffis, he was 
promptly incarcerated.82   
 On another occasion Griffis was dispatched to the place 
where the murder of Andrea Giovannetti had occurred, but was 
unable to go at first because of illness. He wrote to Guido 
Manfredi that as soon as he was able to ride a horse he 
would proceed to punish severely those guilty of the 
crime.83 The Captain was also responsible for the 
confiscation of illegally-owned arms; a visit to the house 
of a man named Stefanuccio to arrest him for a crime he had 
committed netted the Captain not the criminal since he was 
not at home, but instead “three shields, three lance, two 
large cutting knives, a spear, and a crossbow.”84 The 
Captain’s letter to Guido concerning this matter gives 
evidence of just why the office of the Captain of the 
Contado wielded so much authority. Since the person he was 
seeking could not be found, the Captain informed Guido that 
he returned to the bridge at Moriano “with all of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
82Ibid., regesto n. 306, p. 55. 
 
83Ibid., regesto n. 229, p. 43. 
 
84Ibid., regesto n. 495, p. 93, “tre rotellini, tre lancie, 






             171
brigade.”85 Thus, the Captains of the Lucchese contado were 
involved in a wide range of affairs designed to bring about 
security to the state, and they were provided with a small 
army in which to help them bring it about. 
 A brief look at the travels of the Captain Giovanni de 
Griffis in a half year span in which he held the office in 
1419 will reveal how he was constantly on the move, being 
sent from place to place throughout the realm by Paolo, 
Guido, or other Lucchese officials to restore order. The 
following is a list of towns from which Griffis sent letters 
to Guido Manfredi in Lucca during the first six months of 
1419: 10 January (Nozzano); 17 January (Marlia); 20 January 
(Segromigno); 5 February (Nozzano); 17 March (Avenza); 23 
March (Santa Maria a Colle); 25 March (Nozzano); 18 April 
(Carrara); 26 April (Nozzano); 3 May (Quiesa); 21 May 
(Nozzano); 15 June (S. Gemignano di Moriano). The frequency 
of Nozzano in the list does not imply a trip back to his 
home, but rather to what was at the time a particularly 
troubled area of Lucchesia. Griffis indeed longed to return 
to his home in Massa, but would not depart until his office 
was complete.86 Thus, Griffis headed an effort in the 
                                                          
85Ibid., “cum tuta la brigata.” 
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countryside of Lucca to maintain law and order, and to see 
to it that no foreign threats arose.  
This does not mean he acted ruthlessly in carrying 
these things out, though he could and did use the powers 
bestowed upon his office if necessary to follow orders from 
Lucca. It is clear Griffis was not acting arbitrarily or 
without consent from the mother city. Other citizens of 
Lucca even advised him on how to handle matters. In one 
letter, he was told: “I beseech you, if honor and the 
dignity of your office permits, you ought to release Matheus 
and the others from the rigors of our statutes, for these 
are not the times for losing our rural folks and 
farmers...In my opinion, it is better that they pay for 
their crimes with fines rather than remaining in prison 
calling out that alms be given them, for there they are not 
useful to themselves nor to others.”87 This provides another 
example of the pragmatism of the period of Paolo Guinigi; 
                                                          
87Ibid., regesto n. 1276, p. 241, “Vos precor ut, si 
honestas et officii vestri dignitas patitur, Matheus et 
reliquos ex forma statutorum nostrorum relaxari iubeatis; 
non enim sunt tempora ruralibus et colonis nostris 
perdenda...Melius est, meo iuditio, quod cum pecunia luant 
penas quam stantes in carcere elemosinas miseris datas 
vocent, neque sibi neque aliis utiles sint.” See Franca 
Leverotti, “Gli Estimi Lucchesi del 1411-1413: Una fonte per 
lo studio dell’ amministrazione del paessagio agrario e 
dello demografia,” in Scritti in Ricordi di Giorgio Buratti 
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the “forma statutorum,” that is, at times took second place 
to the adoption of more practical political policies.   
 The second office which came to be of great help in 
preserving order in the Lucchese countryside was the 
establishment of the office of Podestà throughout the region 
of the Sei Miglia. The office of Podestà was an old office, 
dating back to the thirteenth century, that many Italian 
cities had adopted as a result of bitter factionalism. By 
the end of the thirteenth century, however, it had lost much 
of its previous authority in most places to the popolo 
regimes. Nevertheless, it was retained in the cities in some 
form, sometimes even as one of the more important offices 
responsible for police-type duties. By the end of the 
fourteenth century, the office had evolved so that most 
city-states had several podestà, and thus it had became a 
less prestigious office. Those who were given the office 
were typically being assigned to the more vital areas of 
that city’s border territories; this was the situation in 
Lucca when Paolo came to power in 1400. 
 At the beginning of Paolo’s reign there were only a few 
podestà in the most distant and militarily-vital places of 
Lucchese territory, such as Casola, Collodi, Coreglia, and 
Nozzano. After Carrara became a vicariate of Lucca in 1404, 
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assigned to it by Lucca in the next year as well.88 In 
January 1405, Paolo named a podestà to the parish of S. 
Gennaro, and another was created in the following year 
(1406), but after that for five years no more were 
established. Until 1411, that is, for at that time in the 
entire Sei Miglia was instituted the system of the 
“podesteriè.”  Up to that time the Sei Miglia had been 
divided into parishes, but with the nomination of the 
“Potestates Plebeiorum” on 27 April 1411, the region was 
recast into nine podesterie. The primary reason for this 
clamping down of authority in the area of the Sei Miglia, 
the area closest to the city but outside the walls, was 
again for security purposes.89 
 Lucca in the first thirty years of the fifteenth 
century kept a close eye on its contado regions. An activist 
Lucchese domestic policy within Lucca itself carried over 
into its subject communities. The attempt to gain control 
over the religious sphere of Lucchesia was included in this 
effort, an effort that will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
                                                          
88A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n.1, c. 10v., p. 314. 
 
89Leverotti, “Gli Estimi,” 209-10. 
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  CHAPTER 6 
 
 
     LUCCA AND THE CHURCH 
 
    Confrontation of Church and State 
 The Church in the early fifteenth century remained a 
vital and influential part of Italian society; it has been 
noted that in the territory of Florence alone there were 
more than 2,100 parochial churches and 300 pieve during the 
Quattrocento, and that ecclesiastical persons constituted 
some 3.7% of the overall population.1 Gene Brucker has 
argued that the Florentines eventually became hostile toward 
the clergy not so much because of the “occasional scoundrel 
or blackguard in clerical robes,” but rather because the 
clergy seemed to be everywhere one turned.2 Large numbers of 
religiosi would have been omnipresent in Lucca as well; 
according to the findings published by Martino Giusti and 
Pietro Guidi, Lucca and its contado had more monasteries, 
                                                          
1Roberto Bizzocchi, Chiesa e potere nella Toscana del 
Quattrocento (Bologna: il Mulino, 1987), 13-14. 
 
2Brucker, Renaissance Florence (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), 180. 
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canonries, and hospitals than not only Pisa and Siena, but 
also Florence.3 
 However, while many of the local churches of Italy 
flourished at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the 
universal Church was experiencing troubled times. The Church 
had come to have less of an impact on the affairs of the 
Italian cities during the course of the fourteenth century 
because of the relocation of the papal court to Avignon; in 
addition, at the outset of the fifteenth century, the Church 
was undergoing criticism from all parts of Christendom for 
having fallen into schism.4 The Church had lost the status 
of superpower in Italian political affairs, as well as the 
ability to sway the strongest heads of state with its 
spiritual powers; now because of the schism each of the 
disputing popes was in search of friends they could call 
their own and to destroy the rival pope.5 Paolo Guinigi was 
                                                          
3See Duane Osheim, “I Sentimenti Religiosi dei Lucchesi al 
tempo di Castruccio,” in Castruccio e il suo tempo : 
Convegno Intrnazionale, Lucca 5-10 Ottobre 1981 (Lucca: 
Istituto Storico Lucchese, 1984), 100. 
 
4From 1378-1417, the Church was divided as there was a Roman 
pope and a French pope; for a time after the Council of Pisa 
in 1409 there were three claimants to the papal throne.  
This opened up the Church to severe criticism for being more 
concerned with political and military matters than spiritual 
ones. 
 
5Peter Partner in “Florence and the Papacy in the Earlier 
Fifteenth Century,” in Florentine Studies: Politics and 
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able to utilize the new realities the popes and the Church 
as a whole faced as result of the Schism for the betterment 
of Lucca. 
 During the course of the fourteenth century, Church 
officials gradually had lost the traditional privilege of 
exemption from taxation by secular rulers; by the beginning 
of the fifteenth century, most Italian cities had become 
quite experienced in using the resources of the Church 
whenever the need arose. Lucca was no different in this 
regard.6 For example, in February 1419, the Captain of the 
Contado Giovanni de Griffis wrote to Paolo’s secretary Guido 
Manfredi from Nozzano informing him that in conformity with 
the order received earlier from the Signore, he had ordered 
a notary to make an estimo in the pivieri of Arliano and 
Massaciuccoli of not only “all the houses of the 
countryside, but even the citizens and monasteries.”7 Later 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 
argues that whereas Italian politics allowed for an active 
and powerful role for the papacy until 1346 (and a passive 
one for Florence), after 1378 these roles were reversed. 
6Enrici Coturri, “La chiesa lucchese al tempo di 
Castruccio,” Actum Luce 13, 14 (1984-1985), 115, where he 
states that the commune of Lucca first taxed the clergy no 
later than 1303. 
 
7Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, Cancelliere della Repubblica 
di Lucca, Segretario della Signoria di Paolo Guinigi, in 
Regesti del R. Archivio di Stato, ed. Luigi Fumi, vol. III, 
pt. ii (Pescia: Benedetti, 1933), regesto n. 286, p. 52, “a 
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that same year, in August, Guido received word from 
Pietrasanta that the grain tax imposed on the churches of 
Massa by Lucca was currently being conducted.8 Taxation of 
the clergy was a right that had been won by the communes 
over the course of the fourteenth century, and Paolo Guinigi 
did not lose the advantage (nor did he abuse it) for Lucca 
at the turn of the fifteenth.  
 Lucca can also be seen as having emerged victorious in 
the struggle for supremacy between church and commune in 
that it gained control over the episcopal sees of Lucca and 
Luni. Church appointments, particularly over such important 
offices as bishop, had traditionally been the sole domain of 
the Church, but this privilege was gradually lost as secular 
rulers had to be increasingly accomodated, and sometimes 
obeyed. The bishoprics in theory were named by the pope, but 
in reality he had to listen to the suggestions of local 
rulers in many cases; that was the case in Lucca.9 Hardly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
scrivere lo vino, grano, miglio e ogni biada grossa e 
minuta, che troverà in le case de contadini et etiandio de 
citadini e de monestieri” [sic]. 
 
8Ibid., regesto n. 568, p. 105. 
 
9Denys Hay, The Church in Italy in the Fifteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 12.  For 
example, the bishops of Lucca from 1330-1373 were Frenchmen 
appointed from Avignon, the bishops from 1374-1383 were 
Italians, but were nonetheless not those requested by the 
Lucchese Anziani; finally in 1383, with the nomination of 
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any other Italian city was as successful as were the 
Lucchese in bringing their hopes for the office into effect: 
both the Bishops of Lucca and Luni during the reign of Paolo 
Guinigi came to be persons that he favored in the positions.  
 The Bishop of Lucca was actually a second cousin of 
Paolo, Nicolao Guinigi, who had been appointed by Pope 
Boniface IX before Paolo took over, in 1394. Though Nicolao 
had plotted to remove Paolo from power in November 1400, 
they later reconciled and the bishop became one of his 
strongest supporters. The Bishop of Luni after April 1415 
was Francesco Manfredi, the son of Paolo’s secretary Guido 
Manfredi. It is clear from Paolo’s correspondence that he 
was at least partly responsible for persuading Pope Boniface 
to name Francesco as head of the bishopric at Luni. On 13 
April he wrote to D. Bartholomeo de Bosco of Genoa that “it 
pleased him recently when our Most Sacred Father while he 
was at Constance promoted to the bishopric of Luni 
Franciscus, son of my most beloved secretary Sir Guido of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Giovanni Salvucci da Fucecchio as Bishop of Lucca, the 
Lucchese succeeded in getting someone in this office who 
they favored. There still were a number of warnings from the 
Bishop to the Podestà of Lucca in these years for trying to 
exercise civic jurisdiction over persons subject to church 
law only. See Giuseppe Benedetto, “Potere dei Chierici e 
potere dei Laici nella Lucca del Quattrocento al tempo della 
Signoria di Paolo Guinigi (1400-1430): Una simbiosi,” 
Annuario della Biblioteca Civica di Massa (1984), 7-14. 
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Pietrasanta, because of his kindness and because of my 
interceding on his behalf.”10 It was not unusual by the 
fifteenth century for the city-states of Italy to assert 
their will with the popes concerning the appointment of 
church officials in their territories, but the Lucchese had 
as much or more success as any other Italian city in 
actually getting who they wanted into these important 
positions.11 
 Roberto Bizzocchi in his studies on the relations 
between the secular and spiritual rulers of Italy has 
claimed that there indeed was a close relationship between 
commune and church in the fifteenth century, a relationship 
based not so much on close contacts and mutual exchanges, 
but rather one that saw the communes actively gaining 
control over local church structures.12 He has argued that 
                                                          
10A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 64, p. 127, 
“Placuit nuper Sanctissimo Papa nostro dum esset in 
constantia sue benignitatis gratia et intercessionibus meis 
quam efficaces libens fide promovere ad episcopatem lunensi 
dominus francescus filium dilectissimi secretaris mei Ser 
Guidonis de petrasanta.” 
 
11Florence, for example, tried valiantly to push the 
Augustinian scholar Luigi Marsili into the bishopric of 
Florence in the 1380s, but were unable to persuade the pope 
to accept their choice, despite the office coming vacant 
three times during the decade; see Brucker, Renaissance 
Florence, 184. 
 
12See Michael Bratchel’s interesting analysis of 
church/commune relations for the latter part of the 
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in various Italian city-states of this period, secular 
rulers began to utilize the Church in order to enhance their 
own power and prestige. One of the ways this utilization, or 
“aristocratization” of the Church was brought about was by 
the various cities gaining control over the canons of the 
local cathedral chapters. Giuseppe Benedetto, using Lucca as 
a test case in this scenario, has proven that this process 
of the “aristocratization” of the Church was indeed carried 
out in Lucca as well during the period of Paolo Guinigi: in 
1400, the year in which Paolo came to power, only four of 
the sixteen canons of the cathedral of S. Martino belonged 
to families which had members in the Lucchese Anziani from 
1369-1400, but of the next sixteen canons that entered the 
chapter from June 1401-September 1418, eleven were 
supporters of the Guinigi government.13 
 Another aspect of the Bizzocchi thesis has to do with 
the communes gaining influence over the leadership of the 
Franciscan and Dominican orders in their cities. Bizzocchi 
claims that by the fifteenth century, the leaders of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fifteenth century in Lucca 1430-1494: The Reconstruction of 
an Italian City-Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
256-80; on Bizzocchi, see above, n. 1. For the exposition of 
his basic arguments, see “Chiesa e aristocrazia nella 
Firenze del Quattrocento,” Archivio storico italiano 142 
(1984): 191-282. 
 
13Benedetto, “Potere dei Chierici,” 17-18, 28. 
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orders in various cities across Italy had come to closely 
resemble the cathedral chapters (and thus, the civic rulers) 
in terms of social composition. Though this does not hold 
true in Lucca for the Dominicans of S. Romano since most of 
the priors there were non-natives, it does for the 
Franciscans. The Franciscans at S. Frediano in Lucca were 
from 1414-1430 under the priorship of Dino di Poggio, member 
of one of Lucca’s most ancient families.14 
 Paolo knew the importance of establishing good 
relations not only with the local Church, but also with the 
Church in Rome. Only a month after had he declared himself 
Signore of Lucca in November 1400 he had an agent, Jacopo 
Faitinelli, stationed in Rome.15 Faitinelli was likely sent 
there originally to announce the change of government in 
Lucca and to try and garner support for the new regime, but 
he ended up staying in Rome until at least April 1405, 
becoming in the meantime a personal favorite of the Roman 
Pope Boniface IX.16 There are at least eighteen extant 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
14Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494, 271-72. 
 
15Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi 1400-1430 in Regesti del R. 
Archivio di Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi and Eugenio 
Lazzareschi, Vol. III, pt. ii (Lucca: Giusti, 1925), regesto 
n. 6, p. 165. 
 
16In June 1404, Paolo received word from Rome that his 
request to recall to Lucca the “nobilis et circumspectus vir 
                183
letters of Paolo to Faitinelli in Rome from the years 1401-
1405; the correspondence may be characterized as being an 
attempt by Lucca to foster good relations with the Pope 
without conceding too much.   
 Paolo did his best, for example, to get the latest and 
most important information through Faitinelli to Rome 
concerning affairs elsewhere in Italy. He let Boniface know 
about such things as the movements of troops associated with 
the Pope of Avignon (Benedict XIII),17 the danger that Pisa 
was in due to Florentine aggression,18 and the widespread 
confusion in Lombardy at this time as the Duke of Milan’s 
empire was collapsing.19 In several letters, Faitinelli was 
instructed to try and establish good relations with 
Boniface; in others, Paolo’s tone was vastly changed.  
Faitinelli was instructed by Paolo not to concede too much 
to Boniface, or to take care that he only divulge 
information to certain officials of the Church. “Open the 
ears of Pope Boniface and Cardinal Cossa,” Paolo wrote to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Iacobus de Faytinellis, ambaxiator vester” was not agreeable 
to the pope, who had grown very fond of the Lucchese agent; 
See ibid., regesto n. 345, p. 213-14. 
 
17A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 5, c. 32, p. 63. 
 
18Ibid., n. 5, c. 34v., p. 68. 
 
19Ibid., n. 5, c. 33, p. 65. 
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Faitinelli on one occasion after his earlier advice to Rome 
had been rebuffed.20 In other instances, Paolo instructed 
Faitinelli to do just the opposite, to say less; in June 
1404, he advised him to “always with good integrity excuse 
yourself on difficult questions by saying you cannot discuss 
such things without permission.”21   
 Moreover, it is clear from Paolo’s correspondence with 
Faitinelli that in some cases Paolo was unhappy with 
Boniface, and vice versa. In February 1403, Boniface wrote 
Paolo in astonishment that he had imprisoned Anselm, the 
abbot of the monastery of S. Salvatore di Sesto, and had 
continued to withhold him from the jurisdiction of the 
bishop, which was (according to the pope) not only going 
against his ecclesiastical liberties, but also was setting a 
bad example.22 On the other hand, in June 1405, Paolo 
complained bitterly to Faitinelli about the recent papal 
proclamation of excommunication and interdict against the 
Lucchese commune of S. Quirico in the Valdriana, and 
requested that he do his best to persuade the Pope to remove 
                                                          
20Ibid., n. 5, c. 37, p. 73, “Apri li orechi a Angelo (Pope 
Boniface) et al Signor Benigno (Card. Cossa).”  
 
21Ibid., n. 5, c. 36, p. 71, “ma sempre con buona honesta ti 
scusa che tu non ai commissione di tal pratica nè senza 
licentia.” 
 
22Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 282, p. 204. 
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the bull.23 That the pendulum was swinging in favor of the 
communes in their struggle with the Church for supremacy in 
the early fifteenth century can be seen in a variety of 
ways, including in the personal correspondence between 
church officials and the leaders of secular governments.   
 The character of Lucca’s relations with the Church is 
also revealed by the number of times various pontiffs were 
willing to make exceptions to the standard procedure of 
giving church offices, making clear the weak position of the 
Roman Church and its need to appease others. On several 
occasions Lucchese citizens were made exempt from certain 
disqualifications which had been preventing them from 
ecclesiastical office. In 1400, Boniface exempted Francesco 
Manfredi, son of Guido, from a requirement that he be of 
certain age before attaining ecclesiastical benefices.24  
Others seeking to join the priesthood were exempted from the 
traditional disqualification of being of illegitimate 
birth.25 Nor was it only the leading family or two of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
23A.S.L, Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 5, c. 37v., p. 76. 
 
24Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 1, p. 165.  Two 
years later, in 1402, Boniface made Francesco exempt from 
another prohibition that was keeping him from entering a 
studio generale in order to study civil and canon law, see 
ibid., regesto n. 60, p. 173. 
 
25Ibid., regesto n. 1403, p. 444. 
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city who benefitted from a papacy in Rome that was 
temporarily disposed to giving offices: the Cenami, 
Arnolfini, Poggio, and Trenta families (among others) of 
Lucca also pressured Rome to get family members into 
ecclesiastical offices.26 
 The most blatant example I have discovered of the 
manipulation by the popes of the requirements for church 
office, and of their complete refusal to abide by the 
traditional steps one usually passed through to get from one 
stage of the church hierarchy to the next occurred in 
relation to the rise of Nicolao Guinigi in 1394. When 
Nicolao was appointed Bishop of Lucca by Pope Boniface IX in 
January 1394, he was only a cleric in minor orders; by 
March, however, he had been made sub-deacon, by 4 April he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
26Sante Polica, “Le Famiglie del Ceto Dirigente Lucchese 
dalla Caduta di Paolo Guinigi all’ Fine del Quattrocento,” 
in I Ceti Dirigenti nella Toscana del Quattrocento: Comitato 
di Studi sulla Storia dei Ceti Dirigenti in Toscana, Atti 
del V e VI Convegno: Firenze, 10-11 Dicembre 1982; 2-3 
Dicembre 1983 (Florence: Francesco Papafava, 1987), 373.  
Something like this occurs in many cities with ties to Rome; 
for Florence, for example, see George Holmes, “How the 
Medici became the Pope’s Bankers,” in Florentine Studies: 
Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai 
Rubinstein (Evanston, Illionois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), 360, where he states it is “conceivable that 
in the long period of strained relations under Urban VI and 
Boniface IX the political colouring of these families 
[Alberti, Spini, Ricci, and Medici] was a recommendation for 
them at the Curia.” 
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became deacon, and on 5 April 1394, was elevated to priest.  
Later that month, Nicolao was consecrated and entered the 
priesthood.27   
 Victory of commune over local church is further evident 
in that in the event that the churches or monasteries in 
Lucchese territory had issues they wanted addressed, or 
problems they wanted solved, they tended to look not to Rome 
-- but to Lucca. Antonius de Casabasciana wrote to Guido 
Manfredi in September 1419 thanking him for conferment of 
the office of rector at the church of S. Maria Corte 
Orlandinghi, but also requesting from him that an altar be 
built there with the names of those inscribed who built the 
church.28 In June 1419, Paolo received a request from 
Antonio degli Alexandri of Florence that he become involved 
in a dispute that Alexandri had with the monastery of S. 
Domenico in Pisa -- since the Bishop of Lucca was refusing 
to deal with the matter any longer.29   
 In February 1420, the Anziani of Pietrasanta complained 
to Guido about the priest who had been assigned to the 
principal church there, a man named Nicolao di Ser Piero 
                                                          
27Benedetto, “Potere e Chierici,” 15, n. 48. 
 
28Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 584, p. 108. 
 
29Ibid., regesto n. 1227, p. 232. 
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Pandoni. The priest badly governed the church, the Anziani 
argued, by doing such things as denying the sacraments to 
certain people, and not presiding over the candle-lighting 
on the morning of “Sancta Maria Candelaria” as was his duty 
-- not to mention that he was entirely unwilling even to 
enter the church.30 The Pietrasantanese in their petition 
were clearly looking for Lucca to remove the priest.  
 Lucca’s control over the personnel associated with the  
churches and monasteries of its territory was evident 
throughout the thirty years of Paolo Guinigi’s government.  
The Dominican Alessio de Strozzi, of the famous Florentine 
family who was residing at the Florentine convent of S. 
Maria Novella, was sent to the convent of S. Romano in Lucca 
by the order of “il Maestro” of the Dominican Order. Behind 
the order was the initial request of Paolo Guinigi, however, 
who wanted to restore the religious houses in his lands to 
places of respect.31 In another matter involving S. Romano, 
Thomas, Prior of the convent, wrote to Guido that in 
conformity with their (meaning Guido’s and Paolo’s) wishes, 
two maestri had been assigned to the house, one a master in 
                                                          
30Ibid., regesto n. 857, p. 159. 
 
31Ibid., regesto n. 143, p. 27. 
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theology and the other assigned to preaching future Lent 
sermons.32  
 Perhaps where the communal victory over church is most 
evident in regard to Lucca was Paolo’s achievement in 
getting the papal strictures revoked which had been levelled 
on the city since Castruccio Castracani’s day more than 
three-quarters of a century earlier. In 1314, Uguccione and 
Castruccio had plundered Lucca, and among the prizes they 
looted was a large portion of the papal treasure that had 
been temporarily stored at S. Frediano by a papal court 
bound in haste from Rome to Avignon a few years earlier.  
Ever since this event Lucca had suffered in its relations 
with the Church; since 1340, Lucca had been obligated to pay 
a certain fine every year to the papal court, as well as it 
being mandated that all citizens attend an annual sermon in 
the church of S. Martino which was focused on the sins of 
the Lucchese.33 The papal interdict against Lucca, at least 
in theory, was still in place in the year 1400 when Paolo 
Guinigi came to power. 
                                                          
32Ibid., regesto n. 1099, p. 203. 
33According to the decree of Boniface, Lucca had been 
subject to “poenas, provisiones, juramenta, obligationes, 
sententias, et alia,” see Boniface’s bull retracting the 
penalties printed in A. N. Cianelli, “Dissertazioni sopra la 
storia lucchese: Sistema di Governo in Lucca dal 1369 fino 
al 1430,” in Memorie e Documenti per Servire all’ Istoria 
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 Very soon after coming into leadership of the city, 
however, Paolo began to initiate removal of the papal 
demands. By early 1401, in the space of a few weeks, he had 
accomplished the objective as the Lucchese were absolved by 
Boniface from carrying out these obligations in the future. 
The Lucchese agreed to obey the Church in all matters in the 
future, respect ecclesiastical liberties, build a chapel in 
S. Martino dedicated to Saint Benedict, and provide alms for 
1,000 persons -- yet the whole affair may be clearly 
perceived as a victory for the commune. Removal of the papal 
interdict against Lucca which had humiliated the city for 
such a long period helped Paolo’s estimate in the eyes of 
his fellow citizens. It is clear from the wording of the 
papal bull decreed by Boniface which removed the interdict 
against Lucca that the matter had been initiated by Paolo. 
From Sercambi’s account it is also evident Paolo was the one 
responsible for pursuing the matter with Rome from the 
beginning.34 
                                                                                                                                                                             
della Città e Stato di Lucca, vol. II, pt. i (Lucca: 
Francesco Bertini, 1814), 124-25.    
34Giovanni Sercambi, Le Croniche Lucchesi, ed. Salvatore 
Bongi, 3 vols., in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (Rome: 
Giusti, 1892), 1: 66; where it is stated that Boniface 
released Lucca from the annual obligations “a preghiere del 
comune di Luccha e d’ alquanti ciptadini.” 
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 The victory of the communes over the Church was being 
played out in various places all across Italy at this time, 
and Lucca was no exception. It was a victory, however, that 
was far from a complete victory -- primarily because the 
winners chose not to push their advantage.35 Secular rulers 
came to understand the Church might be used not only as an 
ally in foreign affairs, but that the local church could be 
used as a buttress to their own authority at home. In the 
same manner that Lucca exerted its will over the contado for 
the sake of state security in the period of Paolo Guinigi, 
as was seen in the previous chapter, so did it also succeed 
in establishing a greater influence over the personnel and 
activities of the Church in Lucchese territory. 
        Monasticism 
 Monastic life in general was experiencing great 
difficulty in Italy at the beginning of the fifteenth 
century. Some of the problems monasteries faced were the 
same problems society as a whole encountered, such as 
plague, famine, and war. The populations of monasteries 
suffered horribly in times of plague, probably because of 
the close living quarters of their inhabitants; the 
Dominican convent of S. Romano in Lucca lost twenty-nine 
                                                          
35Brucker, Renaissance Florence, 181-89. 
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brothers during the Black Death of 1348.36 S. Jacopo de 
Ripoli in Florence came out even worse, as only three 
survivors out of a community of one hundred lived through 
that year’s plague, although this is citing an extreme 
example.37 One result of the devastated populations of 
monasteries was that in order to refill them quickly they 
had to accept youth, many of whom had questionable motives 
for entering, and most of whom were admitted with little 
concern for their particular religious interests or 
inclinations.38 Guido Manfredi in 1418 informed the Master 
General of the Dominican order in Florence that there were 
no learned brothers at the Dominican convent in Lucca; in 
addition, he complained, there were many who could care less 
about their state of ignorance: “I wish that if they are not 
learned -- that they at least be good!”39 
                                                          
36Innocenzo P. Taurisano, I Domenicani in Lucca (Lucca: 
Baroni, 1914), 32-33. 
 
37Brucker, Renaissance Florence, 191. 
 
38Taurisano, I Domenicani, 31-33. 
 
39Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 386, p. 77, “non 
sunt hic fratres, exceptis priore admodum et Vicario, qui 
litteras norint, qui non tantum literaliter missas, que de 
raro dicuntur, proferre nesciant, sed frequentatas et que 
continuo celebrantur, ignorant. E, o utinam, si non docti, 
saltem boni esse vellent!” 
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 Another source for the troubled times that monastic 
life in Italy faced was that the papacy had been for the 
greater part of the fourteenth century located at Avignon in 
France. This meant that close papal scrutiny over Italian 
monasteries and their activities had been more difficult to 
carry out during that time, which allowed for ample time by 
the beginning of the fifteenth century for the monasteries 
to have fallen into some bad habits. Furthermore, 
immediately upon the return of the papacy to Rome in the 
1370s, the church erupted into a divisive schism. The 
effects of the schism were completely numbing to Christian 
society; the popes cannot have inspired much spiritual 
resuscitation among their congregations in these years as 
they were busy leading armies, trying to secure political 
allies, and attempting to create enemies for the other pope.  
Finally, monastic society suffered from a lack of 
organization sufficient to supervise the upbringing and 
education of the clergy that it once possessed.40    
 Other difficulties the monasteries faced were not so 
much reflective of the times, but rather were problems they 
                                                          
40Giuseppe Benedetto, “Fra Corruzione e Riforme: I monasteri 
femminili della città e del territorio di Lucca nella 
seconda metà del Trecento e nel primo trentennio del 
Quattrocento,” in Ilaria del Carreto e il suo monumento: La 
donna nell’ Arte, la cultura, e la Società del ’400, ed. S. 
Touissaint (Lucca: San Marco, 1995), 175-76.  
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seemed to create on their own. Sister Agnes de Sartoi, the 
abbess of S. Chiara, pleaded with Paulo for help in May 1411 
as a loan of 400 florins had come due which had been made to 
her monastery twenty-three years earlier (1388) by Lazzaro 
for the building of a dormitorio.41 This case reveals how 
financially strapped most monasteries had become by the 
fifteenth century. Nine years later, Sister Agnes had 
apparently again upset members of Paolo’s inner court. She 
wrote to Guido: “I received the response from the messenger 
concerning the matter I sent there, from which I have the 
greatest bitterness and sorrow, and I recognize that I have 
wandered and erred, but it was done in ignorance.”42 On 
other occasions, there appeared to be no doubt why a 
monastery was about to collapse financially. In January 
1417, Paolo wrote to Fr. Manfredino, the “ministro fratrum 
Minorum” in Tuscany, that the reason the monastery was in 
such poverty was that the brothers did not diligently beg 
for alms as did the other orders; more importantly, Paolo 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
41Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 806, p. 303. 
 
42Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 918, p. 171, “Ò 
ricevuta la risposta dal lettore sopra la materia che vi 
mandai a parlare, della qual cosa ò avuto grande amaritudine 
e dolore, e cognoscho che iò errato e fallito, ma 
ignorantantemente questo è stato.” 
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noted, because the brothers perhaps may prefer to take their 
alms to their own cells.43 
 Lucca, just as most other cities of Italy at this time, 
had monasteries that from time to time had members engaging 
in what were perceived as questionable behaviors. Lucchese 
criminal courts came to be particularly focused on the 
sexual activities of the religiosi in areas under their 
jurisdiction. In 1369, the entire community of the female 
monastery of S. Paolo di Coselli was brought to trial in the 
Episcopal Tribunal of Lucca; in the end, all the sisters 
were found guilty of “carnale peccatum,” and were condemned 
to prison at the monastery of S. Marco until their death.44  
The problems apparently continued, as in 1382 Bishop Antonio 
da Riparia made “visite pastorali” to further examine the 
state of the religious houses; it was reported that the most 
orderly monastery in 1382 was that of S. Nicolao Novello, 
but that at S. Quirico, there were two sisters in bad 
relations with the abbess because she refused to allow them 
friendships with men.45 Though I have found no evidence of 
                                                          
43A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 93, p. 185, 
“putantes fortasse quod elemosine usque ad eorum cellulas 
desirantur.” 
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such harsh treatment of an entire congregation during the 
years of Paolo Guinigi as that which S. Paolo di Coselli 
suffered in 1369, the activities of nuns and brothers 
continued to be a real concern of Lucchese governors well 
into the fifteenth century. 
 Three criminal trials involving the sexual misconduct 
of Lucchese religiosi which occurred in the first few months 
of Paolo’s reign reveal that the issue still existed, and 
may have helped persuade him that stringent reform of the 
monasteries was necessary to preserving order. In July 1402 
occurred a trial of a sister who had abandoned the monastery 
of S. Bernado without permission, and had gone to reside 
with a man; the second case involved a priest, Giovanni di 
Bartolomeo Lupori and a sister of the monastery of S. Paulo 
di Coselli; and finally, a trial which concerned a canon of 
the cathedral of S. Martino (Giovanni Nicolai) and the 
abbess of S. Michele nei Monti di Brancoli.46   
 Paolo, along with the Bishop of Lucca, had actually 
first conceived of the need to reform the female monasteries 
of Lucca no later than February 1402.47 During the Signore’s 
                                                          
46Ibid.,” 188. 
 
47A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 5, c. 30, p. 59; in 
this letter to Faitinelli, Paolo urged him to support the 
Bishop of Lucca’s attempt to clean up the monasteries, and 
to get a papal bull from Boniface authorizing “che possa 
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visit to inspect Lucchese territories during the next year, 
he undoubtedly came to more fully understand the extent of 
the “disonesto vivere” occurring in the monasteries. In 
1404, the efforts of Paolo and the Bishop of Lucca to reform 
the pious places of the city and contado were finally 
approved and carried out; on 29 February, the Bishop shut 
down six female monasteries, the inhabitants of all six 
moving into the more reputable and well-established houses 
of S. Giustina and S. Nicolao Novello.48 Nor did the 
Lucchese attempt to keep close watch over the monasteries 
cease with this massive administrative effort of 1404.   
 In June 1420, Paolo wrote to the Cardinal of Ursinis to 
ask that he persuade Pope Martin V to restore control over 
the monastery of S. Salvatore of Fucecchio, the parish of S. 
Giovanni of Fucecchio, and the church of S. Bartholomew of 
Cappiano to its rightful possessor, which was the Lucchese 
monastery of S. Clare (Gattaviola). These had been 
wrongfully removed from S. Clare’s jurisdiction in 1412, 
Paolo argued, since they had been ceded to the monastery 
                                                                                                                                                                             
visitarli, corregerli, punire, ordinare et statuire sì in de 
capi come in de le membra tutto cio che li paresse di 
bizogna.” 
 
48Ibid., n. 5, c. 32v., p. 64. 
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long ago by Pope Alexander IV.49 Later that summer of 1420, 
the Signore requested from the Cardinal of Brancaccis that 
the abbey at Pozzevoli not be taken away from the canons of 
S. Martino since Pope Gregory had given it to the chapter 
when he was in Lucca in 1408. Its recent decay, Paolo 
claimed, was not due to the canons but to the “misgivings 
and negligence of those who in recent times presided over 
it.”50   
 In other cases, Paolo tried to avert mischances such as 
these and take action first. When Paolo perceived the 
Dominican Order in Lucca to have fallen into a state of 
sterility, he asked the Cardinal of Brancaciis to intervene 
and send from Venice the esteemed Fr. Giovanni Bartolomei da 
Lucca to resurrect it, so that it once again might become a 
place of “modesty, self-control, and fasting.” This 
religious house was obviously of great importance to Lucca, 
for according to Paolo’s letter to the Cardinal, “if anyone 
                                                          
49Ibid., n. 6, c. 138v., p. 278, “iam dudum per felicissime 
recordationis Dominus Allexandrum papam quartum monasterium 
S. Salvatoris de Fucecchio cum plebe S. Iohannis de 
Fucecchio et ecclesia S. Bartholomei de Cappiano, 
Iurisditionis et Iurium detti monasteri...concessum et 
collatum fuitur monasterio de Gattaviola quod vulgariter 
dicitur monasterium S. Clare de Luca, et semper ab eo tempo 
citra usque ad Annum MCCCCXII.” 
 
50Ibid., n. 6, c. 141v., p. 284, “culpa et negligentia eorum 
qui ei retroactis temporibus...” 
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wanted to live in a celebrated (holy) place, not only in 
Italy, but also from foreign nations, they made haste 
quickly and eagerly to this aforementioned Lucchese 
convent.”51 
 Thus, Paolo Guinigi during the first thirty years of 
the fifteenth century was able to establish a firm grip on 
the churches and monasteries of Lucchese territory. No stone 
could be left unturned for this regime in the context of the 
larger attempt to preserve Lucchese independence. Yet, 
whatever the motives were in closing down the morally 
questionable monasteries, Paolo’s Christian sincerity cannot 
be doubted. His desire to purify the city was a moral quest 
just as it was an attempt at political consolidation.  
Undoubtedly, at least part of the reason he undertook the 
campaign to root out indecent living in the monasteries was 
because he believed such ways of life were not Christian-
like.   
 The Signore of Lucca certianly believed in right codes 
of living, and he was as likely to dismiss an official over 
some act that was considered immoral as any other type of 
                                                          
51Ibid., n. 6, c. 144, p. 289, “tanta modestia, continentia 
et ciborum abstinentia preditum, ut quisquis non solum apud 
Italos, sed etiam externas nationes in celebri loco vitam 
ducere proponeret, ad conventum lucensium cupidus et celer 
accederet.” 
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offense. He evicted, for example, the Augustinian brother 
Giovanni from the order for the “immoralità commesse.”52  
The Lucchese court records of the 1420s are filled with 
cases of alleged sodomy and male homosexuality, also 
pointing out the regime’s moral concerns.53 Sumptuary laws, 
established in Lucca in 1331, were kept intact through the 
Guinigi regime, although they were sometimes eased for 
special occasions. Still, in 1409 there was a decree passed 
whose aim was to rid of the “super fluitates expensarum” of 
women’s dress.54 
 Paolo’s real concern, however, lay only with the 
visible church, with the buildings and the personnel of the 
churches and monasteries of Lucchese territory; the 
invisible church was something he would have thought to be 
only the domain of properly-trained religiosi. In a letter 
to the Priors of Siena in January 1420, he claimed that as 
far as ecclesiatical matters go, he left them up to the 
                                                          
52Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 814, p. 151. 
 
53 Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494, 14. 
 
54See Marco Paoli, Arte e committenza privata a Lucca nel 
Trecento e nel Quattrocento (Lucca: Maria Pacini Fazzi, 
1986), 61-62. 
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experts.55 Paolo would have felt that to interfere in the 
affairs of the visible church would be beneficial, even 
necessary, to the state as a whole; but, to tread in 
doctrinal matters would have been detrimental to his true 
Christian beliefs. Yet Lucca’s close involvement with the 
personnel and activities that went on in its territory are 
reflective not of a desire to induce conformity on its 
populace, but rather of a desire to keep a close handle on 
the overall security of the state. 
       Lucca in the Great Schism 
 The Great Schism (1378-1417) of the late medieval 
church began after a group of cardinals unhappy with the 
election of Urban VI (r.1378-89) as pope in 1378 abandoned 
him and named another pope, Clement VII. Clement (r.1378-94) 
established his court in France at Avignon, where the papacy 
had been centered for much of the fourteenth century, while 
Urban resided in Rome. For the next forty years until the 
election of Martin V at Constance (r. 1417-31) as the one 
true pope in 1417, Christendom was deeply divided between 
the rival candidates of Rome and Avignon. The situation 
became even more complicated after the Council of Pisa in 
1409 when both the then popes Gregory XII (r. 1406-1415) and 
                                                          
55A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 131, p. 263, 
“Cum autem de rebus ecclesiaticis illis delibertionem et 
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Benedict XIII (r. 1394-1423) were deposed and Alexander III 
(r. 1409-10) elected as the valid claimant of the holy see. 
The problems arose when the two deposed popes refused to 
accept the ruling of the council, and thus, for a time there 
were three who claimed to be the legitimate vicar of Christ.  
One consequence of the Great Schism was that now the popes 
were forced to seek others to join their cause.56 Lucca used 
this new situation of a weakened papacy for its own benefit 
at the beginning of the fifteenth century. 
 The first point that should be made concerning Lucca’s 
relations with the various schism popes is that they  
remained obedient to the Roman Urbanist tradition -- not 
only up to the Council of Pisa in June 1409 like virtually 
every other Italian city -- but for some time afterward, 
perhaps as late as 1412. Why Lucca did not immediately 
adhere to the decision of the Council of Pisa was mainly due 
to their alliance after 1408 with Ladislas, the King of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decisionem ad quos de iure pertinent...” 
56Though it is generally true that England, Flanders, 
Germany and the city-states of Italy mostly supported the 
Roman popes, while France, Spain, and Scotland favored the 
Avignon popes, both sides still were active propagandists 
against their rivals, excommunicating them, hurling insult 
after insult at them, appealing to various heads of state 
across Europe to uphold their edicts, and other types of 
aggression.  There were always exceptions, however; for 
example, Genoa removed its support from the Roman popes, 
while the French government from 1398-1403 removed its 
support of the Avignonese pope, Benedict XIII. 
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Naples, a topic that will be discussed further below.57 In 
short, whatever stance Lucca took at any one point in regard 
to the popes of the schism may be explained by it being the 
stance that gave them the greatest possible security.   
 Lucca particularly benefitted at the onset of the Great 
Schism because there had been deteriorating relations 
between Florence and the Church in the 1370s, which had 
culminated in the War of the Eight Saints (1375-78). As a 
result of the war, Lucchese bankers, especially the Guinigi, 
took over the profitable position as papal bankers from the 
Florentines, who no longer were in the good graces of 
Rome.58 Yet, despite seemingly every motivation to stay on 
good terms with the first Roman pope, Urban VI, much 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
57Ladislas of Durazzo (1380-1414) was King of Naples from 
age six until his death. After first conquering Naples in 
1399, he turned his attention northward. He became an 
increasing threat to various cities of the papal states and 
Tuscany from 1404-1414, beginning with his takeover of Rome 
in 1404, although earlier he had been the protector of the 
Roman line of popes. Ladislas first became involved in 
Tuscan affairs after the Pisan Signore Gabriel Maria 
Visconti began to consider ceding Pisa to the French in 
1404-05, which would have been a victory not only for the 
French Pope Benedict XIII, but also would have helped the 
cause of Ladislas’ own rival, Louis II of Anjou, the other 
claimant to the throne of Naples. 
 
58Holmes, “How the Medici,” 359-60. The Lucchese were the 
main papal bankers from 1377-1392, the Guinigi Company being 
used by the papacy as well as those of Lando Moriconi and 
Bartholomeo Turco. 
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evidence points to Lucca’s hesitancy to endorse him fully.  
Even though Lucca was officially loyal to the Roman line of 
popes from 1378-1412, it was a thinly-veiled loyalty without 
much zeal behind it. This is not because they did not truly 
favor Urban over the French candidate, Clement VII; indeed 
most Italian cities, Lucca included, were happy to finally 
have a native-born Italian pope. But the Lucchese did not 
want to offend the French pope (or his allies) if they could 
at all avoid it. French troops, after all, were often within 
range of Lucchesia in these years. In short, Lucca like the 
large majority of Italian cities, favored Urban; they just 
were not in a position to be active propagandists for him.  
 For example, the Lucchese received with joy the news 
that Urban had been elected in April 1378, providing the 
holy see with an Italian-born pope for the first time in 
decades; yet in December 1378, and again in March 1379, the 
republican government of Lucca did not feel it could reject 
proposed visits from representatives of the “anti-pope” 
Clement. These visits, moreover, were received so 
courteously that they were upsetting to Urban.59 The 
Lucchese penchant for a non-committal foreign policy may be 
                                                          
59Christine Meek, Lucca 1369-1400: Politics and Society in 
an Early Renaissance City-State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), 153, n.1. 
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seen again in 1382, when constant delay tactics and evasive 
responses were given to Urban’s representatives when they 
were calling for Lucca to join the war against Louis of 
Anjou of France.60 Finally, Urban’s visit to Lucca in 1386 
is very revealing. When Lucca finally accepted the pope’s 
request to visit Lucca in October 1386 (the initial request 
was made in April), it was done only with the stipulation 
that the pope would agree that none of the armed troops that 
would accompany him on his journey were to be allowed inside 
the city. The Lucchese supported Urban -- but they trusted 
no one when it came to putting their state at risk. 
 Turning to a discussion of Lucca’s relations with the 
popes of the schism during the period of Paolo Guinigi, it 
is evident that in the aftermath of the death of the Duke of 
Milan, the Lucchese made a wise choice in whom they would 
attempt to allign themselves with in the future. Apparently 
more clearly than other Tuscan and Lombard cities, the 
Lucchese perceived the potential that lay in the young King 
of Naples, Ladislas. As early as 1403 they were 
corresponding with Ladislas in an attempt to build cordial 
relations. The King thanked Guido for the “affection which 
you hold for us which arises from your innate virtue, news 
                                                          
60Ibid., 162, n. 33. 
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which was brought us by Bartholomeus, your venerable and 
pious orator and our faithful disciple.”61 In responding to 
a gift sent by the Lucchese in May of the following year, 
Ladislas again reminded Guido of his devotion to them.”62  
In September 1404, the Lucchese desire to tie themselves to 
the young king became evident for all to see when the first-
born son of Paolo Guingi was named in honor of the king.63  
In June 1405, Gabriele Maria Visconti, still hanging by a 
thread to the inheritance of Pisa that his father had 
bestowed upon him in his will, received an offer from 
Ladislas to join a league with him, a league which included 
as a member the Signore of Lucca.64 From this point until 
his death, the Lucchese never faltered in their attempt to 
                                                          
61Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 3, p. 1, “de 
affectione quam ex innata virtute tua venerabilis et 
religiosus frater Bartholomeus orator et devotus noster erga 
nos habere te retulit, referimus grates dignas.” 
 
62Ibid., regesto n. 5, p. 1, “parati sumus devotioni 
tue...cognoscentes tue sinceritatis et devocionis affectum 
procedere ex dilectionis fervore quam ad nos ipsa devocio 
tua gerit.” 
 
63On 24 September 1404 Paolo and Ilaria had their first son, 
who “a petitione del re Lancilao di Napoli, fu bactegiato in 
suo nome proprio per uno barone del dicto re...Al quale 
bactismo funno molti venerabili ciptadini di Lucha e molte 
venerabilissime donne; e puoseli nome Lancilao,” Sercambi, 
Le Croniche, 3: 77. 
 
64Francesco Cognasso, “Il ducato visconteo da Gian Galeazzo 
a Filippo Maria,” in Storia di Milano, 17 vols. (Milan: 
Treccani degli Alfieri, 1955), 6: 114-115. 
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remain on good terms with Ladislas -- much to the chagrin of 
several of their neighbors.65 
 When Boniface died in October 1404, Ladislas 
immediately moved his army into Rome so that by the time the 
next Roman pope Innocent VII was elected, he was elected 
with Ladislas’ troops presiding over the city. Ladislas’ 
control of the Roman line of popes dates from Innocent’s 
reign and it continued virtually until his death in 1414; 
Innocent VII himself, in fact was an old subject of the 
King, the Sulmonese Cosimo dei Migliorati. Ladislas forced 
Innocent to accept a popular government in Rome, with the 
King to act as arbiter between the pope and commune if 
disputes arose.66   
 After Innocent’s brief reign ended with his death in 
November 1406, the Roman line was restored with the papacy 
of Gregory XII. With the ascension of Gregory the call to 
end the Schism became even more urgent, led by Florence.  
Both Gregory and the Pope of Avignon, now feeling increased 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
65Florence, for example, carried out land devastations in 
Lucchese territory because they believed that Paolo Guinigi 
was responsible for urging Ladislas to come to Tuscany in 
1408-09; Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 149. 
 
66Peter Partner, The Papal State Under Martin V: The 
Administration and Government of the temporal power in the 
early Fifteenth Century (London, 1958), 16-17. 
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pressure from all sides to end the schism, claimed that they 
were willing to step down from the office if their rival 
would also resign in order that a third person could then be 
elected for the sake of ending the division in 
Christendom.67 It was decided in April 1407 that a suitable 
meeting place for the two popes was at Savona, an Italian 
port city southwest of Genoa, but which at the time was 
under French control.   
 The problem was that neither pope was in any particular 
hurry to lay down his office, though Gregory was the more 
fearful of the two of the consequences of being forced to 
meet by secular rulers, their cardinals, or others. After 
some delay, Gregory decided Savona was not a suitable place 
and proposed meeting instead at Pietrasanta in Lucchese 
territory.68 The French pope agreed to this and finally, 
after more delays Gregory arrived in Lucca in late January 
                                                          
67Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 121; also Carteggio di Paolo 
Guinigi, regesto n. 435, p. 230. 
 
68Papal agents contacted Lucca in December 1407 concerning 
permission for “accessu ac residentia per nos ad Civitatem 
lucanum et terram Petresancte comitatus lucanum cum nostra 
Curia vel eorum altera faciendis, occasione extirpationis 
scismatis et pro consecutione desiderabilis unionis;” see 
Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 447, p. 232. 
 
                209
1408, while the galleys of Benedict XIII sailed from Savona 
and proceeded to the nearby town of Portovenere.69    
 Although given a grand reception upon entering the 
outskirts of Lucca at Pietrasanta, where Gregory’s 
assemblage was initially lodged, it cannot be said the 
Lucchese were happy to have their papal guests. The primary 
reason was that accompanying the pope to Lucca were 450 
knights.70 Certainly once Gregory was in Lucca the hosts 
were hopeful of a quick resolution between the two popes, 
and a quick exit by Gregory and his armed guards. They got 
neither. Paolo refused Gregory’s request of occupying 
certain castles in Lucchese territory that were deemed too 
vital to give up for the security of the state.71  
Throughout the winter and spring of 1408 the two popes sent 
stipulations, requests, warnings, and other types of 
messages to one another, but never met even though only a 
few miles apart. Though little was accomplished as far as 
ending the schism in these few months of 1408 when the popes 
                                                          
69Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 127-29. 
 
70Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 482, p. 239. 
 
71Mancini, Storia di Lucca (Florence: Sansoni, 1950), 191. 
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were in Lucchese territory, Paolo Guinigi did receive the 
gift of rosa d’ oro from Gregory in March.72 
 Meanwhile, as Gregory continued to delay meeting with  
Benedict XIII, Ladislas again took control of Rome and much 
of the surrounding area of the papal states in April 1408.73  
This action was perceived as a threat to the Florentines 
since the papal states bordered their territory to the south 
and to the east; it was more than just a threat to Siena as 
their lands were part of those already being devastated.74  
According to Sercambi, Florence, believing that an end to 
the schism of the church was necessary before Ladislas 
consolidated his gains in the papal states and moved toward 
Tuscany, and losing hope that Gregory was ever going to 
                                                          
72This token marked the highest “successo della politica 
ecclesiastica e il riconoscimento della Signoria di Paolo 
Guinigi;” see Eugenio Lazzareschi, “I Domenicani nel 
Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi,” Memorie Domenicane XLIII 
(1926),479.  
 
73Gregory by 1408, like Innocent earlier, had become a 
puppet of Ladislas. Since Ladislas did not want the Schism 
to end because he feared a French pope would be named to 
replace the two current ones (which would mean a general 
French resurgence in Italy), this gave Gregory even more 
incentive to continue avoiding meeting with the French pope. 
   
74C.C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The 
‘De Militia’ of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961), 77. 
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consent to meet with Benedict, decided to secretly negotiate 
with the Avignonese pope.75   
 It was agreed that the Florentines would attempt to get 
Gregory to go to Pisa (under Florentine control since 1406) 
under their protection, where he could be watched more 
closely and kept away from Ladislas, while Benedict should 
proceed temporarily to Genoa, a city which until September 
1409 was friendly to the Florentines.76 There was also 
beginning to be much discussion in these months at secular 
courts, churches, the University of Paris and many other 
places concerning the holding of a church council to settle 
the matter of the schism since apparently neither pope was 
willing to take steps to end the schism. The “via 
cessionis,” from 1378-1408 favored by most of Christendom as 
the preferred way to end the schism, was now clearly giving 
way to the “via consilii.”77 
                                                          
75Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 129, “Nicolò da Uzano & messer 
Mazo delli Albisi, con alquanta conpagnia, et praticando col 
predicto papa socto nome d’ unione, vedendo lo comune di 
Firenza che i re Lancilao era per aver Roma & che tucto dì 
prendea delle terre di santa Chieza, dubitando di tale re, 
conchiuseno secretamente col dicto papa che farenno tanto 
che papa Gregorio andere’ a Pisa socto la loro signoria.” 
 
76In September 1409, Genoa removed their French governor 
Boucicault from power, and entered into an alliance with 
Ladislas. 
 
77The King of France, for example, stated that if the Schism 
were not settled by the day of the Ascension of 1408 that he 
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 Gregory made matters worse for himself when he broke a 
promise made at the time of his election not to elect any 
additional cardinals unless it was necessary to maintain an 
equal number as the Avignonese popes. On 4 May 1408, Gregory 
named four additional cardinals while in Lucca, two of which 
were his nephews.78 His cardinals, already unhappy with 
Gregory over the numerous delays, were now ready to flee to 
the protection of Florence and begin proceedings for a 
future council. Gregory had promised the Florentines in 
April 1408 that he would go to Pisa with them, but when 
confronted with the matter later he responded, “Florentine 
ambassadors, you say that I promised you to go to Pisa, and 
you speak the truth. But I did not tell you neither in what 
manner nor when I will do so.”79   
 The majority of cardinals did indeed escape to Pisa at 
this point, despite the grave warnings of Gregory that all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
was going to deny obedience to both popes. Nino Valeri, L’ 
Italia nell’ Eta dei Principati: dal 1343-1516 (Verona: 
Arnaldo Mondadori, 1949), 356-57. 
 
78One of the four cardinals named in 1408 at Lucca was the 
noted Cardinal of Florence, Giovanni Dominici; for 
Dominici’s activities in relation to the Schism, see George 
Holmes, The Florentine Enlightenment, 1400-1450 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 57-58; also see Lazzareschi, 
“I Domenicani,” 478-79. 
 
79Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 131-32, “ambasciatori 
fiorentini, voi dite che io vi promissi il venire a Pisa, et 
dite il vero. Ma io non vi dissi a che modo nè quando.” 
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honors and benefices would be lost for anyone who left.80  
After some of the cardinals had abandoned Lucca, Gregory 
sent out some of his troops to try and bring them back 
forcefully. A few managed to escape to the safety of village 
populations, before making their way on to Pisa; others were 
caught and brought back to Lucca where they were briefly 
imprisoned.81 On 16 May 1408 Gregory posted in all the 
churches of Lucca his grievances against the cardinals; they 
were ordered to return within a certain number of days or 
else lose all ecclesiastical honors.82 None, however, did, 
and Gregory was now in the direst of situations. 
 Paolo Guinigi, however, found no justification in 
detaining the cardinals and after a few days released them 
from the Lucchese prisons;83 Paolo’s freeing of the 
cardinals in order that they might go to Pisa to participate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
80“...di perdere tucti honori et beneficii qualunque de’ 
suprascripti si fusse partito di Luccha, o che si dovesse o 
volesse partire, e i partiti, se in fra certi dì non fusseno 
ritornati, si intendessero, chi contrafacesse, incorrere in 
nella pena dicta,” Ibid., 3: 140. 
 
81Ibid., 3: 135. 
 
82Ibid., 3: 140. 
 
83Sercambi wrote that upon Paolo’s release of the cardinals, 
“tucta Luccha fu meravigliosamente stupefacta, e’ Fiorentini 
lieti che aveano avuto loro intentione di tale cosa;” Ibid., 
3: 136. 
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in a council that was being condemned by Gregory (while he 
was there in Lucca, moreover) reflects that the Lucchese 
were doing everything possible not to give the impression 
they were being overly friendly to one side.84 By mid-May 
1408 all of Gregory’s cardinals had gone to Pisa, except for 
the four he had recently created. Once there, planning began 
in earnest along with some cardinals who had left the 
Avignonese pope to hold a special council in which the issue 
of the Schism was to be addressed; it was determined in 
August 1408 that the Council was to be held the following 
year in Pisa.85 
 Meanwhile, Ladislas’ military successes in the spring 
of 1408 continued to mount. By the summer he controlled not 
only Rome, but all the lands of the Church in Patrimony and 
in Umbria, and had begun to threaten Cortona, Arezzo, and 
other passes into Tuscany.86 As the situation worsened for 
Florence, they made an alliance in May with Baldassare 
Cossa, the papal-legate of Bologna, to try and save what was 
                                                          
84Mancini, Storia di Lucca, 191; it should also be noted 
that Paolo continued to correspond with the French pope in 
this pivotal year of 1408. See Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, 
regesti nos. 567, 569, 577, 578, 580, 584, 585. 
 
85Holmes, Florentine Enlightenment, 59. 
 
86Partner, Papal State under Martin V, 19. 
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remaining of the papal state from coming under Ladislas’ 
control.87   
 The Lucchese, on the other hand, in June 1408 sent a 
secret embassy to Ladislas to congratulate him on his recent 
acquisitions, and before the end of the month, had entered 
into a formal league with the King of Naples.88 This 
alienated Lucca from the Florentines and others, and Lucca 
would pay for it in the future, but at the time it was the 
practical move for the Lucchese to make: Ladislas was the 
most powerful military figure in Italy after the death of 
Giangaleazzo until his own death in 1414. It would have been 
foolish for Paolo not to have sought alliance with him. 
 The beginning of 1409 saw similar successes for 
Ladislas. At the beginning of the year Perugia was taken by 
the King, and he was disposed to wage war against the 
Florentines, according to Sercambi, since he believed they 
were responsible for the cardinals being in Pisa readying to 
end the Schism.89 Florence was still reconciliable with 
                                                          
87Partner, “Florence and the Papacy,” 387. 
 
88Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 140-42. 
 
89Sercambi was prone to blame Florence for many things, 
including for being the cause of the division in the Church: 
“O astutia di Fiorentini et sagacità, con quanto 
provedimento avete divizo il collegio de’ cardinali dal capo 
loro, cioè dal papa!  E non avete guardato a che ruina viene 
la Chieza per tale divizione,” Le Croniche, 3: 136. 
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Ladislas during the first two months of 1409, but their mood 
changed in March when the king seized Cortona, lay siege on 
Arezzo, and resumed land devastations in Sienese 
territory.90 Florence tried last-gasp negotiations with 
Ladislas with the demands that Perugia be freed, and that he 
sever his ties with Lucca and Paolo Guinigi. In the 
following month, a war balìa was created in Florence, and 
from this point, conflict was inevitable.91 The Florentines 
blamed Paolo for being responsible for inducing Ladislas to 
come to Tuscany; according to Sercambi, they plundered 
Lucchese lands on several occasions in retaliation.92 Though 
1409 had begun well for Ladislas, by mid-year he was running 
into serious difficulties. In June 1409, an alliance was 
agreed upon against Ladislas by a powerful league consisting 
of Florence, Siena, Louis II of Anjou, and Baldassare Cossa, 
a force which by the end of the year had begun to halt the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
90Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance 




92Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 149, “...dando suono che il 
predicto signore fusse stato chagione d’ avere facto 
somuovere il dicto re del venire in Toschana, più volte 
deliberonno chavalchare et dannegiare il terreno di Lucha.”  
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advance of Ladislas and inflict some defeats of their own on 
his troops.93  
 At the Council of Pisa in June 1409, a widely announced 
event that attracted some 500 secular leaders from around 
Europe, the cardinals of the two popes quickly deposed 
Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, and elected as the true pope 
Alexander V. Most of Christendom after June 1409 accepted 
the conciliar Pisan (or perhaps more correctly “Florentine”) 
Pope Alexander V; only Ladislas and Lucca continued to give 
their support to Roman legitimism. The Avignonese pope 
Benedict XIII had the support of no one, as even the King of 
France favored the newly-elect. Lucchese reluctance to 
accept Alexander may be seen in the writings of Sercambi.  
He wrote that at the Council of Pisa, the cardinals made 
many protests and recommendations, which in Lucca were not 
approved of.94 He did not feel the election of Alexander had 
cured the ills of the division in the Church, rather it had 
made things worse: “Now Christianity and the Church are more 
divided than before since at the present there have been 
                                                          
93Brucker, Civic World, 233; Valeri, L’ Italia, 359-60; 
Bayley, War and Society, 77. 
 
94Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 159, “le quali qui non s’ 
aprovano, però che non si sa se sono seguiti iuridichamente 
nè cattolicamente e in ciò pecchare non si vorre.” 
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named three popes.”95 Gregory XII obviously felt the same.  
Departing Lucca after a half-year’s stay in July 1408 for 
Siena, he wrote to Paolo in September that Alexander V has 
strayed from the Church under the pretext of seeking union, 
and he urged Paolo to treat him as a rebel.96 
 What may best reveal the uneasiness the Lucchese must 
have felt about what was going to happen at the Council of 
Pisa was that Paolo prohibited the bishops and clergy of 
Lucchese territory from attending the council’s sessions.97  
Considering what many in attendance may have thought about 
any Lucchese representatives in attendance, it may have been 
a humane move on Paolo’s part not to send anyone. The 
Council, however, requested in June 1409 that he send a 
prelate to represent Lucca at the proceedings. But Paolo, 
seeing that much had already been done in Pisa without his 
consent or without any Lucchese representatives in 
attendance, declined to send anyone. Sercambi wrote that 
Paolo responded in his usual, respectful manner, alleging 
how much danger Lucca would incur if it broke its promises 
                                                          
95Ibid., 3: 163, “Ora la cristianità e la chiesa esser molto 
più diviza che prima, perchè al presente tre s’ intictolano 
papi.” 
 
96Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 642, p. 263. 
 
97Mancini, Storia di Lucca, 191. 
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and opposed the Holy Roman Church, as they had just been 
reconciled with Rome after the long period of being under 
papal inderdict.98 
 There were at last some diplomatic overtures from Lucca 
to the newly-crowned Alexander in Pisa. In October 1409, an 
embassy was sent to Alexander led by Nicolao Arnolfini and 
Stefano d’ Jacopo di Poggio, who were well-received by the 
Pope and who claimed Alexander openly demonstrated his 
benevolence toward Paolo and the state of Lucca.99 It is not 
surprising that during the latter half of 1409 and into 1410 
that the Lucchese would have become more conducive to the 
wishes of their neighbors, as Lucca’s ally Ladislas had 
finally begun to suffer defeat at the hands of the League 
that had been established to oppose him.100  
                                                          
98Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 153, “diliberò rispondere con 
honesto modo che s’ aparteneva a lui. Alegando in quanto 
pericolo incorrea Lucha se contrafacesse a quello che già 
promesso fu a santa chieza, quando fu riconciliata dallo 
interdicto che papa Iohanni .xxii. avea facto contra 
Lucha...E con quelle scuze et ragioni fecie il predicto 
signore chiaro il collegio de’ cardinali et altri prelati.” 
 
99Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 47, appendix, p. 
478.  
 
100The League’s army by mid-1409 was headed by some of the 
most notable mercenaries of the day, including Malatesta dei 
Malatesta, Muzio Attendolo Sforza, Braccio da Montone, Paolo 
Orsini (who had abandoned Ladislas); see Valeri, L’ Italia, 
360. 
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 As early as April 1409 Ladislas had begun to be pushed 
back southward. When he set out from Orvieto for Siena, he 
was met by this powerful group of mercenary comapanies for 
the first time, and was halted near Arezzo in the early 
summer. By October 1409, the League had begun to free some 
cities that Ladislas had recently come to possess.101 The 
prospects for the newly-elected Pope Alexander suddenly 
appeared much better, but he died soon after in May 1410.  
This spelled disaster for Lucca as the pontiff named to 
replace him was Baldassare Cossa, the old papal-legate of 
Bologna -- who had come to dislike the Lucchese over the 
years, doing so moreover without much regard to making a 
secret of it. 
 Sercambi wrote that Cossa, who became Pope Giovanni 
XXIII in 1410, had a grudge against Lucca for some time 
before becoming pope. He once tried to persuade the troops 
of the French king to plunder Lucchese lands; Lucca escaped 
harm on this occasion, as the French king refused to allow 
it based on his previous good relations with Paolo 
Guinigi.102 Giovanni XXIII had close relations with Florence, 
                                                          
101Partner, Papal State Under Martin V, 20. 
 
102Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 169, “messer Baldassari 
sollicitò le genti de re Luizi ch’ erano in Valdiserchio che 
venissero in sul terreno di Lucha a dannegiare....Il dicto 
re Luizi rispondendo: come vorrò io che le miei genti 
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and this perhaps best explains the new pope’s attitude 
toward Lucca.103 Sercambi, wondering how such a worldly 
warlord could become pope, determined that it must have been 
“through love or through force.”104 When Paolo was informed 
of Giovanni XXIII’s ascension to the papacy in June 1410, he 
was warned by many cardinals of the evil intentions the new 
pontiff had against him and against Lucca for many 
reasons.105 Paolo’s reaction to the rise of Giovanni to the 
papal throne is not surprising. When the new pope sent an 
embassy to Genoa to announce his ascension, it was 
instructed to stop on the way at Lucca to announce the 
change there as well; when told of the news Paolo gave to 
the informants only those responses that were necessary for 
the protection of Lucca.106 
                                                                                                                                                                             
faccino novità al signore Paulo di Lucha, che ò tanto honore 
ricevuto da quel signore? E volete che io sia ingrato del 
servigio ricevuto? per certo questo non farei mai.” 
 
103Holmes, Florentine Enlightenment, 59. 
 
104Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 165, “tra per amore o per 
forza.” 
 
105Ibid., 3: 181, “Paolo Guinigi di Luccha da molti cardinali 
del predicto papa notificato che il dicto electo avea mala 
et ria intentione contra del dicto signore Paulo per più 
rispetti.” 
 
106Ibid., 3: 177, “come savio, die’ a quelli inbasciatori 
quelle risposte che bizognavano alla salvessa di Lucca.” 
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  Lucca hesitated initally in sending formal 
congratulations and recognition of his new office to Pope 
Giovanni, but by June 1410 Paolo had become convinced it was 
the prudent step to take, despite having many differences 
with the new pope.107 On 30 June 1410 an embassy set out for 
Pope Giovanni in Bologna, headed by the Bishop of Lucca, 
Ciuchino Avogadi, and Stefano di Jacopo di Poggio. There had 
to have been some apprehension amongst this embassy bound 
for Bologna, but upon arriving the anxiety was relieved, as 
the Pope accepted the Lucchese agents and their various 
gifts graciously.108  
 Lucca’s touchy situation was relieved somewhat at the 
beginning of 1411 when their ally Ladislas was finally able 
to persuade the Florentines to withdraw from their own 
league and sign a separate peace with him.109 Moreover, in 
the next year Ladislas was even able to induce peace, though 
                                                          
107Ibid., 3: 181, “i dicti cardinali si mossero a stringere 
et pregare il dicto signore a dovere fare vizitare il dicto 
electo.” 
 
108Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 49, appendix, p. 
478.  
 
109Ladislas in this agreement was to return Cortona and other 
nearby castles, while Florence was to drop its demand that 
80,000 florins be returned (from an earlier confiscation); 
see Bayley, War and Society, 78-79. 
 
                223
short-lived, with Pope Giovanni.110 It was at this time that 
Ladislas dropped all previous ties to the Roman candidate 
Gregory XII and gave his nominal support to Giovanni XXIII; 
it is no surprise that letters of a much more sincere and 
pious tone began to be sent from Lucca to Pope Giovanni 
around this time as well.111 Lucca was to continue to give 
nominal support to Giovanni XXIII until the election of 
Martin V in 1417. 
 Lucca’s relations with the papacy during the years of 
the Great Schism reflect above all their desire to remain an 
independent state. Initially they were able to be more open 
about their hopes for the Roman pope and for the division in 
the church being healed since all their Italian neighbors 
agreed with them. After 1408, however, when a formal 
alliance was made with the King of Naples, and especially 
after the Council of Pisa in June 1409, the Lucchese were 
forced to be very low-key about their persuasions concerning 
the Schism. Their concern was not which of the two (or 
                                                          
110Partner, “Florence and the Papacy,” 388. 
 
111Ladislas’ peace with Pope Giovanni XXIII was made in the 
summer of 1412; in September of that year, Paolo wrote to 
the commissario in Bologna that he was happy to hear of 
Bologna’s return to obedience of Giovanni. In November 1412, 
Paolo wrote to the Pope himself concerning his happiness 
that Ladislas now recognized him as the true pontiff.  
A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 24v., p. 48;  n. 
6, c. 27, p. 53. 
                224
three) popes was the best spiritual leader for Christendom, 
but which was the best for maintenance of the political 
status quo in Italy. And thus is glimpsed a vital difference 
in the way the Lucchese perceived the Church during the late 
Trecento and early Quattrocento as opposed to their neighbor 
Florence: Whereas Florence “wanted a compliant and distant 
pontiff, who would give his moral support to her diplomatic 
objectives, but who would make no demands for help,”112 -- 
the Lucchese did not want a pope detached from the temporal 
affairs of the contemporary Italian political scene. Lucca 
needed the papacy and the papal state to help uphold a 
balance of power in Italy, chiefly to act as guard against 











                                                          
112Brucker, Civic World, 114. 
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       CULTURE 
 When Lorenzo Trenta decided in 1412 to have a chapel 
built in his family’s name in the church of S. Frediano in 
Lucca, he determined to spare no expense. He was at the 
height of his career, and in that year had been chosen as 
one of Paolo Guinigi’s private consiglieri.1 A member of a 
wealthy Lucchese silk-merchant family who spent much time 
abroad, Trenta likely felt he should take advantage of his 
stay in Lucca that year to tend to family and civic matters, 
such as the construction of the chapel that came to be known 
as S. Riccardo.2 Wanting the project to be in capable hands 
                                                          
1See Marco Paoli, “Jacopo della Quercia e Lorenzo Trenta: 
nuove osservazioni e ipotesi per la cappella in S. Frediano 
di Lucca,” Antichità Viva 19 (1980), 27. 
 
2The Trenta provide a good example of a leading Lucchese 
family who spent a great deal of time engaged in business in 
foreign lands, but which maintained close ties with their 
native city as well. The family had been active in France 
and Flanders since the fourteenth century; in 1390, 
Lorenzo’s brother Galvano lived in Paris, in 1395 sold 
jewels to the Duke of Borgogna, and in 1406 loaned liv. 
14,851 to him. See L. Mirot and E. Lazzareschi, “Lettere di 
Mercanti Lucchesi da Bruges e da Parigi,” Bollettino Storico 
Lucchese 1 (1929), 166-69. From the correspondence of Paolo 
and Guido Manfredi it is clear Lorenzo himself spent much 
time abroad in Paris; for instance in 1407, he wrote to 
Lucca from there stating he would return to Lucca within a 
year; see Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, Cancelliere della 
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before his departure again from his homeland, he hired the 
talented Sienese sculptors Jacopo della Quercia and Giovanni 
di Francesco da Imola to complete the building of the 
chapel. The two sculptors, especially della Quercia, had 
established good reputations as workers in marble by 1412; a 
few years earlier della Quercia had carved the funerary 
monument of Paolo’s wife Ilaria, a masterful work still on 
display today in the cathedral of S. Martino in Lucca.3 
 Before the chapel was completed, however, the two 
Sienese sculptors became engaged in a scandal that 
threatened their artistic reputations; they became involved 
with a married woman, Chiara Malpigli, who, though 
apparently residing with a husband of some wealth, had come 
into need of money. Her need of money had led her to Jacopo 
della Quercia and Giovanni da Imola at their workshop inside 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Repubblica di Lucca, Segretario della Signoria di Paolo 
Guinigi, in Regesti dal R. Archivio di Stato, ed. Luigi 
Fumi, vol. III, pt.ii (Pescia: Benedetti, 1933), regesti 
nos. 11, 12, p. 2-3. 
 
3The Ilaria project of della Quercia, one of his earliest 
major works, is important in that it provides a good example 
of early Renaissance sculpture as it was carved in the form 
of an ancient Roman sarcophagus; in addition, it may be 
considered the most significant work of art brought to 
fruition in Paolo’s regime. It was completed sometime 
between Ilaria’s death in December 1405 and the end of 1408. 
Da Imola may have been involved with Jacopo on this project 
as well. See James Beck and Aurelio Amendola, Ilaria del 
Carretto di Jacopo Della Quercia (Milan: Amilcare Pizzi, 
1988), 11-13.  
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S. Frediano where they worked on Trenta’s chapel. She began 
to pawn off to the two sculptors some of the prized 
possessions belonging to her husband in return for cash.  
These possessions included such things as silk clothes, 
ivory-works, an overcoat, an “agnus dei” made of silver, and 
other objects, all of which came to total (her husband later 
claimed) some 200 florins worth of goods.4 In addition, it 
was alleged that the relations of Chiara and Giovanni went 
beyond the realm of shady business-deals. At the trial, 
there were allegations of sexual involvement between the 
two, though Giovanni denied it.5 Giovanni, attempting to lay 
all blame on Chiara, alleged that she wrote six letters 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
4Giovanni Malpigli, a relative of Chiara’s husband who was 
looking for retribution, wrote to Paolo Guinigi on 18 
December 1413 that “...io penso che sia noto alla vostra 
Signoria dello abbominevole e vituperoso cazo occorsomi di 
mia cugnata, sia due volte per difecto e cagione di lei e 
operatione de’ suoi parenti, cioè del cuzino carnale e di 
due altri ladroncelli senesi pichiapietre,” Quoted in 
Eugenio Lazzareschi, “La dimora a Lucca d’ Jacopo della 
Guercia e di Giovanni da Imola,” Bullettino Senese di Storia 
Patria 31 (1924), 91. 
 
5“Constitutus personaliter coram capitano custodie lucane 
civitatis [Anthonio Nisterni de Tuderto] magister Iohannes 
magistri Francisci de Ymola sculpitor lapidum in quadam 
salecta parvula palatij residentie ipsius capitani, et primo 
interrogatus per dictum dominum capitanum si unquam 
carnaliter congnoverit dominam Claram uxorem Nicolai Malpili 
de Luca, dixit et respondit quod non,” Ibid., 93. 
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describing her burning love for him.6 In the end, however, 
it was the foreign artist who was punished. Giovanni’s more 
talented companion Jacopo della Quercia, who was initially 
charged with the harboring of stolen goods, was later found 
not guilty of all charges, and allowed to return to Siena, 
where he soon commenced his masterpiece, the fonte Gaia, 
located now in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena.7 Giovanni da 
Imola was not so fortunate. 
 Giovanni was brought to trial in April 1414 by a judge 
who opened the case on the basis of hearing from a 
“trustworthy” person (all that was required) that “in the 
past months of November and December 1413, the 
aforementioned master Giovanni ran rampantly through the 
city of Lucca conducting himself disgracefully and in an 
unbecoming way.”8 He was condemned to prison in Lucca after 
being convicted of theft, or the intent to offend (“furto, o 
d’istigazione a delinquere”), until a fine of 300 florins of 
                                                          
6“Interrogatus si dicta domina Clara sibi magistro Iohanni 
aliquam licteram unquam scripsit respondit quod sic et dixit 
quod sibi scripsit in pluribus et pluribus vicibus licteras 
sex tenore et continentia infrascripta videlicet: - Io 
vorria, magistro Iohanni, venire da voi in casa vostra e 
parlar con voi, per ciò che tutto el bene mio ve voglo e 




8“...discurrit per civitatem lucanum se turpiter et 
inhoneste gerendo,” Ibid., 70. 
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gold was paid; this sum, moreover, was to increase by one-
fourth if not paid in twelve days. The accused was unable to 
raise the large sum, and thus a young artistic talent ended 
up remaining imprisoned for three years, from April 1414-
April 1417.9 During this time Lucca held steadfast to its 
decision to detain Giovanni, despite frequent appeals by the 
Sienese, Florentines, and others for his freedom. In Lucca, 
his crimes were taken as very serious in nature since they 
had threatened the general order of the city-state.10 The 
message was clear: art (and artists) whose message or whose 
example was not conducive to the overall good of the state 
were thus expendable. Just as the central government of 
Lucca had usurped power from local churches and monasteries, 
as well as from its contado, as has been shown in the two 
previous chapters, it also came to have a large influence 
over the existence and character of Lucchese art and 
culture. There was a practical, almost didactic element 
characteristic to Lucchese art of the early Quattrocento; 
Sercambi’s Le Croniche, as well as his Novelle, his literary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
9Giovanni was allowed to go free on 17 April 1417 after 
Paolo reduced the fine to 100 florins, which was promptly 
paid by Lorenzo Trenta’s son, Girolamo, perhaps under the 
agreement with Giovanni to be repaid in artwork. 
  
10See Paolo’s response to the Florentine Priors in A.S.L., 
Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 49, p. 97. 
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masterpiece, both of which contain many passages exhortatory 
in nature, provide examples of this in the field of literary 
art.   
 In general, Lucca was not in a position to finance 
large-scale art projects at state expense as was afforded in 
some cities. It would have been inappropriate for it to do 
so, considering the constant state of danger they faced from 
foreign lands, and the consequent need of funds more 
urgently elsewhere. A large proportion of the state budget, 
perhaps one-third or more of annual revenues in any given 
year, was spent to hire mercenaries. The Lucchese spent 
carefully only on a culture that would aid in its civic 
development; culture in Lucca was sponsored largely by the 
state, magnified Lucca, and gave the city some measure of 
the culture enjoyed in the larger Renaissance states. Looked 
at from this perspective, it could hardly be otherwise that 
Lucchese art and culture took on such a pragmatic character.  
Art in Lucca was not for art’s sake, but rather for the 
communes. 
   Giovanni Sercambi: The First “Civic Humanist?” 
 In The Crisis of the Early Renaissance in Italy (1955), 
Hans Baron formulated probably the most important twentieth-
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century interpretation of the Italian Renaissance.11  
Baron’s thesis was that the artistic and intellectual 
developments associated with the Renaissance in Italy were 
the result of the “crisis” that arose in Florence during the 
years 1390-1402. The crisis was the military threat posed by 
the Duke of Milan, who, by the beginning of the fifteenth 
century, had made clear his intentions included taking 
Tuscany as well as controlling all of Lombardy. The 
Florentines in these years watched city after city fall to 
the Milanese aggression, Visconti armies inching nearer to 
Florence all the while.  
 Seeing themselves isolated, outnumbered, and as being 
the last hope to stop the Milanese assault from consuming 
all of Italy, what emerged in Florence was the heart of a 
                                                          
11Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic 
Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and 
Tyranny (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955). Other 
publications of Baron which focus on civic humanism are 
“Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and 
Early Renaissance,” in Lordship and Community in Medieval 
Europe, ed. Fredric L. Cheyette (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1968), 291-314; “Franciscan Poverty and Civic 
Wealth as Factors in the Rise of Humanistic Thought,” 
Speculum 13 (1938): 1-37. There has been (and still is) a 
mountain of scholarship in response to the Baron thesis, 
beginning with the debate of Baron and Seigel; see Jerrold 
E. Seigel, “‘Civic Humanism’ or Ciceronian Rhetoric?” Past 
and Present 34 (1966): 3-48. More recently, see the AHR 
Forum in American Historical Review 101 (1996): 107-44, 
which features several essays by leading scholars on the 
state of affairs in regard to current research concerning 
the Baron thesis.  
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champion, Baron argued. The Florentines accepted the 
challenge; they began to issue emotional appeals based on 
libertarian political concepts, raise more money and more 
armies, and to brace for war. This was the situation in the 
summer of 1402 when Florence’s last remaining ally in 
Bologna succumbed to the Visconti onslaught (which Baron 
compared to Hitler’s march through Europe in World War II).  
Nothing now lay in between Visconti armies and Florence.  
Everyone knew what the next move of the Duke of Milan would 
be -- except that at this point of crisis, the Duke of Milan 
unexpectedly died from the plague and the threat dissipated. 
 In the meantime, however, Baron claimed that the 
military threat of Milan had produced a new spirit in 
Florence which gave rise to, among other things, “civic 
humanism.” Florentine scholars because of their recent 
experiences no longer tended to be ivory-tower 
intellectuals, but now came to be much more involved in the 
civic affairs of their homelands. The above is, in a 
nutshell, the Baron “thesis.” But if Florentine 
intellectuals became civic humanists after the stimulus of 
the threat of the Visconti after 1390, then Lucchese 
intellectuals by that time should have been wild-eyed 
patriots -- in reaction to the threat of the Florentines 
themselves, as well as others.   
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 According to Baron, the Florentines claimed that in 
their struggle against the Duke of Milan they were fighting 
to preserve the sacred concept (and the reality) of liberty 
for the Italian peninsula; this claim looks like biased 
rhetoric when studied from the perspective of the history of 
Lucca in the early fifteenth century (or from the 
perspective of any town which happened to fall under 
Florentine control). If any civic body at this time had the 
real occasion to appeal to “liberty,” then one thinks it 
must have been the Lucchese, for they were under possible 
siege from all directions (i.e. both Florence and Milan) at 
any given time, and earlier than 1390. “Civic humanism,” 
born in at atmosphere of crisis in Florence as their 
independence became suspect, should have, and I believe did, 
arrive earlier in Lucca. Civic humanism in Lucca was 
centered around the important figure of Giovanni Sercambi 
(1345-1424).12 
 In July 1400, with the fate of the Lucchese state 
seeming to worsen daily, Giovanni Sercambi decided to take 
action. According to his version of the events that unfolded 
                                                          
12Until very recently the birth of Sercambi has been 
accepted as 1348, but this has been revised by the recent 
article of Sergio Nelli and Maria Trapani, “Giovanni 
Sercambi: Documenti e fatti della vita familiare,” in 
Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo, Catalogo della Mostra, 
Lucca 30 November 1991 (Lucca: Nuova Grafica, 1991), 70. 
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in those danger-filled days surrounding the advent of the 
Guinigi Signoria, Sercambi went before the leaders of the 
Guinigi family (those that remained) and warned them of the 
terrible danger that would befall the city if immediate 
steps were not taken to prevent it. He advised that in such 
an emergency situation as this a balìa with complete power 
over civic affairs ought to be created. Sercambi’s advice, 
moreover, was heeded by the Guinigi, he tells us, as soon 
after the balìa was established.13 Recent Lucchese history 
had demonstrated that benevolent, yet strong leadership was 
what was needed at this time; even a one-man regime and a 
streamlined government were increasingly becoming seen to be 
the only way to weather the storm. 
 Sercambi’s efforts that summer and fall of 1400 in 
first the establishment of the Guinigi Signoria, and then in 
the subsequent consolidation of it, were instrumental to its 
early success, and they mark him as among Italy’s first 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
13Giovanni Sercambi, Le Croniche Lucchesi, ed. Salvatore 
Bongi, 3 vols., in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (Lucca: 
Giusti, 1892), 3: 8, “E raunato tale consiglio, fu per l’ 
autore di questo libro, cioè Iohanni Sercambii, parlato in 
questa forma: o fedeli & dilecti ciptadini, molto v’ è 
manifesto di quante ingiurie et danni per la superbia delli 
usciti di Luccha siamo stati dannificati; per la qual cosa 
siamo stati, non solamente alle genti d’ apresso ma a quelli 
dalla lunga, in obrobio et dizinore. E per tanto a me parre’ 
che si debbia tale officio di balìa fare; et cosi si fe’.” 
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civic humanists. In the eyes of Sercambi at the time, he was 
not so much helping establish a regime in which one family 
(and later one man) dominated as taking the steps that gave 
the Lucchese their best chance to remain independent. The 
summer of 1400 was not, however, the first time that 
Sercambi had subjected himself to personal danger for the 
sake of the commune by taking such a bold stance. Nor would 
it be the last.  
 Sercambi’s patriotism can be partly explained by the 
circumstances of his early life: he grew up and was in his 
formative years at the time that the Pisans had control over 
Lucca (1342-69). After Lucca regained its independence from 
Pisa, Sercambi enlisted as a crossbowman for the revived 
commune. It would not be long before his military services 
were put to use, as he was included in those Lucchese forces 
that in 1369 drove out the last remaining Pisan troops from 
the citadel at Pontetetto.14 Like Dante the twenty-four 
year-old who went to battle for his beloved city of Florence 
in 1289 at the Battle of Campaldino, so also did the twenty-
four year-old Sercambi take up arms in 1369 in order to 
fight for the cause of the liberty of his homeland.  
                                                          
14Giovanni Sinicropi, ed. Novelle, 2 vols. (Bari: Gius. 
Laterza & Figli, 1972), 2: 762. 
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 When Sercambi returned home from battle to celebrate 
with his fellow citizens, it must have occurred to him that 
for the first time in his life, his native city was not 
under the governorship of foreign rulers. He would not 
forget this sentiment. Almost thirty years later in 1397 
when he was Gonfaloniere of Lucca and when they were again 
at war with Pisa, in a speech to rally the citizens to make 
the necessary financial sacrifices for the war, he 
exclaimed: 
  “It is clear to everyone capable of true   
  understanding and judgement that one of the most  
  dear things God placed on earth was liberty, which 
  may be recognized by its opposite, which is   
  servitude....Certainly it is held that no virtuous 
  citizen before they die wants to     
  return into the hands of the cruel and treacherous 
  Pisans.”15 
 
Sercambi went home from battle in 1369 to his beloved wife 
Pina, with whom he had been joined since age fifteen after 
their families had made such arrangement for the two; they 
                                                          
15“Manifesto è a ogni homo il quale ae dele cose vero 
cognoscimento et iudicio che de le piu care cose che dio 
ponesse al mondo fu libertà, la quale si conosce per lo suo 
contrario cioè per la servitù, la quale servitù quanto sia 
dura et aspra molti citadini viveno li quali per prova et 
experientia ne possono rendere vera. Certo testimonianza 
veramente si tiene che ciascuno virtuoso citadino prima la 
morte volesse che ne le mani de’ crudeli et perfidi Pisani 
ne d’altri ritornare, Quoted in Christine Meek, “Il tempo di 
Giovanni Sercambi,” in Giovanni Sercambi e il suo Tempo, 
Catalogo della Mostra, Lucca, 30 Novembre 1991 (Lucca: Nuova 
Grafica, 1991), 4-5. 
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were to remained married for a total of sixty-four years, 
both dying only in 1424.16 Just coming of the age in which 
he could hold political office at the time that Lucca gained 
its independence from Pisa, Sercambi was active his whole 
life, both in the pursuit of political interests and 
personal wealth, as well as in propagandizing the interests 
of the fatherland in his various writings. 
 Sercambi adopted a career as a speziale, or someone 
involved in the sale of spices and other products,17 despite 
the fact that his father was a notary, as is evident by the 
family name. Though after 1372 Sercambi frequently held 
public office until the end of his life, he never gave up 
his chosen profession, perhaps because it allowed him to 
associate freely with regular citizens with whom he always 
                                                          
16Nelli and Trapani, “Giovanni Sercambi,” 70. One of the 
important aspects of “civic humanism” had to with the 
fulfillment not only of civic duties, but also of fatherly 
and husbandly duties; civic humanism in general was in 
opposition to the vita contemplativa, and to all things 
associated with that lifestyle. 
 
17For example, there are records of payments made by the 
commune to Sercambi, the “spetario” in 1401-02 for supplying 
the court of Paolo and other Lucchese officials with books, 
ink, wax, string, pens, and other necessities (“pro libris, 
cartis membranis et bombicinis, atramento, cera rubea et 
viride, spago, pennis, vernice, et aliis quampluribus rebus 
necessariis”); see Marina Brogi, “Giovanni Sercambi e la 
Signoria di Paolo,” in Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo, 
Catalogo della Mostra, Lucca 30 Novembre 1991 (Lucca: Nuova 
Grafica, 1991), 171. 
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identified.18 Yet after 1372, his business may have suffered 
some as he was a frequent holder of a variety of offices for 
the commune of Lucca -- including offices which required him 
to leave the city for long periods of time.19    
 Sercambi’s entry into the General Council in 1372 marks 
the beginning of his public life.20 In 1377, he received an 
office as Keeper of the Seal of the Castles (“ad tenendum et 
gubernandum Sigilla castellanorum”), and in 1380 another 
minor bookkeeping-type job concerned with Lucchese castles 
                                                          
18In the opening lines of the first Book of Le Croniche, 1: 
64-65, Sercambi laid out his division of the different types 
of writers. First, Sercambi notes there were theologians, 
whose job was to defend the faith; second, there were 
scientists and poets; and third, there were those without 
acquired learning, but with good common sense. It is in this 
last group that Sercambi goes to pains to include himself 
amongst: “E così ora io, il quale ò preso pensieri di fare 
questo librecto, non amaestrato in scienzia teologa, non in 
leggie, non in filozofia, non in astrologia, nè in medicina 
nè in alcuna delle septe arti liberali, ma come homo 
simplici e di pogo intellecto materialmente, ò compreso 
questo libro.” 
                        
19For example, Sercambi was vicar of the Lucchese commune of 
Castiglione for the first six months of 1398, and on other 
occasions he was sent by the commune on diplomatic missions 
to other cities, such as in 1382 when he was dispatched to 
Arezzo to give warning there of the imminent invasion of the 
mercenaries of Count Alberico da Barbiano. 
  
20The General Council consisted of 180 persons, 60 from each 
terziere of the city. 
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(“ad sigillandum mandatorias castellanorum”).21 The next 
year witnessed Sercambi’s entrance for the first time into 
the Council of Thirty-Six; this implies he was becoming 
increasingly seen by his peers as a person qualified to help 
govern the republic. Six times from 1381-1400, Sercambi was 
a member of the Thirty-Six  (1381, 1386, 1391, 1398, 1399, 
1400). Another step upward politically was made in 1390, 
when for the first time he was included in the tasca of the 
Anziani; from this point until his death in 1424, Sercambi 
was a pro-active patriot for Lucchese independence.22 
 In 1391, Sercambi was named as Counselor over the 
Storehouses (“Consigliere della Fondaco”); in 1392, he was 
one of the six citizens named to supervise the election of 
the officers of the dovane; in 1393, he was named as 
Commissioner of the Palace (“Commissario di Palazzo”). In 
1397, Sercambi moves another step forward into the inner 
circle of city fathers when he was named for the first time 
as Gonfaloniere di Giustizia, the same office, incidentally, 
that he held in 1400 at the time Paolo’s assumption to power 
                                                          
21Giorgio Tori, “Profilo di una Carriera Politica,” in 
Giovanni Sercambi e il suo tempo, Catalogo della Mostra, 
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was made.23 The change of regime in 1400, moreover, did not 
bring about much change in terms of Sercambi’s increasingly 
busy political career.   
 Six times between 1411-1422 he held the important 
office of Counselor over the Office of Revenues 
(“Consigliere all’ Officio sopra le Entrate”). Four times 
after 1400, he held the equally-important office of 
Counselor over the Office of Foodstuffs (“Consigliere dell’ 
Officio sopra l’ Abbondanza”). In 1402, and again in 1403, 
Sercambi was vicar of the Lucchese commune of Valleriano.  
Finally, by the final decade of his life Sercambi had at 
last made entry into Paolo’s innermost court, as five times 
between 1415-23 he was a member of the private “Consiglio di 
Stato” of the Signore. Thus, Sercambi’s contribution to the 
civic life of Lucca was immense based merely on the 
governmental posts that he held -- but by far his most 
significant contribution to civic humanism in Lucca was his 
writings.   
 Giangaleazzo Visconti once commented that a letter from 
the Florentine humanist Salutati was more powerful than many 
knights; one might think that Paolo Guinigi came to believe 
                                                          
23Ibid., 105-07. 
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the same about Sercambi.24 Sercambi was the major state 
propagandist for the Guinigi regime, and he did for Lucca 
much the same thing that Leonardo Bruni did for Florence, or 
Pier Candido Decembrio did for Milan. From an analysis of 
Sercambi’s “La Nota a voi, Guinigi,” and various passages in 
his Chronicle, I will consider his type of civic humanism. 
In “La Nota,” written in 1392 before Paolo came to power, 
Sercambi made a series of recommendations to the heads of 
the Guinigi family. These recommendations pertained to a 
wide variety of subjects, but may be generally divided into 
three categories: those concerning the defense, political 
administration, and the finances of the city-state.25 
 Sercambi begins “La Nota” by observing that since Lucca 
was presently subject to so many “inconveniences, offenses, 
dangers, and displeasures,” steps must be taken so that both 
the Guinigi remain in power, and that the liberty of Lucca 
                                                          
24One of the claims for the existence of civic humanism in 
Lucca is that the autograph copy of the first book of 
Sercambi’s Le Croniche, though initially coming into the 
hands of Paolo either through gift or purchase, eventually 
was taken to the Public Palace (also why it has not 
survived), where citizens were given free access to the 
work. In the sixteenth century, the copy was rebound and 
returned to public access until 1804 when the now-mutilated 
copy was taken in by the Archivio di Stato. See S. Bongi, 
introduction to Le Croniche, xxviii-xxxii. 
25See Giovanni Sinicropi, “Giovanni Sercambi, Nota ai 
Guinigi,” Momus 3,4 (1995), 10; the author has appended a 
useful critical edition of “La Nota” to this article. 
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was forever preserved.26 One of the most interesting aspects 
of “La Nota” is that Sercambi was so specific in the 
recommendations he made to the Guinigi, even suggesting the 
exact number of armed guards he believed were required in 
the various strongholds throughout the city-state.27 The 
author also was very careful to point out the importance of 
making sure the Guinigi themselves were safe at all times: 
“Let there be always at the lodge of the Guinigi fifteen 
guards provided with arms both day and night, and which are 
to accompany each of you.”28 Also, special measures should 
be adopted to protect certain castles, Sercambi argued, and 
his naming of these castles reveals exactly which areas were 
most important to the Lucchese defense at this time; also it 
                                                          
26“La Nota ai Guinigi” is printed at the end of Sercambi’s 
Le Croniche, 3: 399-407; “Veduto et continuamente si vede 
quante incoveniense & fatiche, pericoli & dispiacere in 
nella nostra ciptà & contado ocorreno,” 399. 
27Ibid, 399-400, “bene che il comune si dispogna che alla 
guardia della ciptà & contado & delle vostre persone siano & 
esser debbiano soldati da piè & da cavallo & provigionati, 
in questa forma cioè: bandiere 36 da piè, in nelle quali 
abbia per ciascuna du pavesari, provigionati 36, lancie 36, 
ungari 25, & i conestabili siano homini amici & intendenti 
al vostro volere, li quali si stribuiscano: Prima a 
Pietrasanta bandiere 5, lancie 8. It. a Montecarlo bandiere 
5, lancie 8. It. a Camaiore bandiere 1, lancie 2. It. a 
Castilioni bandiere 2.” 
 
28Ibid., 401, “Sempre alla loggia de’ Guinigi di dì et di 
nocte stiano provigionati coll’arme .xv., li quali siano 
presti per accompagnare ciascuno di voi.” 
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was very important, Sercambi wrote, to make sure those 
governing the castles were loyal to the Guinigi party.29 
 In the second part of “La Nota,” Sercambi points out to 
the Guinigi leaders the importance of maintaining in the 
Anziani a loyal body of supporters “so that you are able to 
have your intention.” Power over other offices by the 
Guinigi was deemed vital as well by Sercambi; he advocated 
keeping control over offices such as the “conducterii” 
(those who hired mercenaries), the “gonfalonieri” (the 
standard-bearers), the vicars of Pietrasanta, Montecarlo, 
and others.30 To enhance their control over the internal 
state, Sercambi advised the Guinigi to mandate that each 
citizen put in writing the number and types of arms that 
they possessed; furthermore, that the Guinigi then carefully 
examine that list and determine if any person was armed to a 
degree that went beyond what was needed for personal 
                                                          
29Ibid., “Che le castella & maximamente Pietrasanta, 
Motrone, Massa, Camaiore, Montecarlo, Coregla, Castillioni, 
& l’ altre di pericolo, si diano a homini amici & 
comfidanti, con dovere tenere buoni & leali sergenti, se 
tali castellani et sergenti si dovessero mandare comandati.” 
 
30Ibid., “L’officio dell’ansianatico sempre a’ vostri amici 
si dia, & cosi conductieri, gomfalonieri [sic], vicario di 
Pietrasanta, Montecarlo, Camaiore, Castillioni, segretari, 
officio di balya overo comissari, & facciasi che si possino 
fare per quello modo più honesto, acciò che voi abbiate 
vostra intentione.” 
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protection, and if so to confiscate from them that which was 
in excess.31  
 Also, Sercambi addressed Lucca’s need to be more 
careful and strict in dealing with Lucchese exiles, as he 
had seen in the past that they “always attempt to do evil to 
our liberty.”32 He suggests that in the future those 
relegated to other cities be forced to pay a new bail 
(“nuova cauzione”) in order to guarantee they did not leave 
their prescribed places of exile. Secondly, Sercambi warns 
of placing those relegated to any place where it would be 
likely that they would come across someone opposed to Lucca. 
Finally, he advocated confiscation of the person’s goods and 
declaring them to be a rebel of the state should all else 
fail, and should any exile refuse to obey orders.33   
 Finally, in a surprising passage (a passage that 
perhaps supplies the best proof that, unlike his Croniche 
and Novelle, the author meant this writing to be kept 
                                                          
31Ibid., “Et acciò che altri non possa il vostro buono stato 
& libertà di Lucca sturbare, è bene che si mandi uno bando 
che ogni persona dia per scripto tucta l’ arme che à, & 
quella examinata, secondo che a voi con .II. o tre vostri 
intimi & cordiali diliberiate, cholui che tale arme à, chui 
è, & quanta nelli bizogna.” 
 
32Ibid., 402, “Et veduto che quelli comfinati li quali di 
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secret), Sercambi writes: “Since the fear of death deters 
evil thoughts, all those who are condemned as rebels of the 
commune and who refuse to follow your orders ought to be 
able to be killed, seized, or robbed...I think that this 
fear will be enough to make everyone be content with 
peaceful living and with following your commandments.”34 
 Thus it is evident that Sercambi was not one overly 
enamored with republican institutions; representative 
government in his eyes would have been a recipe for disaster 
at that particular time. This being so, as James Hankins 
recently asked of his subject Leonardo Bruni, can Sercambi 
rightfully be called a civic humanist?35 And the answer for 
Sercambi is yes, since in every measure he advocates in “La 
Nota” and elsewhere, the end is not communal conformity or 
Guinigi supremacy, although he probably believed these would 
                                                          
34Sinicropi, in “Giovanni Sercambi, Nota a Guinigi,” 8, 
claims “La Nota”  was not intended by the author to be 
brought to light. For quote, Le Croniche, 402, “Et perche la 
paura della morte raffrena i ma’ pensieri, è bene che chi 
volesse esser ribello del nostro comune & dispregiasse i 
comandamenti del bene vivere & del vostro volere, che si 
provegha che qualunqua persona si fa ribello del nostro 
comune, sia & esser possa ucciso, preso & derubato in avere 
& in persona....Penso che questo timore farà ognuno star 
contento di vivere pacifico & ubidire a’ vostri 
comandamenti.” 
 
35See James Hankins, “Rhetoric, history, and ideology: the 
civic panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni,” in Renaissance Civic 
Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. James Hankins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 177. 
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have been beneficial, but rather the liberty, or 
independence of the Lucchese city-state from foreign rule.   
Sercambi’s non-republican sentiments ironically make him a 
civic humanist in Lucca since Guinigi rule in his opinion 
gave the city its best chance to remain free.  
 As Hankins points out in regard to Bruni, if by the 
term “civic humanist” we mean that he considered his job to 
“promote an anti-monarchial form of republicanism and to 
disparage other political constitutions,” then the term 
“civic humanist” would not fit. But, as pointed out in the 
introduction of this work, classical republican thought did 
not preclude coexistence with monarchial institutions. It is 
only since Montesquieu that the term “republican” has 
implied an opposite of “monarchy;” in the older republican 
tradition (which would include the Italian Renaissance era), 
the opposite of “republican” was tyranny, or mob rule.36 A 
monarchy, then, had the capability of providing good 
leadership just as republican governments did, according to  
Italian Renaissance political thought, and according to 
Sercambi. He harbored no real sentiments toward 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
36Ibid.,151; Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998). 
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representative government, but he did hold dear Lucchese 
independence.  
 Sercambi in the end like Bruni, was a man with an 
imperialist mindset, yet his humanism, though supportive of 
a “monarchial” system of government, can still be considered 
“civic” humanism because the end was civic independence. His 
adherance to the old world imperialist-papal politics can be 
seen throughout his writings, but perhaps nowhere is it made 
clearer than in the Preface of Book II of his Chronicle, 
written in May 1400: 
  “And now I will begin [Book II] in May 1400, and I 
  will finish as you will see by reading it. Taking 
  help from Highest God in such a matter, from whom 
  all good is derived, and submitting myself to His 
  every wish; from all the celestial court; and  
  likewise from the Most Holy in Christ, Our Father 
  Signore Boniface IX; and from the Most Sacred Holy 
  Roman Empire; and from that most peaceful prince  
  and Signore Wenceslaus, who through Divine   
  Providence is Emperor of the Romans and King of  
  Bohemia.”37  
 
 
                                                          
37Le Croniche, 3: 3-4, “E ora questo comincerà in chalende 
maggio in .MCCCC., e finerà come legendo sentirete. 
Prendendone di tale materia aiuto dallo altissimo Dio, da 
chui tucti li beni derivano, soctomettendomi a ugni suo 
piacere, e a tucta la corte celeste, e simile dal santissimo 
in Christo padre et signore messer Bonifatio, per la divina 
clementia papa nono, et del sacratissimo sacro romano 
imperio, e del serenissimo principe et signore messer 
Vincilao, per la divina potentia inperadore de’ Romani et di 
Buemia.” 
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 Gene Brucker is one recent scholar who remained 
skeptical about the Baron thesis, as he saw in the 
Florentine pratiche of the summer of 1402 evidence that the 
government was reacting to the threat of the Duke of Milan 
calmly and without much panic. He did see a major change 
occur in Florentine politics after 1411, however, during the 
period when Florence was dealing with the threat of Ladislas 
of Naples and with disputes concerning Genoa. This “crisis” 
of Brucker manifested itself in the emergence in Florentine 
councils of speeches employing the skills of rhetoric and 
logic; more references to history, especially classical-age 
republican history; and in more insertions and emendations 
in speeches in order to strengthen a speaker’s argument.38  
      But, Sercambi was was doing all these things in his 
Chronicle at least a decade before 1411. The rhetorical 
attributes of Sercambi’s work are evident to anyone who 
scans a few pages of his Chronicle; it is filled with 
exhortations to Paolo and others to take certain actions (or 
not), speeches presented as if Sercambi were actually 
addressing a particular person, and other rhetorical 
devices. In addition, the two Books of his Chronicle are 
filled with insertions and emendations, sometimes even 
                                                          
38Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 175-81.  
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fictional stories similar to those in his Novelle, that he 
adopted in order to strengthen a point he was driving at.39  
The appeal to historical example was a favorite tactic of 
Sercambi as well.40 After Paolo’s rise to power in late 
1400, Sercambi wrote: “Take heed, Paolo Guinigi, to always 
remember the example of your father Francesco Guinigi who, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
39In her study of the prologues of Sercambi’s Chronicle, 
Franca Ragone has characterized the insertions of Sercambi 
into his work as ethical-political exempla, which cannot be 
separated from his aim in this work: to teach his fellow 
citizens that internal turmoil would mean a loss of Lucchese 
independence; see “Le ‘Croniche’ di Giovanni Sercambi: 
Composizione e Struttura dei Prologhi,” Annali dell’ 
Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici 9 (1985-86), 15-16. 
 
40Sercambi as a historian has been underrated; certainly 
Eric Cochrane, in Historians and Historiography in the 
Italian Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981) has misunderstood Sercambi’s objective as chronicler 
as a “harmless pastime for the unlearned.” Moreover, 
Cochrane’s suggestion that Sercambi had not even heard of 
Ptolemy of Lucca, and even Salutati, is simply incorrect. 
Sercambi and Salutati both lived in Lucca simultaneously 
from 1370-72, and would likely have come into frequent, if 
not daily, contact. In addition, several members of Paolo 
Guinigi’s court owned copies of Salutati’s “De fato et 
fortuna.” Sercambi’s Chronicle was not the medieval variety 
of this type of work, concerned only with local interests or 
with the court in which the chronicler belonged, but takes 
on a much more “cosmopolitan” character; Sercambi discusses 
for example among many other topics, the Hundred Years War,  
the wars of the Duke of Milan and Florence, the conflicts 
between Ladislas and Rome, and the Great Schism.   
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being envied by many citizens who wanted to remove him, 
always maintained good relations with his friends.”41   
 In another instance, Sercambi even advised that Paolo 
take a look at Lucca’s more prosperous overall situation 
during the reign of the tyrant Castruccio Castracani; he 
stated that even though Lucca at that time had no arms or 
munitions and had been robbed, it still surpassed other 
Tuscan cities -- and now since Lucca is filled with good 
people, is full of arms and munitions, and has not been 
robbed -- then it ought to be doing better.42 It is clear, 
therefore, that Sercambi had designs on persuading not only 
the citizenry of Lucca on how to act and what to believe (in 
the Chronicle), but he was attempting to act as policy-guide 
to the Guinigi as well (in such writings as “La Nota”). His 
appeals to any imperial authority (even Castruccio), or his 
“civic humanism” were his means to being heard in Lucca. 
     Dante 
 It may seem odd to bring Dante (1265-1321) into a 
discussion of the culture of Lucca at the beginning of the 
                                                          
41Le Croniche, 3: 18, “...ricordansa a te, Paulo Guinigi, 
che sempre ti stia in nella mente l’ exemplo del tuo padre 
Francesco Guinigi, il quale, essendo da molti ciptadini 
invidiato per volerlo abassare, lui sempre si mantenne colli 
amici suoi.” 
 
42Ibid., 3: 22-25. 
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fifteenth century but in this case it is appropriate. For in 
1400, Dante was Lucca’s favorite author. After his exile 
from his native Florence a hundred years earlier, Dante had 
actually lived in Lucca for a two-year period, either from 
1307-1309, or from 1314-1316.43 Yet of the six cities 
(besides Florence) that Dante criticized in the Divine 
Comedy (Lucca, Pisa, Pistoia, Siena, Bologna, and Genoa), 
Lucca received the most harsh rebuke. While other cities 
such as Genoa, Pisa, and Pistoia were attacked by Dante 
                                                          
43The earlier date is accepted by some since F. P. Luiso in 
1921 discovered amongst the notarial acts of the year 1308 
at the Archivio di Stato in Lucca listed as witness in a 
case a “Iohannes filius Dantis Alagherii de Florentia.”  
This seems to leave little doubt this was Dante’s son, but 
as pointed out in M. Barbi, “Un altro figlio di Dante?” 
Studi danteschi 5 (1922), 6-8, the poet was married in 1295, 
which would have made having a legitimate child eighteen 
years old in 1308 (the age necessary to be a witness in 
these cases) impossible; also, it had long been held that 
Dante’s only sons were Jacopo and Pietro. The latter date of 
1314-1316 for Dante’s stay in Lucca is preferred by other 
scholars, who have argued that at this time Lucca was 
governed by imperial “officials” (Uguccione da Faggioula and 
Castruccio Castracani), who would have been receptive to 
Dantean philosophy (i.e. De monarchia) -- whereas in the 
earlier period (1307-09), Lucca was governed by a staunchly 
democratic regime headed by Bonturo Dati, a character who 
Dante actually puts into the circles of hell in the Inferno 
(Cantos XXI-XXIII). Sercambi implied the latter date in 
Novella LXXI when he wrote that the Florentine poet, “il 
quale non potendo stare in Firenza nè in terra dove la 
Chiesa potesse, si riducea il preditto Dante alcuna volta 
con quelli della Scala et alcuna volta col signore di 
Mantova, e tutto il più col duga di lucca, cioè con messer 
Castruccio Castracani,” Novelle, ed. Giovanni Sinicropi, 1: 
314.  
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because of a single event or a single person, criticism of 
Lucca was more general as well as seemingly more heartfelt, 
as if the poet had a deeper grudge against the entire 
population.44 
 In Canto XVIII of the Inferno, Dante accompanied by his 
guide found in the eighth circle of Hell the flatterers, 
whose punishment was being covered in excrement. When near 
the bottom of the circle, Dante: 
  “...saw one with a head so smeared with shit, 
  one could not see if he were lay or cleric. 
    He howled: “Why do you stare more greedily 
  at me than at the others who are filthy?” 
  And I: “Because, if I remember right, 
    I have seen you before, with your hair dry; 
  and so I eye you more than all: you are Alessio  
   Interminei of Lucca.”45 
 
The other instance in which Lucca was mentioned in the 
 
Inferno occurs in Canto XXI; still in the eighth circle, but 
 
now in the part where barrators were being punished by being 
 
thrown into boiling pitch and guarded by armed demons. 
 
Dante looked up, and:  
                                                          
44F. P. Luiso, “Dante e Lucca,” in Dante: La Vita, Le Opere, 
Le Grandi Città Dantesche, Dante e L’ Europa (Milan, 1921), 
172-73.   
 
45“vidi un col capo sì di merda lordo, / che non parea s’ 
era laico o cherco. / Quei mi sgridò: “Perche se’ tu sì 
gordo / di riguardar più me che li altri brutti?” / E io a 
lui: “Perche, se ben ricordo, / già t’ho veduto coi capelli 
asciutti, / e se’ Alessio Interminei da Lucca: / però 
t’adocchio più che li altri tutti,” Inferno, XVIII, 116-23,  
in The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, trans. and intro. 
by Allen Mandelbaum (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1980). 
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  “...then in back of us I saw a black 
  demon as he came racing up the crags. 
    Ah, he was surely barbarous to see! 
  And how relentless seemed to me his acts! 
  His wings were open and his feet were lithe; 
    across his shoulder, which was sharp and high, 
  he had slung a sinner, upward from the thighs; 
  in front, the demon gripped him by the ankles. 
    Then from our bridge, he called: “O Malebranche, 
  I’ve got a elder of Saint Zita for you! 
  Shove this one under-I’ll go back for more- 
    his city is well furnished with such stores; 
  there, everyone’s a grafter but Bonturo; 
  and there-for cash-they’ll change a no to yes.” 
    He threw the sinner down, then wheeled along 
  the stony cliff: no mastiff’s ever been 
  unleashed with so much haste to chase a thief. 
    The sinner plunged, then surfaced, black with  
    pitch; 
  but now the demons, from beneath the bridge, 
  shouted: “The Sacred Face has no place here; 
    here we swim differently than in the Serchio.”46 
 
The poet’s reference in this passage to “Saint Zita,” the 
“Sacred Face,” and the “Serchio” clearly are references to 
Lucca. His criticism of “everyone” in Lucca should present 
                                                          
46“...e vidi dietro a noi un diavol nero / correndo su per 
lo scoglio venire. / Ahi quant’ elli era ne l’aspetto fero! 
/ e quanto mi parea ne l’atto acerbo, / con l’ali aperte e 
sovra i piè leggero! / L’omero suo, ch’era aguto e superbo, 
/ carcava un peccator con ambo l’anche, / e quei tenea de’ 
piè ghermito ’l nerbo. / Del nostro ponte disse: “O 
Malebranche, / ecco un de li anzian di Santa Zita! / 
Mettetel sotto, ch’i’ torno per anche / a quella terra, che 
n’ è ben fornita: / ogn’ uom v’ è barattier, fuor che 
Bonturo; /del no, per li denar, vi si fa ita.” / Là giù ’l 
buttò, e per lo scoglio duro / si volse; e mai non fu 
mastino sciolto / con tanta fretta a seguitar lo furo. / 
Quel s’attuffò, e tornò su convolto; / ma i demon che del 
ponte avean coperchio, / gridar: “Qui non ha loco il Santo 
Volto! / qui si nuota altrimenti che nel Serchio!” Inferno, 
XXI, 29-49. 
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no surprise, however. Lucca and Florence had evolved along 
rather parallel political lines at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, and it should be expected that if one 
had drawn the ire of the poet, which Florence obviously 
already had for condemning him to eternal exile, then the 
other was bound to have drawn his disapprobation as well. 
When the Divine Comedy was being composed, Lucca was living 
under the republican government led by Bonturo Dati that 
Dante would have thoroughly despised as much as he did the 
liberal governors of Florence.47 This explains why Dante at 
one time was so critical of Lucca; unfortunately for Lucca 
and its posterity, it just happened to be at the time he was 
composing the Divine Comedy. After the republican regime of 
Dati was removed in 1314, one assumes Dante would have felt 
much less hostile toward the city. 
 What is noteworthy about the popularity of Dante in 
Lucca at the beginning of the fifteenth century is that it 
made them unique. It would be difficult to overestimate the 
impact Dante had on the intellectual life of the fourteenth 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
47Luiso also proved in his 1921 study “Dante e Lucca” (see 
above, n. 44) that Dante’s character Martino Bottaio in 
Canto 21 of the Inferno was really Bonturo Dati of Lucca.  
See Renato Piattoli, “I personaggi danteschi Lucchese 
Bonturo Dati e Alessio Antelminelli in Firenze,” in 
Miscellanea in memoria di Giorgio Cencetti (Torino: Bottega 
d’ Erasmo, 1973), 389-90. 
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century. Many cities beginning in the second half of the 
century had begun to hire public lecturers, or readers, of 
Dante to meet the public demand; many commentaries of the 
poem were published to explain its complexities during this 
time as well. But by the beginning of the fifteenth century 
interest in Dante and his works was well in decline in most 
places for a variety of reasons. In the first seventy-five 
years of the fifteenth century, for example, only two 
commentaries of the poem were produced at all.48 The cult of 
Dante had apparently faded away. Paolo Cortesi claimed: 
“Alas, it happens with Dante just as with an old painting: 
the colours fade, and only the outlines remain to delight 
us.”49 In most of the other larger cities by 1400, interest 
among the intellectual classes in Dante and the Trecento 
Italian authors had been replaced by an absorption into the 
classical world and humanistic subjects in their more Latin-
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
48Micheal Caesar, ed. Dante: The Critical Heritage (London: 
Routledge, 1989), 19. 
 
49For quote, see ibid., 18. Paolo Cortesi (1485-1510) wrote 
De hominis doctis, a criticism of the Latin in use from 
Dante’s time to his own day. It is interesting to note that 
in the work of Christian Bec, Les marchands ecrivains: 
Affaires et humanisme à Florence, 1375-1434 (Paris: La Haye, 
1967), the author concluded that interest in Dante thrived 
in one particular professional class in the early 
Quattrocento: the merchant class -- precisely who had come 
into power in Lucca with the rise of the Guinigi. 
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oriented culture.50 But Dante did not fade away for the 
Lucchese as the Trecento came to a close, rather he 
continued to be a large influence on their thought 
throughout the fifteenth century.  
 To be a follower of Dante in Quattrocento Italy was 
more than a statement of one’s taste in literary styles. It 
quite possibly meant a political assertion as well, as 
Deborah Parker pointed out in her discussion of Francesco 
Filelfo, a Florentine public lecturer on Dante who in May 
1433 had his face slashed by someone of the Medici party 
whose interpretation of Dante (and politics) was different 
than his.51 This may explain why no state-sponsored public 
lectures or readings on Dante were ever held in Lucca like 
they were in Florence, Bologna, and other places. Civic 
leaders had problems enough keeping control over the state; 
they would not have desired risking political suicide by 
                                                          
50In fact, the height of the resurgence of classical Latin 
letters and language very much coincides with the years of 
the reign of Paolo Guinigi; see Giuliano Tanturli, “Il 
disprezzo per Dante dal Petrarca al Bruni,” Rinascimento 25 
(1985): 199-219; Vittorio Rossi, “Dante nel Trecento e nel 
Quattrocento,” in Saggi e Discorsi su Dante (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1930), 293-96; Maria Luisa Mansi, “La vita di Dante 
e del Petrarca di Leonardo Bruni,” in Dante nel Pensiero e 
nella Esegesi dei Secoli XIV e XV (Florence: Leo Olschki, 
1975), 406. 
51Deborah Parker, Commentary and Ideology: Dante in the 
Renaissance (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 55; 
Filelfo had taken sides with the Albizzi faction of 
Florence. 
            257
inviting inside the city walls discussion on such 
controversial issues as Dante raised in his writings.  
 Yet, it was this very political aspect of Dante that 
was attractive to the Lucchese. While almost all fourteenth 
century commentators on Dante had centered their interest on 
the moral or allegorical interpretations of the Divine 
Comedy, the few Dante scholars that still remained in the 
early fifteenth century had started to look at the poet (and 
other of his works) differently.52 The Florentine Leonardo 
Bruni, after perhaps some indecision early in his life 
concerning the merits of Dante, came to reject the view of 
Dante as presented in Boccaccio’s biography as the 
melancholic, brooding, lover of Beatrice;53 to Bruni, Dante 
came to be first and foremost a Florentine patriot and a 
political activist, in short, a civic humanist. The 
Lucchese, like Bruni and most of the Florentine humanists, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
52Gianvito Resta states that after 1400, Dante was no longer 
seen as just the poet of a great spiritual adventure, but as 
an individual who had been actively involved in the social 
and civic life of his native Florence. See “Dante nel 
Quattrocento,” in Dante nel Pensiero e nella Esegesi dei 
Secoli XIV e XV (Florence: Leo Olschki, 1975), 86. 
 
53In the first decade of the fifteenth century, Bruni’s 
dialogue Ad petram paulum histrum dialogum expressed 
divergent opinions on Dante, while his later biography 
(1436) reveals him to be much more admiring of him. See D. 
Aguzzi-Barbagli, “Dante e la poetica di Coluccio Salutati,” 
Italica 42 (1965), 122. 
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began to perceive Dante chiefly as a political thinker, but 
not so much for his civic activism as was the case in 
Florence, as for the whole of his political thought. 
 In Sercambi’s Novelle, Dante appeared as the main 
character in two of the stories.54 In both he is praised as 
a man of wisdom, including one instance in which the King of 
Naples addressed him as the “wisest man in all of Italy.”55  
In Novella LXXI, the story evolves around Dante’s visit to 
the court of King Uberto. Having heard in many places of the 
wisdom of the exiled poet, Uberto sent for Dante, wanting to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
54The Novelle was the literary masterpiece of the Guinigi 
period. It is a collection of 166 short stories reminiscent 
of Boccaccio’s Decameron, and undoubtedly owing much to this 
work. The stories were told, for example, by a group of ten 
youth travelling around to escape the plague; in addition, 
twenty-four of Sercambi’s stories were derived directly from 
the Decameron, some keeping entire sentences of Boccaccio, 
others more or less summaries of his tales. See Luigi Rossi, 
“Sercambi e Boccaccio,” Studi sul Boccaccio 6 (1971), 152-
53. Giovanni Cherubini, in “Vita Trecentesca nelle Novelle 
di Giovanni Sercambi,” in Signorie, Contadini, Borghesi: 
Ricerce sulla Società Italiana del Basso Mediovale 
(Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1974), 5, suggests that the 
Novelle of Sercambi were stylistically influenced by the 
Decameron, but were partly inspired by the real-life 
experience of the visitation of the flagellants (“bianchi”) 
to Lucca in 1399. 
 
55Sercambi, Novella LXXII, p. 317, “più savio omo d’ 
Italia.” 
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judge for himself.56 Arriving at the court clad only in his 
usual dress, however, Dante was given a place at the foot of 
the King’s table away from Uberto and the court barons. Nor 
was he afforded the finer food and drink that was given to 
the more distinguished guests. Dante, not appearing in the 
least offended, simply ate what was given him and then 
calmly rose from his seat and slipped away from Uberto’s 
presence.57     
 When the king realized his error, he again sent for 
Dante in order to pay honor to the esteemed poet, inviting 
him to return to his court at a later time for a grand 
feast. The second time Dante entered the court in the 
clothing of nobility to show the king the folly of his ways. 
Now set at the head of the table near the king, when 
presented with the finest of wines Dante proceeded to pour 
it all over his clothes. Astonished, the king at last asked 
Dante why he did this, and he said to Uberto: “Holy King, I 
recognize that this grand honor that you have made has been 
made to the clothes, and therefore I wanted the clothes to 
                                                          
56Ibid., LXXI, p. 314, “Et essendo già la nomea sparta del 
senno del ditto Dante e i’ re Uberto desideroso d’ averlo 
per vedere e sentire del suo senno e vertù...” 
 
57Ibid., LXXI, p. 314, “Dante come savio vede quanto il 
signore ha avuto pogo provedimento; nondimeno, avendo Dante 
volontà di mangiare, mangiò. E come ebbe mangiato, subito si 
partiò e caminò....” 
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enjoy the things that have been prepared.”58 The story ends 
with the king, having seen the foolishness of his behavior 
thanks to the lesson taught him by Dante, believing the poet 
even wiser than he had heard from the beginning.59 
 In the second of Sercambi’s Novelle in which Dante 
appeared as the main character the plot is much the same, 
the wisdom of the poet becoming increasingly evident as the 
story unfolds. This time, however, King Uberto of Naples 
hired several buffoons to test Dante’s wisdom (and patience) 
by having them address him with disrespect and with some 
very difficult (and inane) questions, such as why does a 
black hen lay white eggs. By diligently responding to each 
and every question in a direct, methodical, almost Socratic-
like manner, Dante was able to reveal again to Uberto and 
the buffoons that he was indeed the wisest man in all of 
Italy. 
  In addition, Sercambi appealed to the authority of 
Dante several times in his Chronicle, all of which show his 
admiration for the thought (not the language, style, or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
58Ibid., LXXI, p. 315, “Santa corona, io cognosco che questo 
grande onore ch’ è ora fatto, avete fatto a’ panni; e 
pertanto io ho voluto che i panni godano le vivande 
aparecchiate.” 
 
59Ibid., LXXI, p. 315, “trovò Dante esser da più che non li 
era stato ditto.” 
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patriotism) of the Florentine poet.60 Sercambi was 
interested in what Dante wrote, not how he wrote it. In one 
instance in his Chronicle in which he was making a point 
about the dangers of avarice, Sercambi drew on Dante’s exact 
words, duplicating in his own work the first ninety-six 
lines of Canto VII of the Inferno.61 Other times he 
summarizes parts of the Divine Comedy, or merely states 
something in his own words to be followed by “as Dante 
says,” or “as Dante writes.” There is an unmistakable 
admiration, almost reverence, for the thought of Dante in 
the writings of Sercambi. Another way this admiration of 
Sercambi and his compatriots for Dante may be revealed is 
through an examination of the inventories of their 
libraries. 
 It is fortunate that there are four surviving 
inventories of libraries of the leading men of Paolo 
Guinigi’s court; these include those of Paolo himself, his 
secretary Guido Manfredi, Sercambi, and Augustino Gherardi 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
60Nor have I found in any Lucchese source of the fifteenth 
century any questioning of Dante for his use of Italian in 
the Divine Comedy, rather than Latin, which was perceived by 
many as the language for more serious subjects. This was one 
of the criticisms levelled at Dante by the Florentine 
humanists in the first half of the Quattrocento. 
 
61Sercambi, Le Croniche, 2: 198-203. 
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da Fivizzano.62 To briefly summarize the four, I begin with 
Paolo’s library, which was one of the most outstanding in 
all of Italy for his day. It included more than thirty 
classical works, including such canons as Cicero’s De 
oratore, Ovid’s Ars Amatoria, Seneca’s Tragedies, 
Aristotle’s Politics (in Italian), and the recently 
published edition of Plato’s Phaedo which had been 
translated by Leonardo Bruni. In his collection of modern 
authors was Dante’s Divine Comedy. Paolo also owned the 
autograph copy of Francesco Buti’s three volumes of 
Commentary on the Divine Comedy, which was purchased at Pisa 
for him by Jacopo della Testa in 1405.63 
 The library of Guido Manfredi of Pietrasanta is also 
noteworthy for more than twenty classical books. Included in 
                                                          
62The inventories may be found at the following: for Paolo, 
see Salvatore Bongi, Di Paolo Guinigi e delle sue Richezze 
(Lucca: Benedini Guidotti, 1871), 74-82; for Guido, see 
Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 1277, p. 242; for 
Sercambi, see Novelle, ed. Giovanni Sinicropi (Bari: Gius. 
Laterza & Figli, 1972), 2: 762, n.1; and for Gherardi, see 
Marco Paoli, Arte e committenza privata a Lucca nel Trecento 
e nel Quattrocento (Lucca: Maria Pacini Fazzi, 1986), 103-
07. 
 
63Under the year 1405 in A.S.L., Libro della Camera di 
Lucca, c. 132, “Iacobo del Testa de Pisis, quos ipse Iacobus 
in civitate Pisarum pro dicto Domino solvit pro pretio trium 
librorum in quibus descripte sunt expositiones Dantis manu 
magistri Francisci de Buyti. Stefaninus camerarius dedit et 
solvit vigore provisienis facte die 9 octobris presentis, 
quod potuerit dedisse et solvisse florenos sexagintaquinque 
in auro.” 
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Guido’s collection were many writings of a religious nature, 
such as Augustine’s City of God, his Confessions, Phaedon’s 
Immortality of the Soul, Boccaccio’s Geneology of the Gods, 
various types of psalters, and a volume containing the 
epistles of Paul. Of the four libraries, Guido’s was the 
only one without at least one work written by Dante. 
 Sercambi’s collection was the sparsest of the four, 
consisting only of two volumes having to do with his 
occupation as a speziale, another on herbs, a few religious 
and Latin writings -- but three codici of Dante. Finally, 
Augustino Gherardi’s collection of books has been 
characterized as being as grand as the libraries of Petrarch 
and Boccaccio themselves.64 Gherardi’s collection included 
more than seventy classical works (all in Latin) of twenty-
three authors, as well as many works of the medieval period, 
including the standard writings of Boethius and Thomas 
Aquinas. Also, of the four contemporary works in his library 
written in Latin, one was Leonardo Bruni’s recent 
translation of Aristotle’s Ethics, and another was Francesco 
Barbaro’s De re uxoria, which had been published only in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
64Paoli, Arte e committenza, 105. 
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1416.65 Finally, although Gherardi’s library contained very 
few works written in Italian, there were two codici of the 
works of Dante.66 
 Why the Lucchese were attracted to Dante’s political 
thought is that is provided a large role for an imperial 
presence in Italy, a presence designed (in Dante’s mind) to 
provide Christendom with a single authority over temporal 
matters. Lucca desired this same active involvement in 
Italian affairs on the part of the Holy Roman Emperor, but 
in order to bring about a general balance of power situation 
in Italy. Lucchese fear of Florentine expansion made them 
always welcome another superpower into Italy to disrupt, 
deter, or distract Florentine plans for expansion in 
Tuscany, as has been seen in their relations with the Duke 
of Milan and King Ladislas of Naples. Thus, Dante believed 
an imperial monarch was essential in order to keep an eye on 
                                                          
65Paolo’s secretary Guido Manfredi was corresponding with 
Francesco Barbaro around this time when the latter was in 
Venice, and he may have had some connection to Gherardi’s 
attaining this work on ‘Wifely Duties;’ see Carteggio di 
Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 1075, p. 199. 
 
66Gherardi would perhaps have been the most inclined of the 
four under discussion to harbor a belief that Latin was a 
superior medium of communication to Italian, as he was an 
instructor of Latin for the commune of Lucca. See Paolo 
Barsanti, Il pubblico insegnamento in Lucca del XIV alla 
fine del secolo XVIII (Lucca: Alberto Marchi, 1905. Reprint, 
Bologna: Arnaldo Forni 1980), 115-16. 
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the papacy; the Lucchese believed it was necessary to help 
keep watch over the Florentines. 
 Dante’s politics are best viewed in his De monarchia 
(c.1312), a work that despite being banned by the Church was 
widely known by the beginning of the fifteenth century as it 
had been frequently used as a basis of debate over papal-
imperial relations.67 Thus, despite the Inferno’s graphic 
descriptions of the horrors of a Hell into which many 
churchmen had been thrust by Dante, it received nothing like 
the ecclesiastical censure that the De monarchia did. This 
explains why the Lucchese as well as everyone else did not 
have the work in their libraries -- or at least in their 
inventories of their libraries.68 Regardless, one may be 
                                                          
67Dante’s De monarchia became widely known after it was 
used, along with other anti-papal texts, in the struggle 
over the accesion of Ludwig of Bavaria in 1328, according to 
Boccaccio. See Caesar, Dante, 3. The work came under 
ecclesiatical censure and was burned in 1329 as a heretical 
work (as it stood until 1881) by the Cardinal of Poggetto. 
From 1327-34, the Dominican Guido Vernani da Rimini wrote a 
series of influential treatises against Dante, most notably 
his De reprobatione monarchie composite a Dante Aligheri 
florentino. See Gioacchino Paparelli, “Dante e il Trecento,” 
in Dante nel Pensiero e nella Esiges dei Secoli XIV e XV 
(Florence: Leo Olschki, 1975), 46.  
  
68The vagueness of Sercambi’s inventory suggests there is a 
possibility he might have owned a copy of De monarchia. In 
the inventory of his books printed in Novelle, Sinicropi, 
ed., p. 762, n.1, which is a word-for-word transcription 
from the “Atti civile del Podestà di Lucca” of the year 
1426, in A.S.L., n. 1038, c. 52-53, the segment concerning 
Dante’s books reads: “Un testo di Dante in carta montonina;  
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sure that many of the members of Paolo Guinigi’s inner court 
were quite well-informed of the ideas put forth in the De 
monarchia -- whether they had it in their libraries or not.  
 The politics of Dante in early fifteenth century Italy 
was thus an old world politics. Derived at a time when 
universal, authoritative, interfering, external institutions 
such as empire and papacy were assumed to be more or less 
true, by the Quattrocento the system of Dante was no longer 
useful for the larger, expansionistic city-states. Milan, 
Florence, and Venice now perceived a strong emperor in Italy 
no longer as a check to papal authority, but rather as a 
threat to their own efforts at expansion. Those that still 
clung to the Dantean system, such as Lucca, did so because 
it had provided them a greater measure of security in the 
past -- and they hoped that it would again at some point in 
the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Una comedia di Dante del Paradiso; Uno comedia di Dante 
disposto, colle coverte bianche, cioè il Purgatorio.” It is 
very clear what texts are referred to in the last two 
citations; the initial entry is the source of confusion. 
What makes it less likely, however, that Sercambi had De 
monarchia is that from the first half of the fourteenth 
century, no manuscripts of the work have survived, and only 
eight manuscript copies from the years 1350-1400 have 
survived. See Caesar, Dante, 3. 
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    FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE LATER GUINIGI YEARS 
 
      The Rivalry With Florence 
 The period from 1390-1454 was one of the most violent 
periods in Italian history. From the beginning of the final 
conflict between Florence and Milan in 1390 to the Peace of 
Lodi in 1454, the peninsula was subject to almost incessant 
warfare. The Lucchese chronicler Sercambi noted that in 
1421-1422, all of Christendom was filled with armed bands: 
Pope Martin V was opposed to Queen Joanna of Naples, the 
condottiere Pandolfus Malatesta aiding the former, while 
Braccio da Montone was in the service of the latter;1 also, 
Florence and Milan were at war again, this time with Milan 
being led by the son of Giangaleazzo, Filippo Maria 
Visconti; finally, Sercambi noted that Charles, the son of 
                                                          
1The Guinigi years coincide with the age of the Italian-born 
condottieri; for this period in which the mercenaries became 
important in the overall scheme of Italian politics, see 
Geoffrey Trease, The Condottieri: Soldiers of Fortune (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971); also see Michael 
Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in 
Renaissance Italy (London: Bodley Head, 1974). 
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the King of France, was also now in Italy at the head of an 
army.2  
 As for Lucca, much of the history of the Guinigi period 
can be explained by the attempt to escape such violence and 
especially by its rivalry with Florence. Lucchese foreign 
policy at this time was dominated by the attempt to avoid 
coming under attack by Florence by means of the enlistment 
of powerful alliances who were also rivals of the Arno city. 
That Lucca was able to preserve its independence throughout 
the period of Paolo Guinigi, a time which coincides with 
this most violent phase of Italian history, should be 
considered a remarkable feat (Lucca remained an independent 
city from 1369 until the Napoleanic era).  
 How it was able to do so was due to a combination of 
factors, not the least important of which was the continued 
success of the isolationist policy that Paolo and his 
counselors had adopted from the beginning of the regime. 
Paolo Guinigi, where he lacked in military skills, made up 
for it in the art of diplomacy. He aggressively sought 
alliances with the greatest of the superpowers when he 
needed a source of protection, and he mastered the art of 
the delay-tactic when pushed into a corner himself. Such was 
                                                          
2Giovanni Sercambi, Le Croniche Lucchesi, ed. Salvatore 
Bongi, 3 vols., in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (Lucca: 
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the fortune for those who held deeds to the small and 
medium-sized Italian cities in the age of the rise of 
regional states. 
 Also contributing to Paolo’s success in keeping Lucca 
an independent entity was that elsewhere in Italy there was 
such a general state of confusion that the Florentines (and 
others) from 1400-1430 tended to be distracted from any 
enterprise concerning Lucca; even though there were always 
some war-mongers in Florence who coveted possession of 
Lucca, and even though there were some occasions in which 
Lucchese borderlands came under assault by Florentine arms 
it may be said that, in general, the Florentines had more 
pressing concerns than Lucca until the very end of Paolo’s 
reign. From 1400-1402 the major concern of Florence of 
course was the Duke of Milan. After his death in 1402, the 
Florentines became interested first and foremost in the 
pursuit of Pisa.3 Florentine merchants had lost much 
business during the Visconti wars because Florence lacked a 
port; when the Duke died, one of their first and clearest 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Giusti, 1892), 3: 295-96. 
3See Michael Mallett, “Pisa and Florence in the Fifteenth 
Century: Aspects of the Period of the First Florentine 
Domination,” in Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in 
Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968): 403-41. 
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objectives was to seize Pisa and its port and remove this 
problem. 
 Taking Pisa would not be easy for Florence, however, 
and it was brought about only in 1406 after much effort and 
expense. During this time, the Florentines maintained 
friendly relations with Lucca so that their seizure of Pisa 
would be made easier, as they needed access through Lucchese 
territories for their armies, diplomats, messengers, and 
other officials. Moreover, the Florentine government 
underestimated the reactions that their capture of Pisa in 
1406 would stir up all around Europe, as many cities were at 
once opposed to the new status of Florence as a sea power.4 
France and the Italian city-state of Genoa were especially 
resistant to the Florentine presence in Pisa, and several 
conflicts broke out between them and Florence in the decade  
after 1406 as a result. Ladislas of Naples entered into an 
alliance with Genoa in 1409, and as a result Florence was 
again faced with the prospect of war against the Neapolitan 
king. Ladislas’ formal alliance with Paolo Guinigi, in 
                                                          
4Mallett, in “Pisa and Florence,” 403, claims the possession 
of Pisa allowed for “much of the political, economic and 
cultural prestige which accrued to Florence during the 
course of the fifteenth century;” James Hankins stated that 
in 1406, Florence was more powerful than ever before in its 
history, see his “Rhetoric, history, and ideology: the civic 
panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni,” in Renaissance Civic 
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addition, was another deterrent to any Florentine ambitions 
in Lucca. 
 The initial disputes between Florence and Genoa which 
resulted from the Florentine takeover of Pisa took place in 
1411; at the beginning, the primary issue was control over 
the city of Livorno, a city some twenty miles south of Pisa. 
Florence wanted control of Livorno as it was believed 
essential to their continued hold and protection over Pisa; 
Genoa, on the other hand, desired Livorno in order to be 
able to better shore up their hegemony over maritime trade 
in the Tyrrhenian.5 Largely because Florence lacked a navy 
at this point, they were forced to negotiate with the 
Genoese over the issue of Livorno.6 A middle ground was 
chosen as the site for the negotiations to take place at 
Pietrasanta in Lucchese territory, and Paolo Guinigi was 
chosen as the mediator in these talks.7   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. James Hankins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 145. 
5Gene Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 340-42. 
 
6Sercambi noted that in this “guerra mortale” between 
Florence and Genoa, the Genoese warships shut off the 
Tyrrhenian to Florence, so that none of their provisions 
could reach Florence and their merchants again had no place 
from which to ship and receive goods, Le Croniche, 3: 200-
01. 
 
7Domenico Corsi, “La pace di Lucca del 27 Aprile tra i 
communi di Genova e di Firenze.” Atti dell’ Accademia 
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 Paolo reluctantly agreed to act as mediator; at the 
first proceedings in 1411, Sercambi claimed that Paolo gave 
gifts to both sides on a daily basis, probably in an attempt 
to avert hard feelings as much as possible for any important 
decisions that had to be made later by the mediator.8  
Nothing solid came out of these initial talks, but the two 
sides continued to meet in 1412 at Pietrasanta, Paolo 
continuing to monitor and mediate the proceedings. Finally, 
in 1413, when a settlement was finally reached, a letter 
from Paolo to the Doge of Genoa reveals the Signore of 
Lucca’s desire to end the talks (and the whole affair) as 
quickly as possible; in the letter Paolo wrote that despite 
the fact that Florentine aims have to be questioned, it was 
necessary to accept the peace terms as they were in order to 
not disrupt the present state of peace.9 Thus, again it may 
be seen the Guinigi way of governing was not to be so 
concerned with the “forma statutorum,” but can be 
characterized as dealing with problems in a more pragmatic 
fashion. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lucchese di Scienze, Lettere, ed Arti, n.s. 11 (1961): 91-
138. 
 
8Le Croniche, 3: 189-90. 
 
9A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 37, p. 73. 
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 Two other incidents around this time also show that 
Paolo held true to his isolationist policy in the latter 
part of his reign just as he had in the beginning years.  
When war broke out between Venice and the Holy Roman Emperor 
Sigismund in 1412, Sigismund wrote to Paolo threatening 
exile from the Empire for anyone who did not persist in 
harming Venetians and their followers, and shutting off all 
passages so that their soldiers and provisions could not 
pass through. Paolo responded by respectfully protesting the 
emperor’s order, claiming the Venetians had been friends of 
the Lucchese for generations, and thus he could not obey the 
mandates.10   
 In the second incident, the Venetians became involved 
in another dispute in June 1415, this time with Genoa, and 
the two rivals decided to name Paolo Guinigi as the third 
mediator in their case. The Signore of Lucca had apparently 
learned from his experience as mediator earlier between 
Florence and Genoa: this time he refused, saying he could 
not intervene in such disputes, if not by law, then on the 
advice he had received.11 Paolo did everything he could to 
                                                          
10Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, in Regesti del R. Archivio di 
Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi and Eugenio Lazzareschi, Vol. 
III, pt. I (Lucca: Giusti, 1925), regesto n. 823, p. 306-07. 
 
11Ibid., regesto n. 235, p. 54. 
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avoid situations such as these in which he was required to 
take a side in a conflict, and if given a chance would 
refuse or back away from the task in order to not risk 
coming into future opposition; acting as mediator between 
two other city-states would have been a no-win situation for 
Paolo with not much to possibly gain, but a great deal to be 
potentially lost. It did not take him long to realize that. 
 After the death of King Ladislas in 1414, who had been 
the major ally of Paolo, Lucca was as susceptible to 
invasion as it had been at any point thus far in Paolo’s 
reign. The son of Giangaleazzo, Filippo Maria Visconti, now 
Duke of Milan himself, had just started to consolidate power 
in Milan at the time of the death of Ladislas. Though in the 
1420s Lucca would again come to benefit from an alliance 
with a powerful lord of Milan, Filippo had not yet reached 
that stage, and thus could not have been of much assistance 
to Lucca had Florence decided on a full-scale attack at this 
point. But again, Lucca benefitted from the fact that after 
Ladislas’ death, the Florentines had become distracted from 
Lucca (and this time, from everything else of a foreign 
nature as well). In response to the growing financial 
concerns that had resulted from their protracted war efforts 
against Giangaleazzo and Ladislas in the previous decade, 
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Florentine governors after the death of Ladislas desired to 
embark on a period of isolationism themselves.12   
    The Braccio Affair 
 Yet, Lucca did not come out of this dangerous period   
totally unscathed. One Florentine attack must be mentioned 
because of the major consequences that it had in Lucca for 
the rest of the Guinigi period. In June 1418, Lucca was 
invaded by the troops belonging to the noted condottiere 
Braccio da Montone, who was almost certainly acting on the 
instigation of Florence.13 The Lucchese believed that the 
Florentines had put him up to it, and they received reports 
from several other places that that was the case.14 The fact 
that the Florentines denied any involvement in regard to 
                                                          
12Anthony Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early 
Renaissance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 1-7; also see Brucker, Civic World, 194-208. It might 
be noted that when Florence re-emerged from this decade or 
so of relative isolation from foreign affairs that the 
Visconti of Milan were again a formidable power in Italian 
politics, and a power that would hold the attention of 
Florence for much of the decade of the 1420s, thus 
diminishing the importance Florence might have placed on 
gaining control of Lucca. 
 
13See the description of Braccio da Montone in Trease, The 
Condottieri, esp. 190-91, 202-31. 
 
14For example, Paolo received a letter dated 28 August 1418 
from Bonfiglio de Bonfigli in Fermo stating that it was 
being said there in Fermo that Braccio had gone to Lucca at 
the petition of the Florentines; Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, 
regesto n.1368, p. 435-36. 
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Braccio’s invasion of Lucca probably shows more than 
anything they were going out of their way to convince their 
own still peace-hungry citizens that they were not involved 
in another costly war effort. It was not unusual for an 
Italian city-state at this time to free up a condottiere 
from further “official” service under that government, allow 
him to then become something of a “free agent” condottiere, 
then re-hire him secretly, thus relieving the regime in 
power from being held responsible for his actions; this is 
probably what happened in this case. 
 Though Lucca had been suspicious of Braccio since at 
least 1413, when Lucchese agents and spies first started 
tracking his movements, the attack that came in late June 
1418 apparently achieved a complete surprise. Paolo was not 
even in Lucca, having gone to stay in Pietrasanta and 
leaving his secretary Guido Manfredi in power while he was 
away. The first mention of Braccio in relation to this 
invasion of June 1418 in either the official correspondence 
of Paolo or of his secretary Guido was a letter dated 28 
June 1418 written to Paolo from Girolamo Trenta, who at the 
time was in Florence. In the letter, Trenta reveals with 
sadness that he heard while in Florence that Braccio was now 
near Siena with 3,000 men of war and was heading toward 
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Lucca.15  The next day preparations were made in Lucca to 
defend the important places in the countryside such as 
Pietrasanta, Motrone, and Massa. They did not matter much, 
however; on the following day, 30 June, Braccio entered 
Lucchese territory unimpeded.16 
 When he arrived, Braccio and his soldiers set up camp 
in the countryside, apparently near the town of Sasso, and 
immediately began to rob and pillage the surrounding lands.  
They also stole farm animals, grain, and other valuables.17  
Braccio was only diverted from doing further damage to 
Lucchese lands after being paid off by Paolo a sum of 25,000 
florins, a huge sum that would have been approximate to how 
much Lucca spent on the hiring of mercenaries for an entire 
year. It is evident from the meetings of the Council of Two 
Hundred in Florence in the summer months of 1418 that the 
Florentines had become very hostile toward Lucca; the cause 
                                                          
15Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 1221, p. 406, 
“Questa ora ci è nuove ciertissime [sic] a dì 27 del mese 
prezente, a notte, Braccio dal Montone giunse a Siena con 
chavagli III m. e passò più qua circha miglia quatro, et ae 
qui scritto che a dirittura viene a-fferire a-lLucca [sic]; 
della qual cosa n’ ò avuto et ò tanto dolore, che ne crepo, 
veduto quanto inconveniente ne puote incorrere.” 
 
16Ibid., regesto n. 1224, p. 406. 
 
17Franca Leverotti, in Popolazione, famiglie, insediamento: 
Le Sei Miglia Lucchesi nel XIV e XV Secolo (Pisa: Pacini, 
1992), 76, writes that there were 30,000 staia of grain 
removed from Lucca by Braccio’s men in 1418. 
              278
of this sudden hostility, as is that of Braccio’s invasion, 
is not entirely clear. Sercambi wrote that Braccio attacked 
Lucca despite the fact that Paolo had done nothing to offend 
him.18 
 After Braccio had begun his land devastations in 
Lucchese territory, an embassy led by Jacobus de Vivianis 
and Leonardus de Massa was sent to Florence by Paolo; upon 
arriving, however, the Lucchese agents found that the 
Council of Two Hundred had been discussing what to do 
concerning Lucca and Paolo Guinigi. Leonardus was not 
optimistic; he claimed in an early letter back to Lucca that 
nothing had been decided as of yet, but that if it were not 
for the restraint of some good men, things would proceed 
badly for Lucca. His letter implies also there were definite 
relations with the Florentines and Braccio.19   
 On 9 July, Leonardus wrote to Paolo in Lucca that every 
day in Florence there were displeasing words to hear about 
you, even though the meetings of the Council of Two Hundred 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
18Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 236-39. 
 
19Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 1238, p. 411, “In 
tanto che, se non fusse il freno de’ buoni, le cose 
procederanno male. Et li cancellieri et li altri amici di 
B[raccio], che sono qui in nostro danno, sollecitano loro 
amici. Preterea, questa sera a le xxiij hore, ebbi da uno 
de’ vostri che quell’ ora si era vinto, che ambasciatori si 
mandasseno a B[raccio].” 
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were being held in secret. The fact that he wrote another 
letter to Paolo on the same day reveals the urgency of the 
situation, and the desire of Lucca to have the latest 
information from their agents; in the second letter, Paolo 
was informed that the members of the Two Hundred were not 
allowed to speak under penalty of death, and as a result it 
was difficult to get reliable information about Florentine 
intentions concerning Lucca. Moreover, Leonardus informed 
Paolo, all those Lucchese citizens now in Florence were 
being looked at with “great suspicion.”20  
 Hard feelings continued throughout the summer of 1418.  
Paolo received various warnings from around Tuscany of the 
suddenly militant aims of the Florentines toward Lucca. In 
August, the Lucchese vicar in Collodi informed Paolo that 
the Florentine Priors were commanding troops in the 
Valdinievole near Lucca, and that some believed they were 
doing so in order that they could attach onto the larger 
Florentine army in the Garfagnana; the vicar advised Paolo 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
20Ibid., regesto n. 1245, p. 413, “Per altra questa mattina 
vi scripsi, ora per questo vi significo che il Consiglio de 
.cc. con più di .c. richiesti entrò questa mattina in 
Consiglio alle xii hore et stettevi in sino a circa xviii. 
Di loro consigliare et deliberare da persona nulla si può 
avere nè sentire, excusandosi tucti che è pena la testa. Per 
la qual cagione noi tucti lucchesi, che siamo qui ne viviamo 
in gran sospecto et malinconia.” 
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to remove himself along with his children to a safer place 
as this would call for a march through Lucchese territory.21 
In this same month, Jacopo da Carrara wrote to Guido 
Manfredi from Florence that all the citizens there were 
displeased with Paolo. Giovanni Turchi, another Lucchese 
represenative dispatched to Florence in the days after the 
invasion of Braccio, sent back news to Lucca that the 
Florentine governors were very suspicious of Paolo, and that 
they say that it is necessary for him to choose sides, or 
else lose his state.22 
 The reason that the Braccio affair was so significant 
for the future of Lucca was that it exposed Paolo’s long-
time secretary Guido Manfredi as guilty of treason. Since 
Paolo was at Pietrasanta when the brigades of Braccio 
arrived in Lucca, Guido had been left in control of the 
city. Guido had long ties with Florence, dating to his 
friendship with Coluccio Salutati; he had been sent to 
Florence as head of several embassies, both during the late 
years of the republic and in the reign of Paolo. His crime  
                                                          
21Ibid., regesto n. 1287, p. 422. 
 
22Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, Cancelliere della Repubblica 
di Lucca, Segretario della Signoria di Paolo Guinigi, in 
Regesti del R. Archivio di Stato di Lucca, ed. Luigi Fumi, 
Vol. III, pt. ii (Pescia: Benedetti, 1933), regesto n. 165, 
p. 30-31. 
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was in having knowledge of the imminent raid by Braccio 
through Lucchese territory, but not revealing it to Paolo. 
There has been no satisfactory explanation given as to why 
Guido would have taken such action, other than it being 
possibly a financial decision.23 
 The crime was not detected at first, and in fact Guido 
remained in place as the beloved secretary of the Signore 
for more than two years afterward. Toward the end of 1420, 
however, Paolo had at last become suspicious of Guido’s past 
acts, and apparently Guido noticed Paolo’s suspicion  
because he departed suddenly for Florence without informing 
anyone in November 1420. His flight, of course, only served 
to heighten suspicion of his earlier compliance with the 
Florentines. This led Paolo to sentence his secretary and 
friend to eternal exile at Foligno, a town that Paolo had 
close ties with through a recent marriage alliance. The bond 
of friendship was highly regarded in Lucca, as may be seen 
from almost every page of Sercambi’s Chronicle, but even 
friendship had to be subordinated to the welfare of the 
state in Renaissance Lucca.   
                                                          
23Franca Ragone has suggested that Guido was upset over the 
“scarsa remuneratività della collaborazione prestata al 
signore...” see her “Paolo Guinigi, i suoi collaboratori, i 
suoi nemici: l’ emergere di nuovi ruoli politici in una 
corte toscana del Quattrocento,” Momus 1 (1994), 21-22. 
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 After the plague spread to Foligno, Guido was allowed 
to have his sentence moved to Siena; it was at Siena where 
he began to derive his devious plan to lead an actual  
military attack on Lucca and oust Paolo from power.24 At 
Siena, Guido began to plan Paolo’s downfall with Forese 
Sacchetti and another Lucchese citizen residing inside 
Lucca, Giovanni Turchi.25 Guido broke the terms of his exile 
soon after this by departing Siena for Florence without 
permission, which resulted in Paolo’s order for the 
confiscation of his possessions.   
 After the summer of turmoil of 1418, relations with the 
Florentines actually improved for the next several months.26 
In 1419, several attempts were made on the part of 
                                                          
24Ibid., 20. 
 
25Paolo later said the crime of Turchi, because it was 
carried out from the inside (of Lucca) was worse than that 
of Guido’s, see Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 636, 
p. 116-17; Turchi was also sentenced by Paolo to exile, and 
all of his goods in Lucca were confiscated. 
 
26It should be pointed out that no matter what Paolo’s 
relations were with the government of Florence at any 
particular time, he always maintained a small number of 
friendships with private citizens; Niccolò da Uzzano and 
Baccio Valori were especially close to Paolo in the latter 
years of his regime, as both were ex-gonfalonieri in Lucca. 
Also, the Guinigi had cordial relations with various members 
of the Strozzi family, Palla Strozzi, for example, was 
invited to the baptism of Paolo’s daughter Filippa, who was 
born in April 1420. Paolo was also on friendly terms with 
Matteo Castellani and Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi. 
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Florentine leaders to build better relations with Lucca; 
they requested, for example, that Paolo send his son 
Ladislas and his secretary Guido Manfredi as distinguished 
guests to Florence for the festival of S. Giovanni.27 In 
September 1419, there was even an invitation made to Paolo 
to come to Florence and receive an honorary Florentine 
citizenship.28 What is interesting is that there was no 
apparent cause for the change of heart in Florence. No 
agreement had been reached, nor had any event occurred which 
should have induced them to feel more brotherly toward their 
neighbor Lucca. 
 Much of what appears to be improved relations in this 
case can be dismissed as rhetoric, or statesmanship. In 
reality, the Florentines became more cordial toward Lucca 
after 1418 only because it was precisely at that time that 
Filippo Maria Visconti was beginning to appear to have an 
interest in returning to Tuscany to take up where his father 
had left off. Florence became more friendly to Lucca in 1419 
so that the Lucchese in desperation would not decide to 
                                                          
27Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 242-43, states that Guido and 
Lazzaro stayed nine days in Florence, went to the festival, 
saw Pope Martin V and the Florentine Priors, and received 
honors and gifts. 
 
28Carteggio di Guido Manfredi, regesto n. 618, p. 114-15. 
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throw their support to Filippo Maria. It did not, however, 
work out as planned for the Florentines in this case. 
 The Lucchese had actually begun to attempt to establish 
cordial relations with Filippo Maria soon after King 
Ladislas’ death in 1414, sending letters to Milan filled 
with “verbosa retorica” about how glad they were to see him 
coming to power.29 In a letter of September 1414, Paolo 
congratulated Filippo Maria for his taking of the city of 
Laudensis.30 Similar letters were sent from Lucca to Filippo 
over the course of the next months as the Milanese lord 
captured various Lombard towns. The letters as a whole can 
be characterized as expressions of happiness that the 
Signore of Milan was regaining many of those lands and 
powers that his father once had.31 
                                                          
29Giuliano Lucarelli, I Visconti di Milano e Lucca (Lucca: 
Maria Pacini Fazzi, 1984), 123-24.  For Filippo’s 
consolidation of power in Milan, see Nino Valeri, L’ Italia 
nell’ Età dei Principati: dal 1343-1516 (Verona: Arnaldo 
Mondadori, 1949), 375-403. 
 
30A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 86, p. 171, 
“Illustrissime princeps et magnifico domine, protector 
homine. Receptis letteris excellentie vostre super 
recuperatione Civitatis Laudensis gratias ingentes habeo 
Celsitudini prelibate quod tam paterne tam dulciter dignata 
sit devotioni mee successus suos et felicitate votivam suis 
litteris intimare.” 
 
31See, for example, A.S.L., Governo di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, 
c. 93v., p. 186;  n.6, c. 125v., p. 252; n. 6, c. 132, p. 
266. 
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 A serious problem arose for Lucca, however, with the 
peace established between Florence and Milan in 1420, for 
the agreement called for the two superpowers to abide by the 
terms of a previous treaty in which both parties were 
involved, the Treaty of Sarzana of 1353. What this treaty 
stipulated was that, in essence, Florence was not to become 
involved in the affairs of Lombardy, while Milan was not to 
interfere in Tuscan affairs. This policy of non-intervention 
in the region of the other superpower, moreover, was 
reaffirmed in the 1428 Treaty of Ferrara. These treaties 
have been seen by some scholars as the reason Paolo’s regime 
eventually collapsed; without the protection of the lord of 
Milan, it was only going to be a matter of time before the 
Florentines did see a suitable time to lay siege on Lucca. 
 Into this situation the Lucchese were thus thrust 
during the last decade of Paolo’s rule. By 1422, Lucca 
entered a league headed by Florence and Venice which was 
designed above all else to oppose the Visconti, although 
Paolo entered the league very reluctantly, and under 
pressure from the other parties. It might be assumed that 
since Paolo was not afforded the luxury of the protection in 
the figure of the Duke of Milan that he would have been 
happy to receive it from elsewhere, but that was not the 
case; this shows his true fear of Florence. Involvement in a 
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league, especially in a league with Florence, could be 
burdensome, as the Lucchese knew from experience. Paolo knew 
membership in the league would likely draw the eventual ire 
of the Duke of Milan, and he knew that leagues often 
required soldiers or money for military efforts out of one’s 
own homeland, a luxury he could not afford. 
 During the period of the alliance with Florence and 
Venice, the Signore of Lucca often reverted to the use of 
delay-tactics when asked by another member of the league for 
assistance; on other occasions, Paolo refused altogether to 
abide by the terms of the league to provide mutual support 
to one another. In September 1423, for instance, Lucca was 
asked by fellow league-members Florence and Siena to supply 
troops for a certain military effort, but Paolo refused, 
claiming that he had not a sufficient number of forces to 
contribute, although he did say he would be willing to pay 
for a number of soldiers (for a short period of time).32 In 
August 1425, Paolo refused again to send requested help to 
the Florentines, despite it being part of their 
responsibility to do so, according to the terms of the 
league; this time, the tone of Paolo’s letter in response to 
the Florentine request bordered on being belligerent. He 
                                                          
32Sercambi, Le Croniche, 3: 372-73. 
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claimed that they should not be surprised he is not 
consenting to their request for troops since he was busy 
gathering troops at that very time for the defense of his 
own state.33   
 It is apparent from the documents that despite having 
enacted a five-year league with Florence in 1422, and 
despite thus being theoretically at war against Milan in 
this period, the Lucchese in reality still favored an 
alliance with Milan to that of Florence. Though Florence and 
Milan had agreed to peace in 1420, it was not long before 
their settlement began to be questioned,34 and indeed not 
long before war between the two resumed, this time to last 
from 1422-1427. It was also not long once the war resumed 
before Paolo Guinigi started trying to secretly rebuild the 
ancient Lucchese tie to the Visconti.  
The End of the Regime 
 It is often claimed in Lucchese historiography that 
another factor in Paolo Guinigi’s increasingly tenuous hold 
on power in Lucca during the last decade of the Signoria was 
that most of that older generation of individuals who had 
helped him attain power in 1400 were now gone. The loss of 
                                                          
33Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, n. 6, c. 193v., p. 388. 
 
 33When Milan seized Genoa in 1421, this led many in Tuscany 
to believe that further expansion would soon be attempted 
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his prestigious secretary Guido Manfredi to exile in 1422, 
and the death of the state propagandist Sercambi in 1424, 
for example, are held as part of the reason that Paolo’s 
control in Lucca gradually slipped away from him toward the 
end of the regime. It may be, however, that the ambitions of 
the generation behind Paolo did as much or more to bring 
about his fall from power as did the disappearance of the 
generation in front of him. 
 In 1425, Paolo’s oldest son Ladislas, now twenty-one 
years old, had taken it upon himself to set out and make his 
own fortune. He determined that at that stage of his life 
the best thing for him to do was to give himself over to 
military pursuits. Despite Paolo having given Ladislas a 
humanistic education, he decided to take up a life of 
fighting, from which his father was unable to make him 
withdraw. This, at least, was Paolo’s story to Florence and 
Venice. 
 What happened in actuality was that earlier that year 
(1425), either Filippo Maria requested from Paolo that he 
send his son to Milan in order to head a band of Visconti 
knights and Paolo bowed to his wishes, or Paolo sent his son 
willingly into the service of the Duke. The former scenario 
is the more likely, because it would have been out of 
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Paolo’s character to risk opposition in this manner, 
especially opposition in Florence and Venice. However it 
came about, Ladislas did enter the service of the Duke of 
Milan in 1425, and Florence and Venice as a result were 
visibly upset over the matter. The five-year league Lucca 
had signed with Florence in 1422 was still intact -- at 
least until now; Florence and Venice now felt strongly that 
Paolo had betrayed the league. 
 On 27 October 1425, the Balìa of Ten in Florence sent a 
letter to Paolo informing him they were aware he had sent 
his son to serve Milan, and they hoped that he would be able 
to deny such news.35 The Venetians complained to Paolo as 
well over the same matter.36 While the war between Milan and 
Florence continued, the Lucchese would be relatively safe, 
as they would again benefit from Florentine attention being 
held elsewhere. But the last Florentine-Visconti struggle 
was to end in 1427, at which point the Florentines, now 
                                                          
35Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 1514, p. 463. 
 
36Ibid., regesto n. 788, p. 140-41; in responding to these 
criticisms, Paolo tried to disassociate himself from the 
actions of his son, claiming that he could not persuade to 
him withdraw: “...omnia iura clamant quod pater pro filio 
non teneatur, et licet naturaliter unum et idem iure 
sanguinis pater et filius reputentur...Ipse enim Ladizlaus, 
etatis perfecte, disposuit rei militari operam dare a qua 
cum retrahere non valui;” See A.S.L., Governo di Paolo 
Guinigi, n. 6, c. 203v., p. 408; also see n. 6, c. 200v., p. 
402. 
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freed from the burden of foreign wars, began to plot how to 
remove Paolo once and for all; they wanted, according to 
George Holmes, to teach Lucca a lesson for the latest 
betrayal.37 In the end, the Florentines wanted to oust Paolo 
because he brought a measure of stability to Lucca because 
of his wealth and his family’s alliances -- not because they 
believed that he was repressive of the liberties of the 
Lucchese people (what they claimed). The Lucchese people 
were the least of their concerns. Paolo was able, at least 
until the end, to defend Lucca and its territories; this was 
the real basis for the Florentine disdain of the Lucchese 
Signore. 
 But in 1427, Paolo began to lose this ability to hold 
on to Lucchese lands; throughout 1427-28 Florence seized 
most of the towns in the eastern part of Lucchese territory.  
By 1429, the war-mongers again prevailed in Florentine 
councils, and Lucca itself came under direct attack, as 
sieges were put on both Lucca and its subject town of 
Montecarlo, led by the Florentine condottiere 
Fortebraccio.38 Paolo at this point had no choice but to 
                                                          
37Holmes, The Florentine Enlightenment, 1400-1450 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 70-71. 
 
38Michael E. Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494: The Reconstruction 
of an Italian City-Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
212. 
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openly appeal for help; not only did he ask for assistance 
from Filippo Maria, but also from Siena, Bologna, and other 
powers. When Paolo wrote to the Duke of Milan to ask for 
aid, he wanted to be given the services of the condottiere 
Piccinino, whose military skills he highly regarded; 
Piccinino, however, did not want to take part in the 
Lucchese affair, and was able to convince the Duke to not 
send him and his army to Lucca. Instead, Filippo Maria 
dispatched to Lucca another of his hired mercenaries, 
Francesco Sforza, with whom Paolo was not on good terms. 
 Paolo also was able to convince the Sienese during 1429 
that if they did not soon supply assistance, then it was 
more than likely that their city would be the next to fall 
to Florentine aggression. The Sienese gave the assignment of 
raising an army to Antonio Petrucci, who travelled to Rome 
and enlisted several Captains. Petrucci then led the 
Captains and their armies to Lucca by sea. When they arrived 
in February 1430 they found Lucca under siege, and they were 
able to provide needed, temporary relief in helping defend 
the city. Petrucci, seeing his forces were still not going 
to be sufficient to fully lift the siege that Fortebraccio 
had placed on Lucca, then proceeded to Milan to ask for 
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additional help from Filippo Maria.39 In April 1430, Paolo 
objected to one of the Captain’s that Petrucci had hired 
from Rome, and even began to refuse to pay him.40 To the 
end, the Signore of Lucca was concerned not only that he 
remain in power, but he defiantly continued to insist on 
some control over how he stayed in power. 
 Meanwhile, the troops of Francesco Sforza arrived in 
Lucca, and by July 1430, he was able to remove the siege 
placed on the city by Fortebraccio; not only was he able to 
quickly throw back the invaders, but soon had installed 
military fortifications in the fields against them (which 
had been constructed by the Florentines, but discarded in 
their flight from Lucca when Sforza arrived).41 As a result 
of his quick successes, however, Sforza began to demand that 
Paolo get his money ready.42 It is also likely that Sforza 
                                                          
39G. Pardi, “Notizie e documenti sulle relazioni tra Lucca e 
Siena.” Bullettino Senese di Storia Patria 5 (1973): 375-77. 
 
40On 21 April 1430, Petrucci wrote from Pietrasanta to 
Paolo’s son Ladislas that the refusal to pay for the 
services of the conestabile Sbardellato will bring shame and 
damage to the state of Lucca, Paolo, and Ladislas himself; 
Carteggio di Paolo Guinigi, regesto n. 1527, p. 470-71. 
 
41C.C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The 
‘De Militia’ of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961), 102-03. 
 
42Giovanni Cavalcanti, Istorie Fiorentine, ed. Guido di Pino 
(Milan: Aldo Martello, 1944), 189-91. 
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had become offended that Paolo earlier had preferred another 
man of war than himself. The Lucchese people in these last 
days began to question for the first time if Paolo, 
regardless of his intentions, still had the means to protect 
them from losing their independence. Clearly he was not as 
powerful as the condottiere Sforza had just proven himself 
to be; it may be argued that the Lucchese, again in total 
fear of losing their independence to Florentine aggression, 
simply reverted to what they perceived as giving them their 
best chance to retain self-rule in the long run.  
 Who the driving agents were behind the ouster of Paolo 
still remain vague, however. Michael Bratchel has provided 
three possible scenarios in trying to make sense of the last 
days of Paolo’s government: either Sforza bullied the 
Lucchese people to join with him and remove Paolo from 
power, he was under the hire of the Lucchese people who had 
suddenly turned against Paolo because he no longer seemed 
able to protect them, or that both parties were acting 
together and thus, both wanted the Lucchese Signore removed 
from power.43   
 In the end, Paolo was removed from power as the leading 
men of Lucca approached him at his palace in 1430, had him 
placed under arrest, and removed from the city to Milan, 
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where he was imprisoned until his death in 1432. It should 
be no surprise that the end of the regime came about as it 
did: Paolo was particular about how (and by whom) he wanted 
his city-state defended (and governed), and on this occasion 
he happened to offend the wrong person at precisely the time 
when other of his resources were running out, chiefly the 
support of the Lucchese people.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
43Bratchel, Lucca 1430-1494, 19. 
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 When Paolo Guinigi came to power in Lucca in November 
1400, he was a twenty-eight year old without much experience 
in public life in any area, much less in the governance of a 
city-state. Faced with a state of extreme emergency in Lucca 
at this time, Paolo was thrust into the office of Signore of 
Lucca by a group of conspiring, yet patriotic city fathers 
who believed that he offered them their best chance of 
remaining independent because of his wealth and his family’s 
previous ties. Not all Lucchese citizens were confident at 
the beginning that Paolo would be able to provide the city 
with capable leadership; many, in fact, were quite skeptical 
about it. It was something that he would have to prove to 
them over time, that his interests truly were the interests 
of Lucca, and that every effort would be made to preserve 
the status quo. 
 Certainly fate has hardly ever changed the course of 
one person’s life in such a short period as it did for Paolo 
Guinigi. At the beginning of the year 1400, Paolo was merely 
the fourth son of the “pater patriae” of Lucca, Francesco 
Guinigi, and was probably looking forward to at least a 
moderately successful political career (being a Guinigi) for 
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the Republic of Lucca; by the end of that same year he had 
suffered the deaths of his three older brothers and several 
other important family members, undergone a bout with the 
plague during the summer, survived a plot on his own life, 
been named as Captain and Defender of the People of Lucca, 
and subsequently as absolute Signore of Lucca. Paolo’s 
coming to power thus may be considered partly due to chance, 
but his hold on power for thirty years had nothing much at 
all to do with fate. 
 The Signoria of Paolo Guinigi must be considered as one 
of the highlights of Lucchese history if an era may be 
measured for what its leaders set out to do at the 
beginning. It was the ultimate goal of the Lucchese during 
this time to preserve their independence, and this was 
readily accomplished -- in an era, moreover, that was one of 
the most violent in modern history. During the last 
Florentine war with Milan under Giangaleazzo, Lucca did not, 
like Pisa, Perugia, Siena, Bologna, and many other cities, 
fall to Milan. Even more remarkably perhaps, Lucca was able 
to resist Florentine control during the entire reign of 
Paolo Guinigi.  
 Paolo Guinigi also should be considered a capable ruler 
in that he ruled Lucca at this time in its history in the 
only way that I believe a ruler could have ruled -- and 
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survived. On the one hand, he kept an eye on the interests 
of the people as a whole, not only of Lucca, but also those 
of the Lucchese contado. He was careful not to upset certain 
communal institutions and traditions, he went to pains to 
make sure the food supply was in order, and he gave tax 
breaks to newcomers and to communes that were in distress. 
Without doing these types of things, Paolo’s rule in Lucca 
would have been resisted from the beginning; his power 
rested on mutual consent, not on the sword.  
 On the other hand, he ruled in the only way possible 
that a Lucchese leader could have ruled at this time in 
terms of foreign policy. The days of expansion were long 
over for Lucca by the beginning of the fifteenth century; 
Paolo’s objective was merely to hold onto to that territory 
that was presently held. Much of Lucca’s foreign policy in 
the Guinigi period has in the past been wholly explained by 
its rivalry with Florence, but as we have seen, not all of 
it can be; there were occasions in which Paolo briefly took 
on alliances with Florence (1401-02, 1422-25). 
 Lucca’s foreign policy has been characterized as 
isolationist in this paper, that is, an attempt to do 
everything possible to stay out of entangling alliances. 
This was not possible, of course, during the first thirty 
years of the fifteenth century; Lucca’s frequent alliances 
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with Milan are a reflection of the constant fear of 
Florentine aggression. Yet, when forced into alliances, the 
Lucchese were very reluctant to fulfill their part of any 
agreement. Paolo often appealed to the weakness of Lucca, or 
the lack of necessary money or men in order to extricate 
himself from such responsibilities. Looked at from this 
perspective, the policies undertaken by the Guinigi Signoria 
appear not in the end to look like timid policies, but 
rather practical ones, and the only ones that were going to 
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